# AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Alliance Politics in a Century of War, 1914-2014

JAMES W. PETERSON

American Foreign Policy

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To the memory of my father Walter Ludwig Peterson, who was born in 1914, and,
To the memory of my mother Ellen Victoria Peterson, whose middle name is a symbol of the Age before the "world (was) suffocated."

Contents

1914

In bloody pandemonium the world is suffocated, the world is suffocated,
a roar is made, the step of the army sounds darkly …
You are quiet … You are not permitted to speak …
You are not permitted to breathe … You are not permitted to live …
Youthful blossom of Your Nation, youthful blossom of Your Nation
goes in the service of foreigners to die dishonorably,
goes to die dishonorably, goes to die dishonorably …
How is it with you, Czech Land?

Rudolf Medek (1890–1940), a general in the Czech Legion
that defected from the Austro-Hungarian army and fought in
Russia with their army during World War I
Translated by James W. Peterson

Acknowledgments

Introduction: 1914—An Abrupt End to a Century and a Quarter of Isolationism

Prior to 1914, the United States had followed a studied policy of isolationism since its founding in 1789. Famously, President George Washington had warned about the dangers of foreign involvement in his Farewell Address. This was ironic, for he had led the colonies to victory over England in a successful struggle to obtain independence. There was American global involvement sporadically in the course of the next 117 years, but there was no sustained involvement or substantial loss of life. Concerns about the Barbary states in 1804, the war with England in 1812, the struggle with Mexico in the 1840s, diplomacy with the English and French during the Civil War of the 1860s, the Spanish-American War, and building the Panama Canal were important but not really a violation of the isolationist posture. Such an approach to the global setting had the important side benefit of enabling a new nation to work through developmental problems at its own pace. Thus, the new nation and its leaders expanded the territorial base to the Pacific Ocean, dealt with the southern drive for independence through a bitter and tragic civil war, and established the basis for a strong industrial economy. In the early twentieth century, few anticipated that this luxury of time and internal preoccupation was about to end. However, it did end very abruptly, with the emergence early on of new categories of lethal weapons in the hand of armies engaged in warfare, with the rise of totalitarian dictatorships, with the later emergence of erratic rogue state leaders, and finally with the wide-ranging activities of hardcore terrorists who were intent on inflicting a severe blow to western culture and its sweeping global dominance.

It was indeed nearly a full century of war, even for a relatively young nation that had attempted to keep to itself for the first half of its history. Even though America avoided involvement in World War I for a full three years, the issue of its engagement was on the table from the beginning. The allied forces represented the nations from which American culture and its political system

had sprung. The link to the British was by now one of partnership rather than hostility. To the extent that the Central Powers largely represented pre-modern imperial systems, the involvement of the United States was destined if not a foregone conclusion. It is also true that the end of World War I technically gave way to fifteen years of peace in Asia before Japan moved into Manchuria and to two decades of peace in Europe before the signing of the Munich Pact and Hitler's subsequent move into the Sudeten regions of Czechoslovakia. However, the bridges to World War II began to appear piece by piece almost immediately. Western weakness was apparent in the decision by the United States to stay out of the League of Nations due to the breakdown of the Senate ratification process. Simultaneously, there was a preoccupation of many western nations with future avoidance of war rather than preparation to deter or contain nations that were bent on aggression and related challenges to any existing balance of power. In a sense the interlude between the two world wars was an actual warm-up for the next one and even a kind of invitation to the next generation of dictators.

What made alliance politics central to U.S. considerations and decisions during a century of war? First, in each of the four periods under review, American foreign policy leaders did not operate exclusively alone. What is interesting is the diversity that existed in the strength, depth, and extent of alliance support.

During the first period of global warfare, the United States essentially joined existing alliances that were struggling, and so the result was that American power eventually tipped the balance and catapulted the new arrival on the world politics into a position of unchallenged leadership by 1945. In both hot wars the allies were located both to the east and west of the central powers that basically constituted the enemy in both conflicts. Difficult battles took place on West European soil in the first war, and the loss of life for the Allies was very heavy due to the trench warfare at very close quarters. In the second war, the allies were basically under Nazi control and not able to guide their own military destiny, as they had in the first war. Only the United Kingdom remained free from occupation by the Germans, and so the link was really to one western ally during most of the conflict. The D-Day invasion of June 1944 changed that picture, but still there were not really existing allied armies

that could join the force that had entered France. In truth, America was doing battle on behalf of and in support of allies instead of arm in arm with them.

There was also an eastern front in both wars, and the nature of it differed considerably from one war to the next. During World War I, Russia hammered the Central Powers from the east, but they pulled back from the conflict after the new Bolshevik Regime in 1917 signed the Peace of Brest-Litovsk with Germany. Domestic politics, indeed a revolution, weakened the overall allied effort to establish a pincer movement that would force the collapse of the Central Powers in the middle. The Soviet withdrawal occurred near in time to the American involvement, and so that event partly compensated for the lost ally in the east. During the second global conflagration, the Soviet Union actually signed a peace agreement, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, with Germany in 1939, before the giant in the east had even entered the war. The German invasion of the Soviet Union two years later ended the Soviet respite and engaged them in a major way. They suffered more casualties than any other country that fought the war and played a key role in turning back the Nazi tide in places such as the Crimean Peninsula. However, their contributions were compromised by efforts to prepare the liberated areas such as Poland for the communist takeover in the late 1940s. However, they did march in from the east as the others did from the west and helped liberate key centers of fascist power in such places as eastern Czechoslovakia and the worst of the concentration camps in Auschwitz. Of course, the eastern front also included the battle against Japan and the liberation of the areas that it had conquered. In that struggle Stalin bided his time and only declared war the day after the use of atomic weaponry on Hiroshima and a few days before the end of the war. Thus, the Soviet Union was an ally of American power with mixed results along the entire extent of its eastern front.

During the second period under review, the Cold War, America welcomed allies in a global contest of wits that centered initially on a bipolar balance of power that included Moscow at one end and Washington at the other. Alliance loyalties were much stronger in the psychological battle with the Soviet Union than they were in the two regional hot wars on the continent of Asia. Western allies quickly formed NATO in 1949, and the Eisenhower administration established a number of regional pacts such as SEATO in

key, challenged areas of the globe. Soviet rhetoric and bombast was nearly apocalyptic at times, but so was the talk that emanated from the United States at various points in both Republican and Democratic administrations in the 1950s and 1960s. However, by the 1960s cracks appeared in what had been a generally unified western alliance under western leadership. France under DeGaulle attempted in the 1960s to locate a middle way between Moscow and Washington. Chancellor Brandt in West Germany a bit later made trips into Eastern Europe in an effort to heal the scars inflicted by previous historical tragedy, and all of this put pressure on America to respond. In the developing world, expected American allies such as democratic India helped forge a Non-Aligned Movement that changed the image of a united anti-communist or pro-democratic camp. However, these fissures in America's alliances did not seriously compromise allied efforts to build a wall that would contain Soviet power from future aggression. When the fear of nuclear expansion of Soviet power into the Western Hemisphere came to a head in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the alliance pulled together, as it would at various points when Soviet provocations occurred over the city of West Berlin.

America's involvement in the Korean and Southeast Asian conflicts taught a very different story about western solidarity. There was far less consensus on the applicability of a containment policy than they had been about its utility in Asia. From the American point of view, the attack of North Korean forces across the 38th parallel of latitude into South Korea represented the same kind of danger as would have a parallel Soviet thrust into a West European country. Equally important, China joined the Soviet Union in East Asia in a kind of common front against dangers emanating from the capitalist world. After the victory in 1949 by Mao and the communists in the Chinese Civil War, the two communist superpowers were very close for a full decade. In fact, in international communist conferences the Chinese often described Moscow as the sun in the communist universe with all the fellow communist regimes circulating as planets around it. All of that would change in the early 1960s, but at the time of the Korean War it made a powerful impression on the Truman administration. However, there was no alliance comparable to NATO in East Asia, and so the United States had to rely on a handful of Pacific-based allies. America had confronted Soviet personnel in the original push of forces, after

the Inchon Landings, back into North Korean territory. By the end of 1950, Mao unleashed 200,000 forces into the northern part of the peninsula, with the result that they drove the allies back across the 38th parallel. As a result, the United States and a handful of associated Asian nations achieved the outcome of protecting the national sovereignty of a new South Korean ally, but in the process they felt the sting of a powerful East Asian communist nexus of three nations.

A decade later in the mid-1960s the Johnson administration perceived a similar collusion among the North Vietnamese, Chinese, and Soviets in Southeast Asia. The surface parallels to Korea were striking, for in this case protection of South Vietnam against incursions from the North across the 17th parallel of latitude look much like Korea in 1950. Thus, the Tonkin Gulf attack became the trip wire event that prompted American involvement, much as the North Korean attack had in an earlier decade. South Korean military forces joined up with the Americans, perhaps in a payback for the help in their earlier effort against an Asian communist foe. A few other regional allies provided token forces, but the main western allies did not see it as their battle as they had not in Korea at an earlier time. Part of this reluctance was due to European preoccupation with its own economic and political recovery from the devastation of World War II. As the war dragged on for nearly a decade, and as atrocities such as the My Lai massacre received publicity, Europe's attitude often became one of sharp criticism of American purpose as well as the process by which it carried out the war. Both Asian and European allies breathed a sigh of relief, along with the American public, when the armistice was finally signed in January 1973. Of course the final outcome was quite different than that in Korea, for within two years North Vietnam took over the south and integrated the country into one whole. In the end, the parallel to Korea was not very accurate, for both China and the Soviet Union provided mainly supplies to the North Vietnamese. Further, China and Vietnam actually fought a brief war with each other after the American departure.

The third period of review entails the very new kinds of challenges to the United States and its allies after the end of the Cold War in 1989–1991 but prior to the terrorist attacks of 2001. Once again, the alliance patterns were entirely different from the previous period as well as the time of epic global warfare.

While the initial reaction within America was to take a deep breath, assume that the "end of history" had arrived, and to demobilize, lurking dangers soon made their presence felt. If the battle against communism was no longer a central concern, during the next decade protection of oil resources and issues of genocide did become central preoccupations.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait occurred in the year after the fall of communism in Central Europe and a little less than a year before the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the economic issues that it raised were classic post–Cold War ones. How would the West preserve its economic lifeline in coming decades of energy uncertainty? What kinds of new authoritarian leaders would feel more freedom extend their influence with the disappearance of the strictures of the Cold War? Were small states now much more vulnerable to aggressive neighbors with the elimination of a sort of balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States?

In the case of the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991, a strong, UN-supported alliance provided an answer to those three questions. There would be support for the use of military power if oil resources were threatened, if "Rogue Leaders" extended their scope too far, and if vulnerable states in strategic locations were severely jeopardized. The degree of allied support of a global nature was very high for the U.S.-led initiative to take "all means necessary" to dislodge the Iraqi army from Kuwait. The United Nations voted in favor of thirteen resolutions that were directed against Saddam's occupying force. What split the allies as well as the American Congress was the issue of what tactics constituted the proper "means" to bring about the desired result. A variety of nations put economic sanctions into place very quickly, but they did not produce a quick solution. There was a sharp division of opinion over the question of how long to wait for sanctions to work before military force was considered. In early 1991, force replaced sanctions, and the Iraqi army yielded in a relatively short time. The liberation of Kuwait became an illustration of what Americans had learned about defining a winnable conflict in a far more effective way than they had in Vietnam. Thereby, they regained the trust of both the American public and old allies.

In terms of the three critical questions raised above, the challenge from Serbia and Slobodan Milošević evoked the second and third. The implosion

of Yugoslavia in 1991 whetted the appetite of Serb leader Milošević, and throughout the decade he encroached upon several of smaller new nations that used to share the Yugoslav Federation with the Serbs. The basic rationale of the Serbian incursions was protection of Serb minorities in new countries in which they no longer enjoyed majority status, as they had in the old Yugoslavia. In that sense, their plight was similar to that of the new Russian minorities that now lived in post-Soviet nations such as Latvia or Ukraine. Thus, the Serbs from the truncated Yugoslavia engaged in a brief war in Slovenia with that objective in mind. The war in Croatia was more lengthy and bloody. In the end Croatian forces managed to push out the Serbian invaders, but the aftertaste was a bitter one.

It was the war in Bosnia that took the most lives and brought differences within the western alliance to the fore. In this case, Milošević teamed up with Bosnian Serb leaders such as President Radovan Karadžić in an effort not to only protect the Serb minority but also to extend its control over territory with the new state. In 1992–1995 they successfully, through military conquest, spread the Serbian dominance to 70% of the territory of the country. Members of the western alliance held back for a variety of unique reasons. Germany had traditionally had special linkages to the Croatians, while France held historical connections with the Serbs. Initially, President Bush was reluctant to do much due to a kind of longing for the old and larger Yugoslavia that had preserved a kind of neutrality during the Cold War. Soon after President Clinton took office, American intervention under UN sponsorship into Somalia had backfired in such a way that there was a subsequent wariness within the Clinton administration to another similar involvement. Finally, the butchery at Srebrenica in mid-1995 awakened the West to the futility of relying only on UN peacekeeping forces. The western alliance operated through a limited NATO bombing campaign that brought all parties to the peace table in Dayton, Ohio, in relatively short order.

The last piece of the puzzle in analyzing alliance dynamics with regard to rogue state leaders was the struggle over Kosovo, a largely Albanian republic of the shrunken Yugoslavia itself. Alliance activity was much quicker in this situation, probably because of guilt over the earlier slow response in Bosnia and the resulting very high casualty count. NATO military force was used to push

the Serb military out of Kosovo and back into what was still at that time the Serbian Republic. There was an interesting debate within the alliance about the potential need to inject ground forces, if air power proved insufficient to beat back the Serbian offensive. Unlike the Serbian invasion of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, this one was against a republic in its own country. Engagement of ground troops could raise international legal questions about a violation of the national sovereignty of Yugoslavia. In the end, there was no need to explore that question further, and the residual issues included dealing with accusations that the Kosovars had committed atrocities against the Serbs as they retreated back into their own republic.

The western alliance continued to play an engaged role in all of the settings following the defeat of the Rogue Leaders. For example, NATO created no-fly zones over the northern area of Iraq in which the Kurdish minority lived. They did the same in southern Iraq in order to protect the Shiite majority against attacks from Saddam and his associated Sunni groups. Following the Dayton Accord in 1995, NATO worked with the EU and the UN to help preserve a delicate balance among Muslims, Serbs, and Croatians. In December 2004, an EU force replaced NATO as the official peacekeepers in the fragile nation. Finally, NATO continued to play a protective role in Kosovo, a function that may have been even more important after the declaration of independence in Kosovo in February 2008. Of course, the declaration inflamed the Serbs and led to a division between countries that were willing to grant diplomatic recognition to the new nation and those that were not.

During the fourth period covered in this study, the threat of terrorism moved to center stage and became the focal point of American policy as well as that of the western allies. Convergence and divergence of views certainly characterized the relationship between the United States and its allies. Connections were very tight in the days immediately following the 9/11 attacks, remained supportive through the invasion of Afghanistan, nearly broke up over the decision to bring down Saddam's regime in Iraq, and dovetailed again in making the delicate decisions about responding to the turmoil of the Arab Spring.

All western allies and many in other continents moved quickly to support America and its citizens emotionally after the attacks in New York City and

Washington, D.C. As the United States worked to put together a plan to dislodge the Taliban that had protected Al Qaeda from power in Afghanistan, there was nearly unanimous support for the American position and moves. All in traditional alliances could relate to a country that had taken a direct attack on its homeland with the loss of about 3,000 lives. As America sought to establish military bases in surrounding countries, even President Putin in Russia understood the need to set up operations in two former Soviet Republics, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. In fact, the mission over more than a decade was shared between the United States and NATO, with the military alliance taking full control in the last few years. Many Partners for Peace (PfP) of the alliance offered troops and humanitarian missions as well. Fatigue and pressure for withdrawal was shared by all alliance partners after a decade of war, but it is hard to locate an American initiative that had more allied support since World War II.

In contrast, the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 probably ranks with Vietnam as the one with the least support among allies. There was no chance of obtaining UN support in the way that America did in the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991. At the same time, the support that NATO gave to both the Kosovo air campaign and to the invasion of Afghanistan was also lacking. As a result, President Bush and a few supportive leaders in the Azores just prior to the invasion leaned heavily on support from British prime minister Tony Blair, found more support from new NATO members and PfP supporters from the "new Europe," and stitched together a "Coalition of the Willing" in support of the operation. Of course, doubts principally centered on the American assumption that Iraq had something to do with the 9/11 attack, an unlikely possibility given the secular nature of Saddam's regime and the religious fanaticism of Al Qaeda. On the surface, the suspicion that nuclear weapons might be close to development in Iraq might have galvanized the allies. However, the proof of Iraq's progress on nuclear technology was always slim, in spite of his stonewalling tactics to UN inspectors. No doubt, all agreed that his record was abysmal, that his human rights abuses were grave, and that both Iraq and the region would be better off without him. However, there were other despots scattered throughout the world, and America was not considering a similar effort to depose them from power. As with the war in

Vietnam, an initially supportive but divided American public eventually lost faith in the cause. In spite of all of the turmoil over the war, a decade after its beginning, Iraq was governed by elected leaders, was free of American troops, and was in the process of rebuilding. That does not justify the war, but it is fair to report those facts as results of it.

Beginning in winter 2011, turmoil began to engulf the Arab World. Observers described the cross-regional events as the Arab Spring, the Arab Upheaval, or the Arab Uprising. The firecracker revolts unsettled all western countries and changed a number of traditional allies within the Arab World. Egypt became a more distant and difficult ally, but Libya after Gadhafi was potentially a nation with which the West would have easier communications. However, the key concerns of American foreign policy makers centered first on Libya and second on Syria. The Libyan Civil War preoccupied the West during much of 2011, and President Obama eventually persuaded NATO to inject a limited air operation to protect the opposition in the East or Banghazi area from the attacks by Gadhafi from his Tripoli base in the east. The operation was successful, and indigenous forces captured and executed the leader who symbolized the autocratic oppression of the Libyan people over many decades. Syria was a much more complicated issue, for the opposition to Assad was a wide-ranging one that included Sunnis who opposed the Alawite/Shiite regime of Assad, democratic activists, and radical terrorists linked to Al Qaeda. At the same time, UN estimates of 93,000 deaths in the civil war by June 2013 made many have second thoughts. The new U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry offered $60 in nonlethal aid, while some European allies were willing to consider military supplies but not weapons. Thus, America played a leading role in both the Libyan and Syrian civil wars, but it was a cautious and measured role indeed. Hostility in the Arab world to western culture and politics, in addition to the West's past record of intervention, made this careful approach the only feasible one. To his credit, President Obama had given a speech in Cairo early in his administration that called for a new, more open policy to the Arab world, after the alienation that occurred during the Iraq War. Many in the Arab world believed that there had been no genuine follow-through, and that made America's actions even more constrained.

A study of American foreign policy and alliance politics in a century of war can benefit from a theoretical framework that can act as a magnifying glass that enables observers actually to see the central dynamics from different angles. Alliances are often part of identifiable regions, and thus theories that center on the ways in which clusters of nations in a defined geographic area both share and respond to security threats can be revealing for all four periods under review across the entire century.

A number of states often share a common threat from an immediate neighbor, and that challenge forces them into a perception that they possess a "shared internal security dilemma" (Kelly 2007, Abstract). Their efforts to pool resources often shudder and weaken because of the "distance" that exists within their region (Hendrickson 2002, 461–462). In fact, there are at least three significant types of distance. First, gravitational distance pertains to the fact that a strong power within a region finds that its impact weakens as distance increases from smaller powers that it might want to protect. Second, typological distance means that the disappearance of either an empire or a large federation takes away a common outside protective border that may have enhanced the sense of security. Third, attributional distance relates to the fact that like-minded nations in pursuit of security may awaken to discover that they also have quite different cultural and political traditions. Instead of security, these three categories of distance may create a fragile buffer zone or even "shatterbelt" instead of a strong shared security community.

However, there are ways of transcending the kinds of distance that exist in a region that desperately needs to create a security community against a common foe. Membership in a "larger common space" or regional organization can be a beginning point (Hendrickson 2002, 455–466). Then, the nations in the common space that have experienced authoritarian regimes can begin to build and consolidate democratic reforms that may be more characteristic of the other nations in the geographic space. Where sharp ethnic divides exist within a member nation, the practice of participation in security-based activities with other neighboring nations can help to neutralize and someday overcome existing "ethnofederalism." Finally, democratic reforms are insufficient to guarantee effective responses to security threats within a region. Therefore,

bureaucracies with effective force must exist alongside growing democratic practices to ensure security within the threatened region.

All of the above theoretical components are a rich source of basic research questions about challenges to alliances of which America has been part in the last century. They also provide a kind of prescription for alliance leaders in any of the four time periods about how to overcome the various threats posed by outside aggressive threats but also by distance and weakness within the regions. As such, they can assist in the analysis of what went wrong and what went right for the United States and its allies in four different periods of threat from 1914 to 2014.

During the first period of global war, the theory of gravitational distance helps explain why the alliances that the United States eventually joined were fragile in the early years. American power was significant by 1914, but its willingness to engage in a European centered conflict was not. The concept of "gravitational distance" is useful, for America was separated also by an ocean from the area of conflict. The pull of one of the strongest powers in a potential western alliance was weak, and thus the war effort foundered until President Wilson declared war in 1917. Similarly, while war was going forward in Europe after 1938, a strengthened America stayed on the sidelines in terms of military contributions until late 1941. It may be too strong to conclude that the western alliance in those early periods was a "shatterbelt," but it certainly took on the appearance of a zone of fragility. There was also a strong component of "attributional distance" in both conflicts, for a very different kind of ally in the East made wartime planning tricky. For the first three years of World War I, Russia was an ally but still under the tsarist rule of Nicholas II. Its political system was profoundly different from those of its allies in the west and was also under heavy domestic pressure. Those internal stresses would lead to the Bolshevik Revolution in the middle of the war and the new Russia's inevitable withdrawal from the alliance. Following Hitler's breaking of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact and subsequent invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, a similar kind of dilemma occurred. A strong communist state became part of the allied coalition, but doubts about its eventual intentions created a certain distance from the other members. This was most apparent at the Yalta Conference in February 1945.

Following both wars there were purposeful efforts to create a more solid security community through the League of Nations and then the United Nations. Both organizations worked with the allied victors in the two world wars to nurture democratic development, another hallmark of security theory. The Weimar Republic imposed on Germany in 1919 consisted of a democratic model that was similar to a number of other political systems in Western Europe. Similarly, alliance-inspired political frameworks developed for both West Germany and Japan after World War II borrowed heavily from American experiences at home with separation of powers system. What was missing in both international organizations was the equally important component of central administrative and bureaucratic strength. In the first case, the strongest power, the United States, did not join the League due to Senate defeat of the necessary treaty. In the second case, the founders of the UN assigned a unanimous vote principle to key decisions by the Security Council, and this prevented firm action due to the breakout of the Cold War. In two very different situations, UN approval of force to defeat an enemy took place, and they were separated by four full decades. In 1950 they approved the intervention in Korea after the attack on the South, and in 1990 they supported the use of force by western nations seeking to liberate Kuwait.

During the Cold War, the second time frame utilized in the study, alliance theory can bring clarity to the nature of the conflict and the types of choices that leaders needed to make. In the early part of the Cold War, culminating with the Cuban Missile Crisis, gravitational weakness was not an issue, as so many nations in the West and elsewhere rallied around the American pole of leadership. In the sense that that opposition to the Soviet-led alliance consisted exclusively of communist systems, there was no strong sense of attributional distance among countries that all shared a relatively common democratic framework. Typological distance did play a role, for the distance between America and the others in the noncommunist camp was considerable. In the second half of the Cold War, sharp differences emerged within the alliance, and the controversial American role in the Vietnam War had considerable impact in shaping those differences. The geographic distance of the United States then combined with cultural and value differences to weaken the alliance and make it more vulnerable to Soviet provocations such as the invasion

of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and of Afghanistan in 1979. While the common democratic patterns in the West were enough to hold the security community together through the early 1960s, they were not enough to overcome the differences and heal the wound that American involvement in Southeast Asia caused. NATO had become an increasingly strong administrative center to the community, but its contributions were confined to Europe and not applicable to Asian theaters.

During the third period, the first decade after the end of the Cold War, security theory is pertinent in even different ways. With the steep drop off in Soviet power and global impact, the United States was able to exert powerful gravitational force, in particular at the time of the Persian Gulf War. However, considerable typological distance weakened many countries that sought refuge under an American-led tent. Both the collapse of the Soviet Union and the implosion of Yugoslavia created much space between new countries that had previously been part of those large federations. A few such as Belarus and Serbia still clung to Moscow and wished that their larger federations had not broken up. However, most of the others felt a new sense of vulnerability. Those on the Russian western and southwestern flanks pursued membership in NATO or the EU or both. Those in Central Asia sought to make their own way, probably independent of both Cold War powers. The lure of Asia or the common bond with Muslim nations to the south and west became tempting alternatives, especially in light of the oil resources held by a number of former Soviet Republics such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Attributional differences were not consequential for security purposes, given the general thirst in the new countries for a combination of free market and democratic principles. Democratic development was taking place within the entire region, but there were still no strong administrative practices in key regional organizations that provided for the common bond of security. Thus, the West was especially vulnerable to Rogue Leaders such as Saddam and Milošević, who attempted to use the newly fluid post–Cold War situation to serve their own ambitions. In the former case, the West moved forcefully to secure oil lines and protect the UN principle of nonintervention in the affairs of another state. However, in the early-1990s the emergence of different attitudes within the West and also in Central Europe created greater insecurity in the Balkans

and fed the tragedy there. By 1995, the degree of suffering in Bosnia made World War II analogies pertinent, and the West stepped in with a degree of force twice in the second half of the decade.

In the fourth period after 9/11, the perception of a new "shatterbelt" was foremost in the consideration of America and most of its allies. It was not only the United States that felt a new and pronounced sense of vulnerability. All states in the west realized that they had little ability to protect absolutely their borders, technology, economic systems, and even such basic political values as freedom of expression and other civil liberties. During the initial decision to move into Afghanistan in order to defeat the protectors of Al Qaeda, the gravitational pull of American was powerful. As other nations rallied behind the decisions of the Bush administration, a tightened security community resulted. The parallel to the early Cold War may be relevant, but the emergence of such a powerful new threat made both the spaces that separated the allies and the different political traditions that characterized them seem less meaningful. However, the decision to move into Iraq in 2003 was unsettling and shook the alliance. It was not likely to shatter, but nations sympathetic to the United States either stayed on the sidelines or provided minimal and reluctant support. Lacking support by the UN, the legitimacy of the war was always a question. At the same time, NATO as an administrative center of power became the overall architect of the War in Afghanistan, and one result of this was that newly democratic nations began a kind of learning process by working in tandem with the world's older democracies. An inevitable by-product of these wars was, ironically, the development of more commonality within a security community, at the same time when members were questioning some of its key decisions and commitments.

Conclusion

America's relationship with its allies was a defining and hallmark feature of the century of warfare that abruptly ended the long stretch of isolationism. The effectiveness of the resulting security community tended to be highest when the threats were greatest. Further, the distances and spaces within the security

communities used in each of the four periods opened up and weakened the various alliances when the enemy force was less clearly defined or after a long period of strenuous efforts. Gravitational distance expanded when the decisions of America, the alliance leader, looked to be poorly designed or wrong-headed. Typological distance weakened the security community when large stages themselves shattered, as in the post-1918 and post-1991 time frames. Attributional differences emerged when very disparate players were members of the alliance or when new members joined after being under a very different ruling system. However, the very fact of taking part in a meaningful way in a security community had the potential to reduce the danger of each of the types of distance that potentially could weaken the alliance and give the advantage to the enemy of the day.

Part One

Alliance Networks and the Defeat of German and Japanese Power: Early Twentieth-Century Hot Wars, 1914–1945

The earliest involvement on the global stage in a major war occurred after the rise of the European Central Powers and the ensuing World War I. Germany was the strongest and most provocative of that new European coalition, and it was their U-Boats that threatened the Atlantic shipping lanes of the emergent United States. American reluctance to play a role in this European conflict lasted a full three years, and it was consistent with the advice given by President Washington at the end of his terms in office (Jentleson 2007, 62–66). However, the brutal nature of that war, the availability of modern weapons of destruction, and its long stalemate begged for the injection of new power. A generation later, American leaders were similarly resistant to enter the European conflict, even after Hitler's Munich Pact with Czechoslovakia in 1938 and his invasion of Poland the next year. However, in this case, President Roosevelt did engage American power through the Destroyer for Bases Dean and also through the Lend Lease Program. Subsequently, the allies did benefit from American capabilities if not the presence of its fighting forces.

World War I, Temporary Alliance Networks, and American Leadership, 1914–1918

The story of American involvement in the first global war of the century began on a note of pacifism and ended with presumed renewal of isolationism with Senate rejection of American membership in the newly formed League of Nations.

Noninvolvement, 1914–1917

The outbreak of the war in 1914 was in a sense one in which none of the European powers really was singularly at fault. The principal powers had been developing new military capabilities in the first decade of the twentieth century and developed major bilateral alliances to fend off trouble if it ever happened. The trip wire to trouble was the assassination, by the Bosnian Serb Princip, of the nephew of the Habsburg emperor. The Balkans had been brewing with tension for several decades, and "warm-up" wars had already been fought in that region. Four large empires that included the Austro-Hungarian, the Russian, the Ottoman, and the German had been in decay for some time and were ripe for implosion. In fact, all four would disappear by the end of the war. From this perspective, American noninvolvement made sense. This was not a conflict for that nation at this particular time. However, the commonality of culture and values between Europe and America made the war one that was important to everything that nations on both sides of the Atlantic represented.

It is important also to underline that alliances were the key to the outbreak and line-up of nations in 1914. It was an alliance that linked German to

Austria-Hungary after the latter declared war on Serbia. Both Russia and France had traditionally been allies of Serbia, and those connections were thereby invoked. Once the German army began to march toward France, they entered and crossed Belgian territory, and that move activated the British, who had given security guarantees to Belgium (Hook 2011, 37). America's traditional links to both Britain and France assured that they would join an alliance that included both of them, when and if the time came.

In fact, the national interests of the United States became intertwined with those of the allies as early as 1915, and the result was indirect involvement in the war two years before the actual declaration of war. In 1915 the German submarines sank the *Lusitania* and *Sussex*, and on the former there were 128 Americans among the dead. Such German attacks were a major factor in leading President Wilson to the conclusion that major ethical considerations were involved, for freedom of the seas and the rights of neutrals were a traditional protection accorded by international law (McCormick 2005, 25). In "The First Lusitania Note Requests Germany to Halt Submarine Warfare, 1915," Wilson expresses his moral reasoning by noting that it was persons and ships engaged in commerce that were now jeopardized and hurt by the German attacks. Harm to noncombatants was clearly unacceptable ("The First Lusitania Note ... " 2005, 35–36). Further evidence of America's involvement in the century of war earlier than 1917 is that American leaders provided economic assistance and exports in order to strengthen the military capabilities of the allies. For instance, in 1916 alone the U.S. exported $2.75 billion worth of war material to Britain and France. Furthermore, in 1914–1917. U.S. banks loaned the allies $2.3 billion, a step that surely involved America in the war effort (Papp et al. 2005, 125–126).

In early 1917, Germany announced the beginning of unrestricted warfare, and that nearly guaranteed that America would become involved. However, it was an additional foray of Germany into America's own backyard that sealed the deal of U.S. engagement. In the Zimmermann Telegram, the Germans endeavored to persuade Mexico to announce war on their side against the United States (McCormick 2010, 25). In return, Germany would assist Mexico in regaining lost territory during the Mexican War with the United States in 1847–1848 (Papp et al. 2005, 127).

Pivotal role, 1917–1918

When President Wilson described the reasons that justified involvement in the war, he had to couch his message in language that was sensitive to American values and traditions. He noted how the German attacks had finally come to close to the territory of the United States, and this was a drawing card that might appeal in light of the Revolutionary War against the actual presence of a foreign colonial power on American soil. He also told the Congress of his belief that this would be a "war to end all wars." Thereby, he engaged the utopian stream in the short history of the new land. In addition, he described an involvement that would lead to at least the protection if not the spread of American democratic values. In fact, he saw American involvement as critical in an effort to "make the world safe for democracy." In his request that Congress declare war, he mentioned how the German attacks had even sunk hospital and relief ships headed toward Belgium. He even welcomed the Russian Revolution as it put the Russian system on the side of democratic values, too. The moral impulse behind American involvement centered on the need to protect small nations and assure their liberation ("President Wilson Asks Congress..." 2005, 36–38). In the end, American engagement did prove to be the decisive force that led to the defeat of the Central Powers, and as a consequence it was expected that its leaders would have much to say about the shape of the post-war settlement.

The trip wire event for Wilson and America had been the sinking of three American merchant ships, a blow on the homeland that served as the straw that broke the camel's back (Paterson et al. 2005a, 277). In fact, merchant ships had not always been purely removed from the war effort, for in earlier years America had transported some of its aid in the form of arms and munitions via British merchant vessels (Paterson et al. 2005a, 273). Very quickly the United States mobilized for a war that the American people had come to see as a crusade. Their interest in and patience for discussions of "alliances on the European continent" was quite limited (Stoessinger 1985, 5). In the spring of 1917, American involvement was doubly necessary since Britain and France were "near exhaustion," while Russia was "tottering" (Stoessinger 1985, 5). Another powerful rationale for involvement by the United States occurred in

November 1917. The second and more radical stage of the Russian Revolution occurred with Lenin's coup. He immediately signed the Peace of Brest-Litovsk with Germany and effectively took Russia out of the war effort (Hook 2011, 37). The Germans could concentrate their entire war effort on the western front, and American assistance to the allies became all the more urgent.

In the end America did get involved in the eastern front in a way that was initially directed at weakening Germany but that ended up engaging Bolshevik forces as well in the ongoing Russian Revolution. There were tens of thousands of Czech soldiers who had defected from the Austro-Hungarian army and joined up with Russia when the latter was still a tsarist system. Their aim had been in part to strike a blow against the Austro-Hungarian empire in a small effort to pave the way for their own political system and country after the war. However, they became trapped in the Russian Revolution after Lenin came to power. There were 70,000 Czech soldiers trapped on the Trans-Siberian Railroad and deeply involved in fighting the Bolsheviks. This led to American participation in the Allied Intervention that had occurred in part to prevent war material that they had sent to their previous ally Russia when it was fighting the common enemy Germany. However, war aims became complex when 10,000 American troops ended up actually supporting Kolchak and the Whites in their battle against Lenin and the Reds (Paterson et al. 2005a, 293–294). Allied forces were supposed to be protecting military supplies but ended up in an apparent effort "to roll back Bolshevik influence" (Paterson et al. 2005a, 293). Soviet leaders would for decades remember this intervention as an early capitalist effort to "strangle the Bolshevik baby in the cradle." Another more short-range result was that the Czechs and their heroism caught the eye of President Wilson, and he was very supportive of their efforts after the war to found a nation-state. In fact, his statue now stands alongside that of the Czech founding father Thomas Masaryk in front of the main train station in Prague.

Passage of the Selective Service Act in May 1917 was critical in greatly expanding the ranks of the American military. In the previous month there were only 130,000 troops in the American Army, but at the time of the armistice eighteen months later there were 2,000,000 soldiers in Europe alone. At that end point in the war American troops were holding 20% of the allied front lines, clearly a major contribution (Papp et al. 2005, 128). Further, during the

Muse-Argonne offensive in the summer of 1918, the involvement of American troops reached 1,000,000 (Paterson et al. 2005a, 283). It was numbers like these that serve as evidence of the pivotal role that America played in sealing the allied victory of the Triple Entente against the Triple Alliance.

President Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points, new states in Central Europe, and nonmembership in the League of Nations

In fact, the president went to Europe and participated in a leading way during negotiations that resulted in the Peace of Versailles. He had listed Fourteen Points as key considerations before the war actually ended, and they had an explosive effect in Central Europe. With the above-noted collapse of the four aging empires, new groups came forward with well-hatched plans for nation-states of their own. In particular, Wilson's strong emphasis on the importance of "self-determination of nations" hit a nerve ending among peoples who had been dreaming of nation-states at least since the ill-fated European revolutions of 1848. As a result, Poland became a nation after having disappeared from the map itself for over a century. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia became nations with a complicated ethnic makeup for the first time ever. Austria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania also received statehood as an outcome of the war. Bulgaria had achieved that status a bit earlier in 1908 and Albania in 1912. Another dream of President Wilson had been a League of Nations that could make peace permanent by establishing a powerful checking force against any future aggressor. That hope ended for America when key members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee defeated American participation on behalf of a return to traditional noninvolvement in the affairs of Europe (Stoessinger 1985, 21–27).

Intellectually, Wilson's work after the war was centered on replacing the traditional European-centered balance of power with collective security (Taylor 1963, 181; Stoessinger 1985, 7; Wittkopf et al. 2003, 34; McCormick 2010, 26; Hook 2011, 38). His involvement was clear as he spent the better part of six months in Europe between December 1918 and June 1919. In the end,

he had more success bargaining with the allies in Europe than he later would in negotiating with the Senate Foreign Relation Committee back home. The Europeans were not initially interested in a new organization such as the League of Nations. Thus, his pressure and persuasiveness combined with adulation by the European public to make the allies acquiescent (Stoessinger 1985, 22). However, Wilson also had to make concessions to the allies, for Britain, France, Italy, and Japan would not back down on their territorial demands (Stoessinger 1985, 7). As a result of this allied pressure, Germany lost 13% of its territory and 10% of its population (Paterson et al. 2005a, 287). Further, the allies extracted from President Wilson agreement to add a war guilt clause to the armistice and to require that Germany pay $33 billion in war reparations (Paterson et al. 2005a, 286). Of course, the tragedy for Wilson personally was that the Senate ended up defeating the treaty that would have put the United States into the League. A very sick and stubborn president refused to accept any reservations added by the Senate to the treaty, even though evidence indicated that the British at least would have accepted such reservations (Paterson et al. 2005a, 290). Wilson's moralism and vanity had finally undercut his bargain with the allies and also compromised the values with which he had initially let America into the war. Consequences of the American absence were severe for the allies, as the League was impotent to prevent the conquests of the Nazis in the next generation. Compounding this retreat by America from global politics was its absence as well from the new Permanent Court on International Justice (Chittick 2006, 111).

Wilson's philosophy about the value of the alliance in the war is apparent in his famous Fourteen Points. In Point # 10, he in effect seeks to extend the alliance by supporting the "freest opportunity of autonomous development" for the peoples of Austria-Hungary. In Point # 13 he specifically calls for recreation of a modern Polish state. Point # 14 is his famous precursor of the League of Nations, for he notes the need for a "general association of nations" ("Wilson Proclaims…" 2005, 39–40). The actual Covenant of the League of Nations also reflects the beliefs of Wilson about how to be a member of an alliance and about the principles that should guide it. For example, Article 11 affirms that "any threat of war…is a matter of concern" for the whole League.

The institutions of the League all had specific assignments. The Council would "advise upon the means" when aggression threatens a member's "territorial integrity and existing political independence." Use of the principle of arbitration would be the instrument for dealing with issues that had come up (Article 13). In Article 16, there is included a plan to establish a "Permanent Court of International Justice." In all of these ways Wilson sought to define a way of participating in and even leading an alliance. This was an enormous change in a short time for a country that had mainly avoided European "entanglements" for over a century.

In spite of the return to partial isolationism after the war, the United States continued to engage in discussions and even agreements with former allied partners, short of the League of Nations. Washington would be the site of two Naval Conferences in 1921 and 1922, and the result was limitation on ship tonnage for the host nation (5), Great Britain (5), Japan (3), France (1.67), and Italy (1.67) (Papp et al. 2005, 135). Had such quotas been enforceable, the exercise of influence by Japan would have been quite different in the 1930s and 1940s. The nation that had opted out of the collective security organization that might have helped to prevent war did seek an international treaty to outlaw war. As a result the Kellogg-Briand Pact became a reality at least on paper in 1928. Thus, America continued to work with allies in an atmosphere in which the fear of war was very real.

There were other concrete and visible signs of America's capability for resuming a role on the world stage. Emplacement of American marines into selected Latin American countries was one indication of a willingness to inject military power at least in its own hemisphere. For example, there were U.S. marines in the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1920, in Nicaragua from 1912 to 1933, and in Haiti from 1915 to 1934. President Roosevelt replaced that military approach with the Good Neighbor Policy after his 1932 election (Papp et al. 2005, 135–137), but both policies reflected different interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine that certainly implied a global thrust that contradicted pure isolationism. In addition, U.S. capabilities in the 1920s preserved a potential position of readiness in case alliance partners in Europe were again to require the use of American military power. For instance, in 1925–1929, factories in

America produced 46% of the world's industrial goods. Further, in 1929, the United States shipped out 15% of the world's exports. American factories also began to construct subsidiaries in specific European countries (Papp et al. 2005, 115).

Further, there were efforts by smaller powers to put together alliances that supplemented the work of the League. For instance, in 1920–1921, Central European powers formed "The Little Entente," a small alliance that included Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. All three feared both a power vacuum after the collapse of the Habsburg empire as well as a resurgent Hungary. Further, the Entente then formed separate agreements with Italy, Poland, and even Austria. Such steps would help to preserve the gains of the revolution of 1918 while offering the hope that "organization has taken the place of chaos" (Beneš 1922, 66–72).

Conclusion

Overall, the American people had their sights set on internal development, and it is accurate to describe the general thrust of the two decades as one of quiet isolation. However, the silence of the interwar period was deceptive, for the winds of war were swirling like a powerful but unseen tornado on a very dark night.

World War II, Permanent Alliances, and American Internationalism, 1931–1945

On the surface, American reactions to the second global battle of the century were similar to those in 1914–1917. President Roosevelt was unable to obtain congressional commitments to the war before 1941. This was surprising in light of the very different kind of danger Adolph Hitler posed to Europe than had the German emperor in 1914. Once again, it required a hit close to American territory to engage the new global giant. This time the attack came in the Pacific and was perpetrated by Japan, a rising Asian naval and colonial power. American reactions were the same as they had been in 1917. Congress declared war, and America tipped the scales on behalf of the allies who were fighting the two-front war. However, in this case, the victory did not arrive for nearly four years.

Neutrality, 1931–1941

Hitler had come to power in Germany in 1933 and had written about his intentions, but very few outside Germany expected that he or they would become much of a threat. In fact, British prime minster Neville Chamberlin put enough trust in Hitler to sign the Munich Pact in 1938, as this was intended to prevent war by giving Germany elbow room to protect those Sudeten Germans who lived in the western part of Czechoslovakia. Even though the Munich Pact became a symbol of western willingness to appease the power-mad and ruthless dictator, the fact that it was signed reflected a general western reluctance to engage in destructive global war again. From that perspective, and when coupled with traditional American isolationism, the neutrality legislation passed by the American Congress is understandable,

if not defensible. However, it is surprising that American passivity lasted through the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, the occupation of France in 1940, and the invasion by Germany of the Soviet Union in 1941. Clearly, those aggressive moves did engage American values and even interests.

Prior to the signing of the Munich Pact, there were a number of warlike provocations, and America did sometimes articulate support for alliance partners as a response. For example, Japan attacked Manchuria in 1931, and the most the League of Nations could come up with at that time was a Study Commission (Stoessinger 1985, 30). Then, in 1933 Germany took the ominous step of withdrawing from the League of Nations and two years later announced its intention to rearm (Papp et al. 2005, 137). Its eventual Mediterranean partner Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1936, and again there was no response by the League (Stoessinger 1985, 31).

The American Congress responded in the middle of these provocative moves by the three eventual partners with Neutrality Acts in 1935–1937. America would provide no loans to warring countries, and there would be no permission given to American citizens to travel on ships under the flags of any warring countries (Papp et al. 2005, 139). These acts no doubt were responses to lessons learned from the World War I era, for both of those types of actions eventually acted like a whirlpool that pulled America into the war. In fact, the acts made some sense in terms of American military capabilities, for there had been a considerable disarmament after World War I. Even President Roosevelt reassured Congress that there was no need to save Europe again (Papp et al. 2005, 139).

On the other hand, America under the hand of FDR did take tentative steps to reach out to eventual alliance partners. For example, he granted diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union in 1933, his first year in office (Paterson et al. 2005b, 124). At the time, it seemed to be an act of realism, in light of the fact that the revolutionary government had been in place since 1917. However, it did provide a kind of foundation for the eventual wartime alliance eight years later. If Roosevelt had not granted diplomatic recognition, it would have been very difficult for the two powers to work together in settings such as Yalta and Potsdam. Then, in 1937, the president announced his proposal to "quarantine" the three aggressive powers. He called upon his

eventual allies to work together "for the triumph of law and moral principles." In his view, "national morality is as vital as private morality." He concluded by comparing this quarantine of the enemy ships to a medical quarantine of patients on behalf of the rest of the community ("President Franklin D. Roosevelt Proposes…" 2005, 119–121). Of course, there was a secondary message that the enemy powers were behaving as they were due to illness rather than to some rational plan. Such acts by the United States did not move the country close to involvement in the war, but they did underline America's philosophical and emotional solidarity with the soon-to-be alliance partners. Roosevelt's emphasis on "morality" in the quarantine message is reminiscent of Wilsonian idealism, but this president would turn out to be more pragmatic and realistic in action.

Following the Munich Pact of 1938, there were far more substantial warlike moves by the Germans, and inevitably America's response to allies became more supportive, pronounced, and visible. What happened at Munich had a catalytic impact on the allies, for it gave the green light to Hitler for a strategy of continuing expansion. At the time of the conference, the British and others felt they had won a major victory. Hitler had asked for the right to take special actions in Czechoslovakia, for he felt a need to protect the Sudeten German communities in the western borderlands of Czechoslovakia. In his view, the Czechs were treating them badly because the Germans had done well and become a special part of the upper middle class. Many Czechs owed debts to the more successful German shopkeepers and merchants, and thus their resentment was compounded. However, British prime minister Neville Chamberlain's announcement that he had achieved "peace in our time" later came back to haunt the alliance, and the concessions made at Munich were much better known later as part of "appeasement" of the dictator. Hitler used the Munich Agreement to plunge deeply into Czechoslovakia and then moved on to take over most of the rest of the continent. By 1939 Hitler had devoured all of Czechoslovakia, and his Italian partner had conquered Albania (Papp et al. 2005, 139). Soon he occupied the Balkans and then bought off the Soviet Union by signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact. However, by 1941, he had decided to reverse course and invaded the U.S.S.R. (Paterson et al. 2005b, 180).

America began to respond to this skewering of the western alliance in small steps, short of involvement themselves. For example, in late 1938, France received permission to purchase 500 U.S.-made warplanes. Domestically, and on its own, America increased its aircraft production to 10,000 per year. Within its own hemisphere, the father of the Good Neighbor Policy declared a 300-mile-wide neutrality zone along the coast of the Americas. This announcement came at the Pan-American Conference, and it resulted in the dispatch of neutrality patrols in search of German submarines (Papp et al. 2005, 140–141). Such steps began to link American policy imperceptibly to that of its European allies. In January of 1939, this alliance connection became more visible through the crash of an A-20 (Boston) near Los Angeles. On board and a casualty of the crash was a French purchasing agent, and this revealed the hidden hand of the War Department. Roosevelt further took steps to convince both the French and the British of the need to order planes, a tactic that would both strengthen the allies and benefit the American economy. There were those who perceived the June 1939 visit to the United States of the English Royal couple as a symbol of the partnership and the subterranean, growing military alliance (Paterson et al. 2005b, 107–108).

Concrete steps followed in the next year, as the first peacetime draft in American history took place with the passage of the Selective Service and Training Act. In the fall of 1940 the Roosevelt administration announced the Lend-Lease Executive Agreement that provided financial support to the allies in return for access to their bases in the western Atlantic (Papp et al. 2005, 141). In addition, America provided military hardware and ships (Hook 2011, 41). As Roosevelt put it in his press conference announcing this destroyer-for-bases deal, it was a little like loaning a fellow a garden hose when his house is on fire ("December 17, 1940, Press Conference" 2005, 122). Such a warm image hid the fact that the aid to the allies was considerably more valuable to them than the bases were to the United States. At the end of December 1940, the president gave a radio address that really provided a rationale for eventual involvement in the ongoing war on the European Continent. He noted that the Axis was in control of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australasia, and the high seas. All would be gone if the British fell. He hinged

American national security directly to the British struggle by underlining the role of the latter as "the spearhead of resistance to world conquest." By providing assistance to the British, America was playing out its destiny as "the great arsenal of democracy." In yet another homey image, he rebuked the appeasement implicit in the Munich Agreement by stating that it was impossible to tame a tiger into a kitten by stroking it ("December 19, 1949 Radio Address" 2005, 123–125).

American public opinion at the time was mixed, for 75% supported the assistance to the British, while 62% agreed with the logic of the destroyer-for-bases agreement after it was announced. On the other hand, 85% did not favor U.S. entry into the war (Stoessinger 1985, 40–42). Such a split in the public mind was worrisome, in tune with World War I isolationism, unrealistic, and decoupled from the president's approach. One might have thought that the German invasion of the Soviet Union in the following year of 1941 would have awakened the public to the reality of the situation. However, even that probe and violation of a two-year-old agreement paralleled continuing public American doubts about the desirability of actual involvement on the continent (Hook 2011, 40). And yet, at virtually the same time the president ordered the U.S. Navy to adopt a "shoot on sight" tactic while at sea. Germany's attack on the U.S. destroyer *Greer* near Iceland was the provocation, as the Germans had given no warning and the ship carried only mail. Describing the Nazi subs as the "rattlesnakes of the Atlantic," Roosevelt was bold enough to say that American patrol vessels would protect "ships of any flag" that were simply carrying out commercial duties in American waters ("Roosevelt Orders…" 2005, 125–127). Obviously, it would take an attack on American to engage the president's policy fully in light of continuing public hesitation, and the allies would have to wait a bit longer.

Two front command, 1941–1945

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was an earthquake for American leaders and people combined. In retrospect, only the assassination of President

Kennedy in 1963 and the Al Qaeda destruction of the Twin Towers and part of the Pentagon in 2001 had a comparable impact. Hawaii was not a state at the time but a territory and definitely in the American orbit of protection. Once President Roosevelt obtained sanction to respond to that attack, he quickly became part of the leadership team that included Soviet leader Stalin and British prime minister Churchill on the European Front. Eventually, General Eisenhower took command of the entire allied effort and planned the D-Day invasion of 1944, while General McArthur played the critical role in Pacific operations with the goal of defeating Japan. American leadership with committed allied commanders resulted in the defeat of both Germany and Japan in 1945. The German defeat and suicide of Hitler came first in May, and celebrations of it took place from San Francisco east to Moscow. Defeat of Japan came a few months later in early August. That result at that time was a consequence of the willingness of the new president Truman to use two atomic bombs, one on Hiroshima and the other on Nagasaki. That decision may have shortened the war in Asia, but it also led to massive loss of life and health in and around those two cities. It was also the only occasion in the nuclear age in which the weapons were used as part of a war rather than as a deterrent against it (Chittick 2006, 117–124).

The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, tightened the knot between the United States and its World War I era allies. Prime Minister Churchill rejoiced that America was finally engaged in the battle against the Nazis, and the renewed western alliance agreed on the objective of total victory as well as the removal of the governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan (Papp et al. 2005, 145). Since Germany and Italy were linked to Japan in an alliance, the American Declaration of War on Japan automatically made them its enemies as well. The Japanese shock to America at Pearl Harbor resulted in the destruction of the U.S. fleet as well as the deaths of 2,500 Americans (Hook 2011, 41). In his war message to the Congress, FDR outlined a hostile Japanese war strategy that included assaults on as well Malaya, Hong Kong, Guam, Philippines, Wake Island, and Midway Island ("Roosevelt Delivers . . ." 2005, 132). In fact, the Japanese march would continue for several years, and by 1943 the empire had taken Malaya, Singapore, Vietnam, and the American colony of the Philippines (Hook 2011, 41).

President Truman chose to end the war in the Pacific with nuclear weapons that had first been tested only one month before their actual usage against the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The number of Japanese citizens killed in those attacks was 150,000, a number that was 60 times more than the number who died at Pearl Harbor (Hook 2011, 41). America had not been entirely alone in that long battle in the Pacific, for the occupied China under Chiang Kai-shek was in its camp, as was the Soviet Union. For example, in the year after Pearl Harbor, the United States provided Chiang with a $500,000,000 loan. For their brief foray into the Asian war, Moscow ended up with substantial fruits of victory that included the southern port of Sakhalin, the free port of Darien, the naval base at Port Arthur, shared operation of the Manchurian Railway, and the Kurile Islands (Paterson et al. 2005b, 192–205). This was a sizeable set of gains for a nation that understandably had been mainly preoccupied with the difficult and costly war on its western front.

Understandably, Stalin was constantly putting pressure on the United States to follow a two-pronged strategy by opening up the second front in Europe to begin the pincer movement against Nazi Germany. Instead, America moved into Europe from the south, beginning in North Africa and then moving up through Italy. This strategy had the advantage of giving the American troops battlefield experience in a situation that was less pressurized than would have been the case if they had following Soviet advice and opened up Operation Overlord against the Germans right away. Given the lack of experience in war, the American leadership deferred to the more experienced Germans for the better part of the first two years of its engagement in the war (Paterson et al. 2005b, 187). Eventually, American planners began to focus on what would become the D-Day invasion of June 1944. Following that successful but bloody invasion, the expected pincer movement from both west and east led to the Nazi defeat. General Eisenhower coordinated with his Soviet counterparts to the extent that he even held the western allies back with the result that the Red Army was able to liberate its allocated sector of Berlin and indeed of the Germany itself (Chittick 2006, 119). As a result, it took nearly one year after the D-Day invasion for the allies to finally extract the German surrender.

Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, wartime alliances, and permanent engagement

President Roosevelt had begun to plan for the post-war world with allied leaders as early as 1942 with the signing of the Atlantic Charter. He also met with Stalin and Churchill at several locations to plan for the eventual armistice and peace, most famously at Yalta in Crimea in February 1945. At that conference, he was clearly in poor health and yielded too much to Stalin's demand for a major role in determining the outcome in Central Europe and the shape of political arrangements in the region so close to the border of the Soviet Union. However, actual post-war planning was left to his successor, President Truman. Despite the controversy surrounding Truman's decision to end the Asian war with atomic weaponry, there were few who quarreled with his leadership of American into a position of permanent engagement in European and even global relations. He gave his name to the Truman Doctrine that committed money to the successful defeat of communist forces in both Greece and Turkey. He endorsed the Marshall Plan of economic aid to defeated allies who needed both to get back on their feet and also to become durable enough to fend off future aggressors on the European continent. In 1949, he supported permanent use of American capabilities in global conflicts through creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Anchoring the United Nations on American territory with its home in New York City was assurance that the kind of retreat from the global scene that occurred after World War II would not happen again.

Even three months before Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt signed the Atlantic Charter on a ship with the British prime minister. At a gloomy time for the besieged British population, that Charter symbolized the American commitment eventually to the defense of Great Britain. Its Eight Points echoed in some sense the Fourteen Points of President Wilson a little more than two decades earlier (Papp et al. 2005, 141). For instance, there were similar emphases on the self-determination of nations and on the freedom of the seas. Other key values underlined pertained to free trade and collective security (Paterson et al. 2005b, 174–176). Thus, when the declaration of war came in December, there was an intellectual underpinning to the alliance that would fight together for the next four years.

In 1943 there were two key conferences to which the three allies came and at which important blueprints for future commitments were made. The target of the meetings in both Moscow and Teheran was establishment of the basis for a final peace agreement. The two meetings focused on the rebuilding of the defeated countries, even though that would not occur for two years. Such a commitment was quite different from the imposition of both "war guilt" and reparations payments on Germany after the Peace of Versailles. Discussion centered as well on how to keep the Soviet Union as part of a peacetime alliance after the achievement of victory. Given the Allied Intervention into Russia at the end of World War I, that also involved an important historical lesson. In the end, such hopes looked to be wishful thinking after the outbreak of the Cold War in the first year after the shooting war's end. The matter of the European colonies in Africa and Asia was also very much on the agenda, for some had expressed already the ambition for independence while all needed economic development. Just as four empires had imploded after being weakened by World War I, so a weakened Europe would eventually lose its colonial holdings after 1945. However, the time frame in the latter occasion would be a protracted one, whereas it had been very short in the earlier conflict. A final parallel between the Moscow/Cairo Meetings and 1914–1919 was the discussion of the need for a strong international organization, in this case the eventual United Nations. By holding conferences in the middle of the war instead of after victory had been achieved, the statesmen were again attempting both to learn from history and to avoid the huge errors of the past.

With respect to the last above-stated goal of building an international organization, there was an additional conference the following year at Dumbarton Oaks. Four of the allies that were carrying on the two-front war agreed to establish a United Nations after the end of the conflict. France was occupied and under control by the Vichy Regime, but the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and China were at the table. Even then, there was discussion of the veto principle, a debate that certainly echoed the sharp pre-war differences between the Soviet Union and the others. Stalin advocated the requirement of a unanimous vote among the great powers on both procedural and substantive differences, but in the end the agreement was for allowing a veto by one on substantive issues only (Chittick 2006, 123). Early agreement on permission

for a veto was also related to historical learning, for it was one more tool that would help assure American participation in an organization that would not be perceived by their people as having the potential to dictate to them.

In February 1945, the Big Three met in a beautiful setting in Yalta, in the Crimean Peninsula and on the Black Sea with the end of the war only two months away. Although the three leaders agreed on the principle of moving away from the idea of spheres of influence, their discussions suggested that it would be very difficult to accomplish that principle in action. All agreed that free elections should determine the fate of Poland, but Stalin would not permit the others to monitor such elections, a fateful step in light of later developments. President Roosevelt offered Stalin the Asian concessions described above in return for the opening of a second front by Moscow in Asia, a development that would occur only at the last moment. The leaders also bargained over the fate of individual nations through the famous percentage agreement. The Soviet Union would have 90% control in Romania and 75% in Bulgaria, while the British would enjoy 90% control in Greece. They would split the difference evenly between them in Hungary and Yugoslavia (Stoessinger 1985, 49–52). In the end this benefitted Stalin, for he ended up in the short run with near total control in Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. The American influence in Greece was not much of a benefit, for they had no interests in controlling Greece but naively assumed that Stalin too was thinking in terms of self-determination. After Stalin's death, Yugoslavia did become independent of Moscow, and this was not a surprise because Tito had won the struggle against the Nazis without Soviet assistance. Yugoslavia became one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement and eventually a kind of bridge between East and West. Amazingly, Stalin also won the agreement of the others to three General Assembly seats for the U.S.S.R. in the United Nations. He argues that Ukraine and Belorussia had been the greatest victims of Hitler's Operation Barbarossa in 1941, and they needed some kind of compensation for that. Of course, the result was that Moscow orchestrated their votes and had three times the influence in the General Assembly that it deserved. Thus, there is deep irony in the sharp difference between the announced principles of Yalta and its concrete results.

The final conference among the Soviet Union, United States, and Great Britain occurred at Potsdam in July 1945, two months after the German

surrender and one month before the Japanese defeat. America had a new president in Truman, after FDR's death, and the British would dislodge both Churchill and his party from power through the election process during the conference itself. The three leaders agreed on four occupation zones for Germany, as they were ready to grant the newly freed France its traditional role as an allied partner at that point (Papp et al. 2005, 144). They also decided to award Poland two hundred miles of German territory by agreeing on the Oder–Neisse line as the border between them. Moscow had already taken Polish territory in the east, so this was not much of a gain in territory for the Poles. At Potsdam, Stalin also promised to enter the war against Japan, for at that time no one dreamed that the Pacific War would end abruptly the next month. The wartime partners also agreed on the distribution of the Italian colonies, the seating of Italy in the UN, withdrawal of troops from Iran, and the internationalization of inland waterways. To cement the alliance in the post-war period, there would be establishment of a permanent Council of Ministers to assure regular consultations among those who had suffered and experienced so much together (Paterson et al. 2005b, 211). Finally, it was at Potsdam that President Truman learned that his scientists had developed nuclear capabilities for use in wartime, and had enormous consequences for the ending of the Pacific War (Chittick 2006, 124).

Clearly, the matter of alliance politics was an important centerpiece of the entire wartime period, for the almost regular meetings of the alliance partners offered a defined framework not only for discussion of wartime strategy but also for the shaping of the post-war peace. In fact, this network is understandable in light of the reasons for the outbreak of the war itself. While many observers earlier concluded that it was the personality of leaders like Hitler and Mussolini that was responsible for the coming of war in the late 1930s, later scholars pointed to systemic factors that had primary responsibility for the war. The balance of power before, during, and through the war among status quo and revisionist states may have more explanatory power than theories that focus on leadership personality variables (Schweller 1993, 73–74). In light of the power of such factors, those who hoped that American engagement in war would end with the Nazi defeat would be eventually as disappointed as their counterparts one generation earlier were.

Theoretical implications of the period of two world wars

In light of the experiences of America in meshing with existing alliances in 1914–1945, it is now worthwhile to revisit to the key theories and research questions that Chapter 1 presents for this time frame. In terms of "gravitational distance," it is clearly the case that the absence of American strength initially weakened the alliances in both wars. America was the distant nation geographically and psychologically for the first three years that war was raging in Europe. In the Asian case during World War II, it took a full decade for America to enter the battle to roll back Japanese conquests. By the time of American entry into World War I in 1917, the two sides were deadlocked in a seemingly never-ending process of advancing their trenches a few feet forward each day. In the case of the second war, only Britain remained free on the European continent, and its people were beleaguered by air raids virtually all of the time. There were "shatterbelts" in Europe due to the weak gravitational tug from the emerging superpower an ocean away.

There was also a strong component of "typological distance" in the European settings in both instances. In particular, it is possible to conclude that the internal weakening and eventual collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire exposed a variety of new states to outside aggression and made them more vulnerable. While the old empire was oppressive of national rights, its common border did provide a degree of protection against earlier powerful forces such as the Ottoman empire. The new central European states moved from early democratic patterns to much more authoritarian ones by the end of the 1920s, and they were all vulnerable to imposing forces such as Germany under Hitler. This was most notably the case with Czechoslovakia in 1938 at the time of the Munich Pact and Poland in 1945 during the discussions in Yalta. Preoccupation of the western alliance with such issues was draining in terms of time and energy but also unfulfilling in terms of short-run accomplishments.

"Attributional distance" also weakened the western alliance, for the Russian/Soviet factor continually tugged and tore the threads that made up the fabric of the alliance. In the case of the first war, the Russian pullout from the alliance after the Bolshevik Revolution created havoc on the eastern front. Important

allied components such as the Czech Legion became caught up in the ensuing Russian Civil War and shifted their focus to getting out of Russia rather than defeating a common enemy. Similarly, the allies became preoccupied with limited interventions in Russia both to protect the equipment and supplies that they had sent there and eventually to help in the battle against the Bolsheviks. These activities had nothing to do with the central war aims and were a major distraction. Of course, Stalin kept the alliance on edge in World War II, in spite of his domestic efforts to rally his own people behind a mission to defend the homeland rather than the socialist system. One year after the Munich Pact, he signed a nonaggression pact with the Germans that kept his nation on the sidelines for two years. Then, after America joined the war, he was constantly hammering his allies to open the second front instead of proceeding on with their plans to come up through southern Europe. In retrospect, his intentions at Yalta were surely to obtain western acquiescence to plans to gain a firm foothold over Central Europe and thereby extend the socialist system toward Western Europe itself or to provide a buffer zone of protection on the western border of the Soviet Union. Whatever the motivations of this eastern power were, its actions and outcomes reflected assumptions and values about the alliance that differed profoundly from those of its partners.

Creation of "security communities" that could negate such alliance weaknesses produced very different results in the two case studies. Wilson presented his plan for a League of Nations at the end of the war after a fairly brief American involvement in it, in comparison with the combat experiences of his allies. To the allies the Fourteen Points were like a flash of lightening from the heavens rather than a set of agenda items that they had thoroughly discussed and vetted. In spite of that reality, they did provide a framework for the initial democratization of the states that were newly freed from rule by Vienna, Budapest, and even Constantinople. However, a decade later only Czechoslovakia had preserved the essence of that new democratic tradition. Similarly, the democratic experiment of the Weimar Republic in Germany led to a political system beleaguered by too frequent changes of government and thereby became vulnerable to a new era of authoritarianism or, more probably this time, totalitarianism. Thus, it was no surprise that the League of Nations lacked a center of action with any kind of meaningful bureaucratic

force. America's failure to join the alliance weakened that potential center of action even more, and thus the sense of an effective security community did not really exist.

Outcomes during and after World War II were more positive in terms of the possibilities of a security community. American-led efforts actually to write constitutional frameworks for both Germany and Japan ensured that there would be attention paid to democratic procedures and values. The nations of the western part of Europe and those in Asia freed of Japanese rule were empowered to chart their own destinies. The results would be different, for the French established a new Fourth Republic while the Chinese within a few years were setting up a Maoist variant of a socialist system. However, the countries of Central Europe lost a second chance at democracy, as the emerging Cold War subordinated them to yet another empire ruled from Moscow that would parallel earlier domination by Vienna/Budapest and then Berlin. Plans for the United Nations were part of the allied discussions in meetings nearly every year of the war, from the Atlantic Charter in 1941 through Potsdam in 1945. Since it did not emerge as a surprise at the end of the war or seemingly dictated by Washington, there was a greater sense of alliance ownership of it. Having the San Francisco chartering meeting on American soil and locating its headquarters in New York City ensure the engagement of the superpower on the other side of the Atlantic. Its effectiveness as a security community was weakened somewhat by the veto principle adopted as the decision-making tool for the Security Council, but creation of NATO four years later added another layer of security with considerably more military and bureaucratic force.

Part Two

Role of Alliances in Containing the Power of the Soviet Union: Late Twentieth-Century Cold War, 1945–1991

Although the Cold War broke out officially in 1946, there were American-Soviet disagreements during World War II that were harbingers indicating that the wartime alliance might not hold. For example, Soviet leaders thought that the western allies were too slow to open up the eastern front in Europe, a move that could have taken the German pressure off their territory and population. Additionally, the Soviet Union did not declare war on Japan until after the dropping of the first atomic bomb. Thus, they offered no help on the Asian front and only seemed to get involved at the end in order to gain territory from the soon-to-be-defeated power.

War of Nerves with the Soviet Union: A Broad but Shaky Containment Alliance, 1945–1991

A strange feature of the Cold War was that shots were never exchanged between the United States and the U.S.S.R., but it was a war nonetheless that caused each side to mobilize capabilities in case of an attack. In any event, deterrence became the coin of the realm, as the military and space build-up on both sides served to deter the other from initiating an attack (Snow 2005, 31–35).

In terms of alliances, the early part of this period was awash with new organizations. Formation of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 was the critical new organizational structure established to put flesh on the bones of the new containment strategy. Eastern Europe had fallen under Soviet control in the brief four years since the holding of the Yalta Conference. There was serious concern within the western alliance that Soviet probes and aggression could extend into Western Europe. In fact, Greece and Turkey looked vulnerable, and the Truman Doctrine of 1947 permitted provision of American military assistance that enabled those countries to defeat the communist insurgencies within. In fact, the American aid replaced that which the United Kingdom had been providing but which it was no longer able to do after the hammering that nation received from Nazi air attacks during the war. The turn-around in the domestic situations in both Greece and Turkey was such that they actually joined NATO in 1952. Another bulwark of West European recovery was the Marshall Plan of 1948, as that program provided thirteen billion dollars in low interest loans (Hook 2011, 47–48). That plan surely became a symbol of alliance commitments, for its language enunciates a purpose was to restore "the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole" (In Jentleson 2007, 101).

Thus, the formation of a military alliance built on a foundation of steady commitment to wartime allies that constituted a sharp departure from the approach that America had taken after World War I. Creation of NATO was a result of the willingness of twelve nations (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the United States) to band together with a unique set of features. One such feature was the promise automatically to come to the assistance of any member that was the target of an attack. This came to be known as the important Article Five of the Charter. A second distinguishing characteristic of the new military alliance was the fully developed organizational structure that it quickly developed (McCormick 2010, 50). In each of these two respects, NATO stood out among all the other alliances that emerged in the first decade after the end of World War II.

American leadership worked to establish containment barriers against potential Soviet moves in other corners of the world as well. However, none of these alliances reflected the combined military power of NATO. Even before creation of the powerful military alliance, the United States had worked with twenty-one other countries in its own hemisphere to build the Rio Pact, an organization whose objectives were to put meaning and force into the traditional Monroe Doctrine. In the decade after NATO's formation, members of the post-war western alliance established three other regional organizations whose purposes centered on containment of the communist threat in additional corners of the world. Fear of Chinese expansion after the communist victory of 1949, in part, prompted the formation of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS) in 1951, an organization in which the United States teamed up with both Australia and New Zealand in an effort to generate additional security. Then, in 1954 five western alliance partners teamed up with three key Asian nations to provide security guarantees in Southeast Treaty Organization (SEATO) after the French defeat in Indochina in the same year. The five western countries included the three ANZUS partners plus France and Great Britain, while the key Asian countries were Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. The vulnerable countries to potential communist aggression probably from China were Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and they all received special protection under the SEATO

Protocol (McCormick 2010, 47). Concern about the vulnerability of the Middle East in light of its proximity to the Soviet Union led to an intriguing effort at a containment alliance in Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). The western alliance partner in this organization was the United Kingdom, and the disparate group of countries from the region included Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan. There had been turmoil in Iran in earlier years, and the fear of Marxist influence was one of the factors, in addition to the prickly domestic political situation in all of them. Such alliances reflected both the value that the United States placed on its western allies plus the strategic importance of setting up mini-containment networks in seemingly threatened selected other regions around the globe.

Within this period there was one major crisis that split the alliance partners and revealed that cohesion in the Cold War would not be axiomatic. The American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had called for withdrawal of assistance to Egypt in constructing the Aswan High Dam as punishment for Egypt's flirtation with Moscow. British and French leadership took him at his word in 1956, and their way of demonstrating solidarity with the United States was withdrawal of their financial support for the Aswan project. In retaliation, the Egyptian leader Nasser nationalized the British- and French-owned Suez Canal with the result that the two western allies invaded to maintain control. At that point the American leaders decided to condemn the British and French attack, as did the Soviet Union. America thus found itself in isolation from its traditional friends, and this was one event that pushed the French president DeGaulle away from an automatic embrace of American interests and positions for the next decade (Snow and Brown 2000, 43–44). In fact, this early fracture in the western alliance was a harbinger of things to come in ensuing decades of Cold War, and it weakened the common front that had been forged by the long years of war in Europe during the 1940s.

Saber-rattling over Berlin, 1955 and after

The war of nerves centered in a number of ways on the divided city of Berlin, located actually 120 miles east into the territory of communist East Germany.

Between the communist victory in that state in 1949 and 1961, more than ten million people fled west to escape communism, and the majority escaped through Berlin. In order to stop that embarrassment, Khrushchev ordered the erection of a wall through the city with heavy border guard coverage. Following that set of events, the wall became a kind of symbol of the Cold War and its divisions (McCormick 2005, 78–79). Many movies depicted daring escape attempts through the wall. Points of high tension between the key Cold War adversaries often led to traffic checks by East German police along the autobahn that connected West Berlin and West Germany. Both Presidents Kennedy and Reagan visited the city and issued ringing denunciations of the wall and the policies behind it.

In fact, Berlin first became an issue in the late 1940s when the Soviet Union set up a blockade around the city. During 1948–1949, the western allies airlifted supplies into West Berlin, a step necessitated by the fact that the western sector was indeed linked to the three combined allied zones set up by Britain, France, and the United States but was isolated in the Soviet-controlled sector. The next critical point in the struggle over German territory was the 1955 decisions to admit West Germany into NATO and to rearm that nation as well (Snow and Brown 2000, 42). Since West Germany was then formally linked to an official western military alliance, the Soviet leader Khrushchev then announced his decision to sign a peace treaty with East Germany, a move that precipitated the 1958 Berlin Crisis (Papp et al. 2005, 385). The implications of such a Soviet proposal were grave, for East Germany would then be able to control the access routes to West Berlin. During the following year, President Eisenhower and First Secretary Khrushchev met and came up with a compromise. The United States would agree to take part in a four power summit on the fate of Germany and Berlin. Khrushchev backed off on his earlier proposal and promised not to act unilaterally on the Berlin issue. While the British supported the American position, both France and Germany began to wrestle with doubts about whether America would really defend Europe when put to the test (Stoessinger 1985, 133–134).

The crisis came to a head once again in 1961, as Moscow once again proposed the separate peace agreement with East Germany. Again, the threat was very real to American, British, and French access routes to West Berlin. This time

the resolution of the crisis lay in heavy-handed action by the Soviet Union, following stern warnings by President Kennedy. Both the American and Soviet leaders had actually met in Vienna in mid-summer and had exchanged their views about the situation. However, the summit did not deter Khrushchev from ordering the construction of a wall that cut the city of Berlin in half. Construction began on August 13, and it effectively set the state for making Berlin a key symbol of the Cold War for the better part of the next three decades. Both President Kennedy and President Reagan made well-publicized visits to West Berlin, and each in his own way underlined American support for West Berlin and challenged Moscow in vigorous ways. Had President Kennedy not defended West Berlin so vigorously, the Soviet leadership might not have felt the need to build the wall. However, the larger impetus for the construction was no doubt the decade-long flow of refugees from the eastern into the western part of the city (McCormick 2010, 77–79). Many of these refugees were persons who had high levels of education, and thus the wall in part could help to halt the "brain drain" (Snow and Brown 2000, 42).

Reactions within the western alliance were uniformly critical of the Soviet hammer blow to freedom of movement between the two halves of Berlin, but there were divided views over any forthcoming action plan. Britain and France did not see construction of the wall as an offensive move like the takeover of Eastern Europe, as their interpretation emphasized its defensive nature. In contrast, American leaders speculated that building the wall might be the forerunner of a more forceful strike in the immediate neighborhood. That understanding of Soviet purposes and underlying objectives explains the relocation of 1,500 American military personnel from West Germany to West Berlin (Stoessinger 1985, 139). Inevitably, the Berlin Wall became a central image of the Cold War, and that is why its destruction on November 9, 1989, became the key sign that the Cold War was indeed over.

Cuba as the centerpiece, 1961–1962

In a sense, Cuba became one important surrogate that acted as a kind of substitute for actual war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Initially, Castro approached the United States for assistance after his revolutionary victory at the end of the 1950s. Rejection by American leaders pushed him into the welcome embrace of the Soviet leadership. In 1961, President Kennedy too easily accepted a CIA proposal to assist Cuban refugees in a supposedly easy rollback of Castro's revolution. However, the Cuban people did not welcome those who came ashore at the Bay of Pigs as liberators, and the venture was a low point of the Kennedy administration. During the next year, Soviet leader Khrushchev reacted by beginning to place nuclear missiles covertly into Cuba. Discovery of this shocking news by U-2 plane over-flights of the island provided President Kennedy with enough evidence to issue an ultimatum requiring that they be dismantled (Stoessinger 1985, 151–160). Khrushchev backed down, and the embarrassment was an important factor in his overthrow two years later.

From the Soviet perspective, the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion was an important reason for their decision to emplace missiles on the island of Cuba the next year. The United States had made a serious effort to undermine and overthrow the Castro regime. But they had underestimated the extent of popular support for the new Castro regime. In any case, Khrushchev expected another such American attempt and one that had more force. Thus, there was a need to buttress their new member of the socialist commonwealth, and the Soviet leader took the bold move of constructing a missile site only ninety miles from the South Florida coast. In addition, the Soviet leadership was searching for a way to counter the American military presence in Western Europe, for the United States had located nuclear weapons there both as a deterrent and as extra protection for its alliance partners. There was also a considerable American military presence in Turkey, a nation that actually bordered the Soviet Union (Jentleson 2007, 107). If Washington could establish such a military presence in close proximity to the Soviet border, why could Moscow not do the same in the Western Hemisphere?

If Berlin became the emotional center of the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis constituted its most threatening string of events. The crisis was "a catalytic event that transformed thinking about how the Cold War could be waged" (Wittkopf et al. 2003, 49). Many analysts have noted that this was the crisis that took the nation and world closest to a nuclear war. Secretary

of State personalized the outcome by suggesting that both superpowers were looking directly into each other's eyes, with the result that Moscow eventually "blinked." Some suggested that the blockade imposed in the end by President Kennedy was a brilliant move and the highlight of his brief administration. Later thinking at times stirred speculation that Kennedy had taken his nation to the edge of the "abyss" in order to prop up his own reputation after the failure at the Bay of Pigs. The huge risks might have been a consequence of his own personality makeup and perhaps unnecessary.

In making the decision for a naval blockade of the island nation, American leadership was fully cognizant of the need to keep both its allies and broader international organizations on board. Secretary Rusk was able to obtain support from the Organization of American States (OAS) for the quarantine, while the NATO allies evinced voluntary support for the defensive action. Consideration of UN support was also part of the decision-making equation, even though that organization hoped for a cooling off period rather than immediate action (Stoessinger 1985, 145–146).

The crisis period was relatively short and took up only thirteen days, but it seemed like a lifetime to those involved in the initially quite secretive deliberative stage. Kennedy had put together an ad hoc group of advisors that came to be known as the ExComm. Later revelations indicated that there was definitely a division of perspectives on what needed to be done. Secretary Rusk's deep concern with the allies made him more cautious than some of the others. For example, he worried about a purely unilateral action that might end up jeopardizing some of the allies. There were suggestions from some that it might be better if the OAS took the lead or if NATO halted all air traffic from their countries into Cuba ("Missiles Photographed…" 2005, 374–375). Eventually, in his address to the nation, the president couched the unilateral military action by the United States in the framework of the Rio Pact of 1947 as well as the UN Charter of 1949. Lessons from the historical past also were shadows that touched the decision-making process as well. The Munich Agreement of 1938 was instructive in that the failure to stop aggression in the short-term interests of peace can unleash aggressive war in the long run ("Kennedy Addresses…" 2005, 379–380). Another shadow from the past was the Monroe Doctrine, a nineteenth-century concept that justified American

engagement in Latin America if threats from the eastern side of the Atlantic Ocean reared their ugly head. In that sense, the emplacement of missiles and resulting blockade made up a textbook case study of how to implement the old doctrine (Papp et al. 2005, 166).

The bargaining process between Khrushchev and Kennedy was significant in revealing the assumptions and priorities of each superpower. The Soviet leader was consistent in calling for an American promise that there would be no military invasion of the island, if he took the missiles out. He also was touched by the shadows of history, for he recalled in his October 26 request that America had once been part of the "adventure" of the Allied Intervention that attempted to stifle their own 1917 revolution ("Soviet Premier..." 2005, 382–383). In the perceptions of the Soviet leadership, an American invasion of Cuba a few years after their revolution would be exactly the same as the earlier involvement of the West shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution. A day later, on October 27, the Soviet premier changed the discussion entirely by escalating to the new demand that the United States remove Jupiter Missiles from Turkey, in return for the missile removal from Cuba ("Khrushchev Requests..." 2005, 384). Discussion within the ExComm weighed the merits of responding to that second message from the Soviet side. Rejection of the new Soviet proposal might lead to a move by them on Berlin, and that would globalize the missile crisis beyond Latin America. A "hot war" might result, and the NATO partners would become very agitated "when the blood starts to flow" ("Kennedy and ExComm Consider..." 2005, 385). In a now-famous move, the ExComm decided to recommend Kennedy ignore the second Soviet message and only respond to the first. This tactic worked, for the Soviet leadership did not escalate the crisis, even though the missiles remained in Turkey. Eventually, America quietly removed the missiles at a later date. This decision to concentrate on the first Soviet message meant that the United States would not invade, and they also agreed to no on-site inspections. Aerial surveillance would have to suffice in checking up to make sure the missiles were removed and the site destroyed (Stoessinger 1985, 147). Of course, this was the technique used to discover the missiles in the first place.

The consequences of the Missile Crisis were enormous psychologically but also in terms of the political consequences. In 1963, both America and the

Soviet Union signed the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT), an agreement that prohibited testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. Further, they set up a "hot line" in order to have a stable and prepared method of communicating, should a parallel international emergency occur in the future. Fearing a series of Cuban type revolutions in Latin America and other regions of the developing world, American leaders and organizations increased the level of aid programs to established governments in those parts of the world (Papp et al. 2005, 166–167). At the same time the forthcoming War in Vietnam undercut the immediate post-Cuba resolve to stiffen the spine of the Containment Strategy. For instance, there was only a minor response to the Soviet-inspired Warsaw-Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia a mere six years after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Of course, that Soviet provocation was not in the American backyard. In addition, there was a Cold War tendency to conceptualize Czechoslovakia as part of Eastern Europe rather than as a country that was actually European in its heart and soul. Depictions of that country as part of the Soviet empire made it seem much further to the East and merely on the edge of Europe. It would take the ending of the Cold War to recast understandings of its location and to re-conceptualize it as part of Central Europe. Membership in both NATO and the EU made total sense in the new age, but such organizational memberships would have been unthinkable in 1968.

The crisis of 1962 had consequences that were not only political but also theoretical. Decision-making models in the field of political science had heavily borrowed from economics with the consequence that there was at one point a convergence of minds on the appropriateness of the "Rational Actor" or "Rational Policy" model. Critics of the model such as Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom had demonstrated with force and clarity that many of the features of that model could never work in the real world. For example, leaders never had "perfect" information to guide them in a crisis. Further, "muddling through" or making only "incremental" adjustments to past policy were more realistic characterizations of the policy process than the Rational Actor Model that hinted at the possibility of totally new thinking based on careful calculations of costs and benefits.

One of the most prominent efforts to rethink the Rational Policy Model in light of the Cuban Missile Crisis was that of Graham Allison in *Essence of*

Decision. First, he interpreted the ExComm decision-making process through the lenses of the Rational Policy Model. He outlined six possible scenarios for resolution of the crisis, with costs and benefits attached to each. The "dovish" solutions included doing nothing, taking the diplomatic route through the UN or OAS, and making a secret approach to Castro. "Hawkish" tactics centered on a land invasion by the army and marines, a surgical strike by the Air Force on the missile sites themselves, and a naval blockade of Cuba that would prevent any more Soviet ships from locating missiles and associated supplies on the island. It is no surprise that usage of the terms "hawks" and "doves" emerged during the missile crisis, while those terms then became part of the informal lexicon in discussions about American foreign policy. Application of costs and benefits to each of those six tactics resulted in the choice of blockade, for it would involve the use of force but be unlikely to result in the loss of lives (Allison 2005, 403–413). Hence, the Rational Actor Model was still alive and well. However, Allison then looked at the decision-making by the Kennedy administration through the perceptual screen of two other models, each of which looked plausible, too. One was an Organizational Process Model that emphasized the extent to which each ExComm participant was imprisoned in a particular administrative setting such as the Departments of Defense or State. Tactical recommendations would be anchored in those settings rather than in some type of rational calculus. The other plausible model was the "Bureaucratic-Politics Model," a theoretical approach that envisioned a struggle among ExComm participants for a piece of the decisional outcome. From that vantage point, the president opted for the blockade because it was the "middle" or compromise recommendation that would offer a micro-victory to each participant in the deliberative process.

It is also possible to factor considerations about America's allies into those three models. The first approach would suggest that a determined U.S. response in Cuba would reassure allies of military support in Europe if such a crisis hit Berlin or another location. The second model might imply that American political and military leaders were partly bound by their organizational experiences in the 1940s and 1950s. Routines and assumptions that applied to the containment strategy in Europe could equally be pertinent in Latin America. Similarly, learned organizational experiences in dealing with Hitler

in the days of World War II were in the background as well, insofar as the threat was an unpredictable one whose next steps were unfathomable. In addition, the third model bears some relevance for alliance building, as individual Western European nations were clearly watching to see what the outcome would be and how resilient the Kennedy administration would appear. Those nations across the ocean would make up another bureaucratic pressure that would drive ExComm participants away from the three "dovish" solutions. Overall, American's alliances and alliance partners were not only in the shadows of this decision but part of the political and historical consciousness of the members of the informal advisory network in a vibrant way.

Nuclear weapons build-up and limitations

Explosion of the two atomic weapons by the American military in 1945 prompted the Soviet leadership to respond in kind. The so-called arms race ensued, and it also included efforts to gain an advantage in space technology. Neither side wanted to be vulnerable to a nuclear attack in which the other side had the advantage due to superior space-based technology. The American "victory" in the Cuban Missile Crisis was a pivotal event, for it convinced the Soviet leaders that they needed to overcome the American advantage in nuclear weapons. By the end of the 1960s they had indeed matched American capabilities, and one result was a serious effort in the 1970s and after to limit further increases of nuclear weapons and subsequently to preserve a situation of equity between the two giants. SALT diplomacy of the 1970s dealt with medium-range nuclear weapons, while the START negotiations of following decades concerned long-range weapons that could hit targets an ocean away. As noted above, perhaps the nuclear threat served as a deterrent that prevented the United States and the Soviet Union from engaging in a hot war over the course of more than four decades.

America's usage of atomic weaponry to end the war in the Pacific against Japan in August 1945 added a dimension to defense capabilities, which greatly shaped national security debates and considerations in the following decades. Truman's justification was based on saving up to one million lives

that might be lost in a land invasion of both Japan and its island possessions. In a sense, the destructive power of these weapons had a similar impact to the consequences of World War I. People and armies were astonished at the devastation and massive loss of life that had occurred in that earlier war. To many, the world seemed to be coming apart at its seams during the 1914–1918 conflict, and the carnage challenged and tested many long-held assumptions. The war had an impact on all areas of life, as the abstract movement continued to build momentum in art and the world of music experienced the emergence of a twelve-tone scale. Perhaps, the new reality of nuclear weapons did not quite have the same impact on so many aspects of the social order. However, the presence of such destructive power gave birth immediately to the twin efforts by nations to develop further the technology but also to negotiate its limitations.

One month after the attacks with atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson proposed talks with his Soviet counterparts about coming to an agreement about this new category of weapons. Since the United States had kept Great Britain informed about the development of nuclear capabilities, they would be at the table for discussion as well. In Stimson's view, the best of all possible worlds would be one in which all three nations halted work on such weapons and used atomic energy for "commercial or humanitarian purposes" ("Secretary of War…" 2005, 191–192). However, these hopes came to naught for the Soviet Union developed their own wartime capability within the span of a few short years. For the next decade and one half, public officials in the two superpowers concentrated much more on competing in the arms race than they did on scaling it back. For example, one issue that emerged in the 1960 presidential campaign in the United States was the so-called missile gap. Senator Kennedy charged that the Eisenhower administration had allowed the Soviet Union to pull ahead of the United States in certain categories of nuclear weapons. It was necessary to increase military spending in this defense area in the interests of America but also of its alliance partners ("Senator John F. Kennedy Presses…" 2005, 299–300). In fact, the Soviet Union would not catch up to the United States until 1969, but the campaign issue discloses the heavy emphasis of public officials on constructing ever stronger nuclear capabilities. There were

private citizens and interest groups that articulated the fears and concerns of the public, but their impact was minimal on the defense policy process. For instance, The National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) formed to raise question about the new type of arms race. In 1957, they called for the highest priority to be placed on the "sovereignty of the human community" ("The National Committee ... " 2005, 296). American and Soviet leaders would not begin to explore seriously the possibility of limiting nuclear weapons until the scare of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

Between the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and achievement of parity in weaponry by the Soviet Union in 1969, there were several significant efforts to limit and restrict the weapons while still proceeding with their build-up. In 1963, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty responded to concerns about the spread of nuclear-inspired radiation by banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere (Snow and Brown 2000, 49). Ratification of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967 was a tentative step to reduce the fear that one side could manipulate space technology to target the other with nuclear weapons. An important summit took place the same year in Glassboro, New Jersey (Wittkopf et al. 2003, 49–51). President Johnson hosted Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin in a meeting that paved the way for the more substantive discussions of the 1970s and 1980s. The last accomplishment of this brief post-Cuba period was the ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 by many nations (Snow and Brown 2000, 49). Signatories agreed that they would not make efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. It was one thing for misuse of this capability by the two superpowers, but it was quite another to wonder if more unpredictable nations or leaders might get a hold of or develop the weapons. Such eventualities would compound global public anxiety about the existence and continuing presence of these weapons. While there was logic in passage of NPT, smaller nations later began to wonder why the Soviet Union and United States merited trust in the management of this lethal capability while others did not.

Once parity between the two superpowers became the reality at the end of the 1960s, discussions to limit the weapons took a more serious turn, and the ensuing decade of the 1970s became known as détente. As Secretary of State Henry Kissinger put it in 1974, it will be impossible for a stable international

system to evolve if the two superpowers continued on in "an unrestrained strategic arms race" ("Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger..." 2005, 464). For the first time since World War II, the U.S.S.R. and America became alliance partners of sorts. While their leaders had profoundly different visions of the world and global politics, they did agree to work together to restrict the weaponry in the name of a larger good. On that one important policy, they became allies, although American conservatives would later argue that Soviet leaders were protected by secrecy and thereby were free to violate the agreement. As a result, both nations signed SALT I in 1972, an agreement that addressed both defensive and offensive weapons. In previous years there had been a fear the development of anti-ballistic missile capabilities (ABM) would give one side the confidence that it could initiate a nuclear strike while remaining confident that the new ABM sites would protect their own population against a retaliatory strike. As a result, SALT I restricted each side to two ABM sites, each of which could possess one hundred launchers. One site would protect the national capital of each country, while the other would make an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) field secure. Since the United States already had such a capability to protect an ICBM site in North Dakota, they could construct a new one near Washington, DC. The opposite scenario pertained to the Soviet Union, for they had already secured Moscow with such a site. They would be free to develop another ABM site near an ICBM field. The main achievement of this agreement was that neither side could move to build a third site.

SALT I also froze the number of offensive nuclear missiles, but it contained a "trade in" provision that caused difficulties later on. As long as neither side broke through the numbers ceiling for offensive weapons, they were free to make qualitative improvements in the missiles, to add many warheads to each, and to utilize as many strategic bombers as they preferred. In fact, each of the superpowers had strengths in different areas. The Soviet defensive system had an advantage in throw-weight and number of launchers, while the American had the advantage in the accuracy of its missiles and eventually in Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV). At Vladivostok in 1974, President Ford and First Secretary Brezhnev addressed some of those ancillary issues. They agreed to cut back on the number of ABM sites to one each, and they

decided that each side could have 2,400 missile launchers, 1,320 of which could possess a MIRV component (Stoessinger 1985, 217–224).

The spirit of détente even spread to a Finnish setting at the Helsinki Meeting in 1975. Nations from both sides of the Iron Curtain gathered in the Finnish capital and agreed on three "baskets" or points. First, they decided to recognize finally and formally the borders that had resulted from changes made during World War II. A central point in this regard was the change in Poland's western border that gave the Poles two hundred miles of German territory and made the Oder–Neisse line their western border. Germany had been very reluctant to yield all the land to the east of that river-based line. Second, both sides agreed to intensify economic and social cooperation. Third, there was agreement that all parties would make serious efforts to protect human rights (Chittick 2006, 148). Later, Americans would charge that this agreement was a bad deal, for the West had conceded on a long-standing Soviet demand on the border issue. In contrast, the late Brezhnev period in the Soviet Union was not particularly one that made any concessions to recognize the human and civil rights of political dissidents. In spite of these doubts, an important piece of organizational machinery emerged from this meeting. The signatories established a Conference on Security and Cooperation Europe (CSCE). This organization was to serve as a regular mode of communication among all parties to the agreement. The members later made it more concrete by renaming it the Organization on Security and Cooperation Europe (OSCE). In the later form, it became one significant vehicle for discussion between both sides after the end of the Cold War, and its election monitors were ever-present as the transition to democracy occurred in former communist-ruled nations.

As these doubts emerged, the high hopes for a SALT II Agreement began to languish. The initial plan had been that the Moscow and Washington would sign a series of such agreements, each of which would progressively limit the size of the nuclear arsenal. Election of President Carter in 1976 was a kind of setback, for the two parties had been ready to meet on the next step of reductions at about that time. If President Ford were elected, then the SALT II meeting would probably have occurred within the year. However, Jimmy Carter offended the Soviet leaders by criticizing them on their human rights record early in his term of office. The Soviet response was to postpone the armaments

meeting for a later time. In addition, technological improvements held the two parties back as well. America had developed the cruise missile, and the Soviet Union had built the Backfire Bomber (Stoessinger 1985, 224). Eventually, the meeting that became known as SALT II was held in 1979 in Vienna, probably two years later than had been originally expected. Its provisions did reduce even further the permitted numbers of launchers and MIRVS, but the political climate in both countries was not conducive to ratification. American doubts about the whole period of détente led to resistance by the Senate and an actual withdrawal of the treaty from that legislative body by President Carter. On the last day of the year, Brezhnev sent troops into Afghanistan, a move to which the American president responded by preventing American athletes from participating in the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics. In spite of the bad feeling on both sides, they informally agreed to comply with the weapons limits required by SALT II. That informal agreement worked until 1986, and so there continued to be something of a partnership on this set of issues if not an alliance.

Near the end of the Cold War, there were at least two meetings of significance in addressing the continuing concern about the huge stockpile of nuclear weapons. The first was the October 1986 Reykjavik Summit in Iceland between Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev. While the first Reagan presidential term had entailed no progress on arms limitations with the Soviet Union, the second term offered more promise. This may have had something to do with the political debate during the 1984 presidential campaign, for Walter Mondale had criticized the president for being the first since before World War II to have never met his Soviet counterpart. At Reykjavik, the two leaders discussed reducing strategic nuclear weapons by 50% over a five-year period and also cutting Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) warheads to one hundred each. Progress occurred quickly, for at the end of 1987 the two presidents decided to eliminate all intermediate nuclear weapons in Europe. The most American weapons in this category were located in West Germany, while the Soviet Union had placed theirs in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The plan and timetable called for elimination of the weapons in three years, but in fact they completed the task ahead of schedule. One new feature of this agreement

was creation of a Special Verification Commission that examined the process of missile destruction on each other's sites (McCormick 2010, 138–139). This was a great change from earlier agreements and persuaded the American public that duplicity was not this time characteristic of the other side.

Conclusion

In sum, American foreign policy did take shape in a setting of war during the 1945–1991 period. It may have been a war of nerves and a psychological war on in many years, but the United States was nevertheless on a war footing. Defense budgets grew and the nuclear stockpile continued to increase. Continuing stand-offs took place over the city of Berlin from the mid-1950s through the mid-1980s. The symbolic importance of that city during the Cold War was such that U.S. presidential candidate Barack Obama in 2008 chose that location for his major speech on European policy. In many ways, the Cuban Missile Crisis was the watershed event of the period. Soviet intentions to bring the fight to the doorstep of the United States were apparent, but so was the resolve of President Kennedy to risk war in enforcing the blockade and in requiring the removal of the weapons. During this prolonged war spanning forty-six years, alliance politics were continually at the center stage. America's defense of the city of Berlin was on behalf of its allies in the western part of Europe. Imposition of the blockade around Cuba sent a message of what might happen if similar Soviet probes occurred on the European continent. Development of nuclear weapons was one method for deterring an attack on Western Europe soon after the fall of Eastern Europe to communism. Similarly, arms negotiations included the allies as partners in the discussions and had the purpose of reducing their anxiousness about being so close to the weapons over which Soviet leaders had control. Overall in the period of Cold War, the Atlantic community was the key alliance hope of the period, although there were internal challenges such as that of the French (Kissinger 1963, 261). In particular, the key to success during the Cuban Missile Crisis was the "mobilization of allies" (Chayes 1963, 550).

In another way, the period of détente also reopened a kind of alliance between the Soviet Union and the United States. It was an alliance of intentions but also of some formal agreements. In the end, it was a bilateral alliance that supplemented rather than replaced the long decades of connections with traditional allies in Europe.

Korean War: A Small Pacific-Based Containment Alliance and Stalemate, 1950–1953

The Korean War was definitely a hot one that extracted a high number of casualties on both sides. In the end, South Korea was a kind of surrogate for America, while North Korea served the same purposes for the Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviet Union provided advice and assistance during the war, and the American General Douglas McArthur landed on the Inchon Peninsula and drove into the north with coalition forces (Stoessinger 1985, 82–92). At the time, communist China was an ally of the Soviet Union, and it was an invasion by their troops that pushed the American-led group back to the 38th parallel of latitude that still separates the two Koreas. Eventually, the North Korean regime became a kind of pariah, even to the Soviet Union. Even so, American troops remained in South Korea even after 1991, and so the peninsula became a kind of vestige or reminder of what the Cold War had entailed.

Strategic and political thinking before the war

The Korean War was in fact the first test of the containment strategy outlined by George Kennan right after World War II and quickly adopted by the Truman administration (Hook and Spanier 2004, 67). That strategy called for setting up check points that could effectively resist any Soviet-inspired probes primarily in Europe but also in Asia. In fact, the application of the primarily Euro-centered approach to Asia took place formally though enactment of a formal recommendation by the new NSC in 1949. There were three "policy components" to that recommendation. One was a call for creation of regional associations of noncommunist states, while a second focused on economic recovery in Asia as a pillar of security. The most detailed component focused

more sharply and concretely on strengthening security. For example, there were references to an enhanced American security position on Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines. Further, there were references to assistance to governments that were up against communist aggression, increased bilateral and multilateral initiatives to squelch communist insurgency, and design of new collective security arrangements for Asia alone ("The National Security Council Extends…" 2005, 250–251). All of those components formed the intellectual basis for engagement in both the Korean and Vietnamese Wars. A second component of the Kennan strategy was that such pressure might force the collapse of the Soviet system from within, an expectation that was not borne out for over forty years.

Another strategic initiative that the Truman administration developed for implementation of the containment strategy was NSC-68 in 1950. The document called for an increased defense budget in the Cold War that would entail large increases in both conventional and nuclear weapons (Papp et al. 2005, 163). Of course, the objective was to put substance into the overall architecture of post–World War II national defense and overall security. However, strategy and tactics do not always coincide, and that was surely true during lead up to the Korean War. In early 1950, Secretary of State Dean Rusk made an effort to define America's defense perimeter in Asia in a way that would reflect its priorities. He stated that the "defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands." Japan was part of this defense perimeter, but South Korea was not ("Secretary of State Dean Acheson Defines…" 2005, 254–256). While Acheson did call at that time for more aid in defense of South Korea, the Soviet interpretation was that this provided them an opening to nudge their North Korean allies toward attempted integration of the Korean Peninsula (Paterson et al. 2005b, 271).

Political considerations also played a role in setting the stage for involvement by the United States in the Korean Peninsula. Republicans were attacking President Truman for weakness in the face of communist aggression. China had "fallen" to the communists and Mao in the previous year, while Ho was on the move against the French in Indochina. Alger Hiss had been convicted within the United States as a communist spy who was doing the work of Moscow on American territory. Senator Joseph McCarthy was on the attack in his search for communist sympathizers within the State Department who

might not have been supportive enough of Chiang Kai-shek in the communist civil war (Paterson et al. 2005b, 266). In the end, broad strategic concerns, new policy articulations, and domestic political concerns all pressed the Truman administration in the direction of a strong response to any provocation on the Korean Peninsula.

Political background to Korean War

Japan had occupied Korea in the immediate decades before World War II and then through the war itself. After August 1945, both the Soviet and American militaries disarmed the Japanese military in their respective zones, north and south. As such this process was very similar to the allied occupation of Germany in the same year. In an early debate in the United Nations, the United States proposed that free elections determine the fate of the peoples both north and south, but the Soviet Union vetoed that idea (Hook and Spanier 2004, 67). In the South, elections were held with the strongly anticommunist Syngman Rhee as the victor in 1948. In the meantime, Kim Il Sung who had been in the Soviet Union accompanied the Soviet army in occupying the northern zone in 1945, and Stalin was prepared to help him move into the position of top political power. Given the contrasting developments in the two zones, President Truman subsequently suggested that the 38th parallel become the dividing point between the two regimes. Following acknowledgment of that reality, both superpowers pulled their troops from the two parts of Korea, and that process was finished by 1949 (Chittick 2006, 129). However, the perceptions of Kim and Rhee were more adventurous and wide-ranging than that reality. Both were convinced that their governments actually ought to represent the entire peninsula. In that respect, Soviet leaders nodded their assent to a North Korean attack on the south as early as March 1949 (Hook and Spanier 2004, 67).

Key events of the war

In early 1950, Kim put great pressure on the Soviet leadership for support in an invasion south of the 38th parallel. At one key meeting in January 1950, Kim

persistently asked two Soviet advisors why he could not schedule a meeting on the issue with either Stalin or Mao. He depicted the "liberation" of South Korea as a natural follow-up to the "liberation" of China in the preceding year ("North Korean Leader..." 2005, 256–257). In any event, the attack by the North across the 38th parallel came on June 26, 1950, and the American response was very rapid. Washington called President Truman back from a visit home in Missouri, and he then shifted troops from Japan to South Korea in order to protect that nation (Chittick 2006, 130). On the following day, he made the critical decision to send the 7th Fleet to the Formosa Straits to protect Taiwan and probably also South Vietnam. This step increased the threat level toward China and was one of the motives for them to react with a move into Korea later in the war (Paterson et al. 2005b, 268). President Truman informed Congress of his agreement to a "police action," but there was no official call for a declaration of war (Paterson et al. 2005b, 267). In the early days of the war, U.S. actions consisted of air and sea attacks, but soon the introduction of land forces under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur took place (Hook and Spanier 2004, 69).

Introduction of ground forces after MacArthur's Inchon Landing let to a major decision that would affect the course and outcome of the war over the long haul. MacArthur pressed for a military move across the dividing line between the two countries, and Truman's assent to this policy resulted in expansion of war aims from defense of South Korea to unification of the entire peninsula (Papp et al. 2005, 163). Once American-led UN troops moved across the key line on October 8, China made a quick decision to enter the way as well. Mao then informed Stalin that doing nothing would invite the "American raiders" to "be more rampant." This policy was a kind of America's appeasement doctrine, based on what the West learned during the Munich Crisis of 1938. Fearing subsequent American attacks on China, the Chinese leaders moved twelve divisions from Southern Manchuria to the border area with North Korea four days after the U.S. move in early October ("Chinese Leader Mao..." 2005, 260–261). On October 19, the Chinese dispatched 250,000 troops across the Yalu River and into North Korea. This was the one time when evidence of Soviet assistance is firm, for they provided "secret air cover, supplies, and training" (Paterson et al. 2005b, 272). In part, Stalin was

seeking the type of leverage over events that he had achieved in Europe. Even though China was at that time a foremost advocate of Moscow's central role in the world communist movement, Soviet leaders understood that the Chinese model of communism with its agrarian base was very different than their own. It was always possible that the Chinese model would have more appeal to East Asian communist movements. Thus, Soviet assistance to China at the time of their intervention would partly dampen Asian enthusiasm for China as the better model of revolution for that region.

Chinese troops drove the allies back across the 38th parallel in spite of MacArthur's conclusion that the Chinese ground troops and Soviet air force would not work well together ("General Douglas MacArthur…" 2005, 262). By the spring of 1951, the UN troops were successful enough to push the enemy back across that division between the two countries. MacArthur then developed the plan that led to his professional undoing. The plan included a naval blockade of China's coast, air force attacks on key Chinese industries, and coordination of a land invasion with Chinese nationalists. Such plans had many risks, and a key one was the possibility of a much greater Soviet involvement, for their alliance with China was partly based on the latter's fears about a resurgent Japan that might again invade China. Therefore, any nation that was connected with Japan and chose to attack China would be subject to Soviet retaliation (Hook and Spanier 2004, 70). In addition, President Truman very well understood that conventional war took on a different complexion in the young nuclear age. In the background was always the possibility that direct conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States always bore the potential to escalate to the nuclear level.

Alliance issues

America's alliance connections played a role during the Korean War at least at three different levels. First, at critical decision points during the war, discussions and votes took place within the United Nations. Second, there was an outreach by the Truman administration to a variety of allies old and new in the theater of operations. Third, there was an echo of this major Asian

conflict much further west in the halls of NATO and in the governing circles of traditional European allies. The mix of alliance considerations was a very new one for the United States, but it represented a priority on acting in a multilateral way rather than simply by itself (Chittick 2006, 130).

Fortunately for the Truman administration, the Soviet ambassador to the relatively new UN reflected official discontent with the failure to seat communist China by boycotting the Security Council meeting at which the vote on protection of South Korea came up. That absence opened up the possibility of a Security Council endorsement of the decision of the United States to protect South Korea after the North moved across the 38th parallel of latitude. That unanimous, veto-free vote made it possible for the Truman administration to advertise that the war was being fought under the "auspices" of the United Nations (Papp et al. 2005, 163). There were also a number of nonpermanent Security Council members at that time, and their composition and votes are revealing as well. One of them, Yugoslavia, decided to vote "no," a ballot that was consistent with their general support for Soviet policy stands at that time (Stoessinger 1985, 78). The Yugoslav leadership under Josef Broz Tito had announced a reform program in 1948, and its elements were decidedly in a more federal direction than Moscow preferred. However, the two communist allies were still generally close in their foreign policies. Interestingly, both Egypt and India abstained from the Security Council vote (Stoessinger 1985, 78). In later decades both would lean more toward the Soviet Union than the United States. would have liked, and both along with Yugoslavia became key founders of the Non-Aligned Movement. India needed protection from Pakistan, and Egypt from Israel. American ties to both Pakistan and Israel constituted geopolitical pressure for the other two to remain somewhat neutral or even independent. However, clear support for the American decision came from other nonpermanent members including the United Kingdom, France, Nationalist China, Cuba, Ecuador, and Norway (Stoessinger 1985, 78). The first two had been key World War II allies, while the two in Latin America were still under leadership that was willing to work with the United States. Norway was one of the original founding members of NATO in 1949, and Chiang Kai-shek's China on the small island of Formosa now retained the China seat on the UN Security Council.

UN endorsement became a critical issue later in the year when President Truman decided to expand war aims to include crossing north across the 38th parallel in order to unify the Korean Peninsula. He might have gone back to the Security Council for support but instead concluded that the United States should go it alone. After the decision was made, the UN General Assembly actually did take a vote, and the American decision received a strong level of support with 47 countries saying "yes," 5 "no," and 7 "abstain." Misperceptions about global friendship and even alliances also played a role in this decision. Prior to 1949, America and China had worked well together, and this history may have misled President Truman to conclude that even a Maoist-ruled China would not react very strongly to the new situation. Chinese sensitivities may have been at work at this time, and they may have decided that they faced a coordinated offensive movement that included the United States, Nationalist China, and France. Further, France was at the same time trying to stop Ho's communist insurrection in Indochina. In other words, reality and perceptions coincided to generate a decision that would entirely change the complexion of the Korean War.

Cultivation of regional allies also proceeded apace outside of the orbit of the United Nations, for there was a need to get at least symbolic support if not actual combat troops, in order to share the burden of war and preserve the image of multilateralism. Table 4.1 reveals the general pattern of allied support as well as the overwhelming role that the U.S. military took on.

Clearly, South Korea as the affected nation provided the highest level of support, next to the United States. In fact, there were 15 nations that provided some level of ground forces. Nations that sent at least one full unit included the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the

Table 4.1 Contributions of armed forces, by percentage, to the allied effort in the Korean War

Type of forces	Ground forces (%)	Naval forces (%)	Air forces (%)
United States	50	85	93
South Korea	40	7	5
Other	10	8	2
Total	100	100	100

Netherlands. Overall a full thirty governments sent noncombat equipment such as field hospitals, medicine, and food. The Chinese Nationalists offered to send 33,000 troops, but President Truman refused that offer in light of the potential provocation to the "other" China under Mao (Stoessinger 1985, 80–81).

Of course, Japan was by this time an ally of the United States but unable to contribute to military missions outside of its own territory. One result of the Korean War was pushing Japan and the United States much closer together. In fact, Washington provided $3 billion in procurement orders to Japan during the war, a step that assisted them in the first steps toward economic recovery (Paterson et al. 2005b, 274). The war also accelerated discussions about signing a peace treaty with Japan, a step that had not occurred directly after World War II. Such talk worried the Soviet leadership and made them think that America was dead set on setting up an Asian equivalent to NATO. If the North Koreans could unify the peninsula with Soviet support, then they would jointly succeed in neutralizing that threat from Japan (LaFeber 1972, 96–97). In September of 1951, the United States plus 48 other nations signed the final peace treaty with Japan, and they became a kind of alliance partner.

There were other smaller repercussions of the Korean War in countries that seemed to face a parallel communist threat. America negotiated for military bases in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Spain. The discussions about rearming West Germany became reality, and a military alliance with Pakistan came into being in 1954 (Paterson et al. 2005b, 274). All of these new developments fit neatly into the new perceptions that the Soviet Union and its allies were on the move in previously unexpected corners of the world.

The impact of the Asian War on Europe was evident through increased expenditures as well as intensified discussions with personnel in the Truman administration. The North Korean attack definitely made countries and leaders more anxious about a similar Soviet-inspired attack in the West. Greece and Turkey had been severely threatened by communist forces in the 1940s, and the Truman Doctrine of 1947 was a direct response and was partly responsible for keeping them from falling into the Soviet-led camp. Heightened concern about those two after the beginning of the Korean War led to earlier-than-anticipated admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO in

1952 (Chittick 2006, 134). Another reaction by the Truman administration was dispatch of more troops to Europe to make the number of NATO troops there a full half million (Papp et al. 2005, 163). The American forces sent constituted four full divisions, and accompanying this shift in resources were requests that Congress earmark an additional $4 billion for defense. Further links with the militaries in Spain, Italy, and Germany were also tied to the overall goal "to protect Europe" (LaFeber 1972, 104–105). Thereby, the western military alliance hopefully possessed the capability better to "deter war in Europe" (Papp et al. 2005, 163).

American leaders had been learning to keep a kind of double vision on Europe and Asia since the strike on Pearl Harbor in 1941. For example, in drafting NSC-68 in 1950, Paul Nitze talked about the industrial areas of East Asia and Europe as being equally important as priorities for American security policy (Chittick 2006, 130). President Truman also had Western Europe in mind when he ruled out the use of nuclear weapons after China flooded across the North Korean border with it massive ground forces. His considerations were partly based on fear about a retaliatory Soviet attack on Western Europe (Paterson et al. 2005b, 270). Consultations with allies about the impact of Korea on other locations also took place, and this was particularly true of the old partner Great Britain. For instance, on the day of the North Korean invasion, the Truman advisory circle discussed the need to talk with London about a parallel attack by domestic communist forces on the Shah's regime in Iran ("President Harry S. Truman … " 2005, 259). Similarly, the debate about whether to use atomic weapons after China's involvement in the war aroused the British leadership, and Prime Minister Clement Atlee arrived by boat in order to be part of the discussions. He wanted to dissuade President Truman from considering use of atomic weaponry to stop China, but the American leader had already decided on that issue. At the same time, Atlee disagreed with the Truman administration's understanding of the nature of the communist movement, for he thought that China was not really a satellite of the Soviet Union. Atlee also pushed for another vote by the United Nations, but Truman had already decided otherwise (LaFeber 1972, 112–114).

It might have been logical to expect that allies for the United States might emerge in Latin America after the signing of the Rio Pact. However, such

unanimous support would have to wait a decade until the Cuban Missile Crisis. Columbia did send some military service personnel, and several other nations sent supplies (LaFeber 1972, 114). However, such indifference and resistance by America's neighborhood region was the exception. Overall, the Truman administration did have singular success in obtaining support from the United Nations, assistance from a number of allies primarily in the Pacific region, increased attentiveness of NATO to repercussions in Europe, and more extensive commitments from European partners.

Conclusion: End of the war and aftermath

There were a full two years of stalemate in the war from 1951 to 1953. Each side stared unmoved in the direction of the other, while the armies on both sides made little progress beyond the stalemate at the 38th parallel. Perhaps, the death of Stalin in 1953 made the new Soviet leadership more interested in some sort of formal end to the war. In the end an armistice was signed to end the actual war, but replacement by a formal treaty was still only a hope sixty years later. The new Eisenhower administration followed up to ensure the future security of South Korea by signing a mutual security pact with them (Hook and Spanier 2004, 72). There were several unresolved issues that did receive attention, and prisoners of war (POW) was one of them. A committee of neutral nations decided that the prisoners could stay where they were or leave, if they liked. A handful of Americans actually opted to stay in North Korea. The demilitarized zone (DMZ) became the official separation between the two still mobilized forces, and roughly it was the same as the 38th parallel that had been such a powerful symbol during the war (Paterson et al. 2005b, 271). Although the continuing tensions between the two countries on the Korea Peninsula bubbled in each decade following the armistice, the outcome was still better than the scenario that General MacArthur outlined in his speech upon returning home. He called for an economic blockade against China, air reconnaissance along the Chinese and Manchurian coasts, and an attack by up to 600,000 Nationalist Chinese troops against communist China

("MacArthur's No Substitute…" 2005, 262–263). Had that scenario been realized, the suffering in this one benchmark of a century of war would have been far greater.

The aftermath of the war also includes its impact on regional and global patterns. In some ways, the American-led struggle in Korea in the early 1950s paralleled the French battle in Indochina from 1946 to 1954. At the time, both western powers perceived their struggle as one directed against a newly aggressive Soviet Union. In both cases the local regimes under attack were relatively weak and in need of outside support. Syngman Rhee in South Korea and Bao Dai in South Vietnam both proved unable on their own to fend off the attacks from local communist based forces in the north (Soustelle 1950, 56). However, later on it became clear that Moscow had little to do with the nationalist movement of Ho Chi Minh and also that China would play a much larger role on the Korean Peninsula than would Stalin's Soviet Union. At the global level, there was a perception that the Korean War was a microcosm of the tug-of-war among the United States, Soviet Union, and United Nations (Stevenson 1952, 349). From that perspective, hostilities in Korea engaged not only specific alliances but also the existing world balance of power.

War in Southeast Asia: Absence of Allies, Noncontainment, and Defeat, 1964–1973

In a similar way, the war in Vietnam in its early days was another surrogate for Soviet-American tensions, and the number that lost lives and suffered injuries on both sides, civilian as well as military, was enormous. Again, China supplied North Vietnam as did the Soviet Union, but this time the Sino-Soviet split was a reality and so they did not coordinate their efforts. More than the Korean War, the war in Vietnam entailed a strong dose of Vietnamese nationalism that the northern leader Ho Chi Minh expressed much better than did the South Vietnamese leadership. In fact, the southern leaders did not even share the Buddhist religion that was dominant in both halves of Vietnam. Eventually, President Nixon expanded the war to Cambodia in order to cut off the movement of supplies down the Ho Chi Minh trail and into South Vietnam. An armistice was hammered out in Paris in early 1973, and American troops departed in March of that year. Within two years the North had absorbed South Vietnam and created one country called Vietnam. The United States could not claim even a stalemate as they could with regard to the Korean Peninsula, and to many it looked like a defeat (Jentleson 2007, 129–138). Its impact on American society and culture was devastating, and it was more than a decade before the United States began to assert its military power in any effective way.

The French and early U.S. roles

France played the colonial role in Indochina and thus was a precursor of the United States in eventually confronting great frustration in attempting

to manage that far-off nation with a culture profoundly different from its own. They had obtained control over that colonial outpost in the 1860s, and the incentive for them at the time was purely economic. As French industrialization expanded, supplies of "rice, rubber, oil, tungsten, and tin" were essential ingredients (Hook and Spanier 2004, 113). Japanese conquest changed the nature of colonial controls from the mid-1930s through the end of the war in 1945. In effect, Japanese administrators took ultimate control over day-to-day decisions in Indochina, but they normally retained the former French administrators in a subordinate position as well. After all, the French personnel knew better the situation on the ground and were able to offer valuable advice. After Japan's defeat in August 1945, the French resumed their former dominant role. However, fate determined that their new lease on life in that part of the world would last only a bit less than a decade (Hook 2011, 51). In attempting to regain control after the Japanese departure, they encountered the growing Vietnamese nationalist movement as represented in the Vietminh and its left-bank, Paris-educated leader Ho Chi Minh. The United States was willing to undergird the French effort t by providing 40% of the costs to the French. America also provided them with "clandestine economic and military assistance" (McCormick 2010, 90–92). Thereby, the Truman administration provided important but insufficient alliance support to a key European nation that sought to extend the colonial age a bit longer.

France left the region after its defeat at the famous battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. With other allies the United States sponsored the Geneva Conference in 1954 in an effort to solidify the situation on the ground. At the conference the participants agreed that there should be an armistice put in place, that the 17th parallel of latitude should be the border between the two countries of North Vietnam and South Vietnam, and that elections that centered on the topic of unification would be held in 1956. Shortly after that conference, America pulled back from the scene. Critically, the Eisenhower administration never pushed for the elections to be held (McCormick 2010, 92). By the early 1960s, the Kennedy administration began to take action in response to increasing turbulence in the region. In 1961 the president dispatched the Seventh Fleet into the South China Sea in order to halt the progress of the Pathet Lao in Laos. By the end of his time in office, Kennedy had placed 16,000 military

advisors in South Vietnam, as the communist insurgency was spreading there as well. In doing so, the administration fully realized that they faced an equal number of Viet Cong soldiers, most of whom were natives of South Vietnam and supplied from that region as well (Paterson et al. 2005b, 343–344).

Decision to enter the war and rationale for doing so

American leaders framed the conflict in Vietnam as a vintage Cold War ideological conflict that was similar to the challenge they had faced in the Korean Peninsula as well as in Europe. Officially, there was an underestimation of the extent to which the battle between North and South was a civil war as well as an extension of the struggle for "independence and self-determination" that the region had recently waged against the French (Hook 2011, 52). President Johnson himself tended to depict the struggle in the early years as one that China backed, as they had the North Koreans in an earlier decade. Fearing a "Red Asia," he proceeded to inject more and more military capabilities until the commitment was a very substantial one. His rationale was "to save Vietnam from China" (LaFeber 1972, 262). American "attainable objectives" were never very clear (Snow and Brown 2000, 49). Ostensibly, the battle looked the same as the one confronted during the Korean War. An enemy in the north was seeking to take over a U.S. ally in the south across a clearly defined border. However, the Vietnamese situation was in a sense more nuanced than the one faced in Korea. There was indeed a North Vietnamese army that sought to unify the peninsula under communist control. However, the associated Viet Cong were largely from the South, while some of the southern leaders were Catholics in a country that was primarily Buddhist. When Air Marshall Ky became premier in June 1965, the leadership baton in South Vietnam had passed to an individual who was actually from North Vietnam and who had fought with the French (LaFeber 1972, 260). While China had a number of reasons for intervening in the Korean War, they turned out to have little interest in going beyond supplies to North Vietnam. After 1975, they actually fought a war with the newly unified Vietnam. Further, the North Vietnamese army itself never actually crossed the 17th parallel.

With the Munich Analogy in the back of his mind, President Johnson went about a strategy of escalation that was intended to protect U.S. power and credibility (Jentleson 2007, 131–132). As early as January 1964, he directed an air bombardment campaign that was envisioned to bring North Vietnam to its knees (Stoessinger 1985, 178). Continuing clandestine attacks may have led to the alleged attacks on the two American ships in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964 (Papp et al. 2005, 167). Although it was later very uncertain whether the North Vietnamese had actually attacked the *Maddox* and *Turner Joy*, there was a perception on their side that the ships may have been in that location to distract attention on military moves by the South Vietnamese military (LaFeber 1972, 249). The ships were also only four miles off the North Vietnamese coastline, a space that claimed as their own national waters (LaFeber 1972, 250).

Major escalation of the war by the United States occurred in early 1965, after the Viet Cong attacked an American camp at Pleiku and killed seven U.S. military personnel. President Johnson then announced his "Rolling Thunder" campaign in order to cut off totally the supply lines into the South from North Vietnam (LaFeber 1972, 259). In this formative period of American strategy toward Vietnam, the administration was following a rationale of getting all North Vietnamese communist sympathizers and soldiers out of South Vietnam so that the latter could pursue its path toward democratic values and institutions. The result would be enhanced security for other noncommunist nations in the region such as Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Hopefully, the U.S. military presence would buttress noncommunist forces engaged in tough battles in Cambodia and Laos ("President Lyndon B. Johnson's Advisers…" 2005, 423). Other regional parallels fed portions of U.S. strategy as well. For example, the nation-building that would follow American military gains would emphasize construction and growth of strategic hamlets whose leaders and people would themselves be capable of fending off future communist insurgencies. This concept was rooted in the previously successful efforts of Malaya to build New Villages in combating their communist challenge in 1961–1963 (Khong 2005, 505). In fact, the Vietnamese situation was quite different, for hamlets in South Vietnam that were "liberated" by day often returned to local Viet Cong control by night.

Evolution of the war

Following the February 1965 air bombardments that were a consequence of the North Vietnamese attack on Pleiku, President Johnson in March sent 27,000 marines to South Vietnam to guard airfields that had been under attack. The North Vietnamese had been hitting those air bases in retaliation for the previous American attacks on their naval facilities as a result of the Tonkin Gulf firing on two American ships in early August 1964 (Snow and Brown 2000, 50). By 1968 the number of American troops had escalated to 500,000 (McCormick 2010, 93), and this had been the clear result of step-by-step, incremental decisions rather than by adoption of an overall, well-thought-out plan. In spite of that enormous investment of military personnel and equipment, the Viet Cong scored a major psychological blow by attacking the U.S. Embassy in Saigon during the Tet Lunar New Year in the same year. Their ability to make that kind of attack after three full years of American military engagement brought public doubts to the surface during a difficult election year in the United States (Hook and Spanier 2004, 128). One clear result was the decision of President Johnson that he would not seek another term in office that year, and so the whole tide of escalation was halted in midstream. Revelation of the My Lai massacres of about 500 villagers by an American unit the very next year compounded public unease and outright discontent with this particular war (Chittick 2006, 143).

During 1969–1971, the Nixon administration reduced the number of American troops from 550,000 to 200,000. Implementation of Nixon's strategy of Vietnamization reduced those numbers to 25,000 by 1973 (McCormick 2010, 94). Within this time frame of the first Nixon term, there was an important expansion of the war to Cambodia in April 1970. The aim was to cut off the supply line along the Ho Chi Minh trail that snaked through Cambodian territory and back into South Vietnam (LaFeber 1972, 274). In fact, there had been a secret campaign to accomplish the same goal before the publicly announced change in policy. Such an expanded set of goals led to great public opposition within the United States and led many to conclude that prolonged Vietnamization was as futile an approach as Johnson's incremental escalation had been. In January 1973, the last American combat troops left the

country after the signing of the cease-fire in Paris. For two years the Nixon and Ford administrations provided military assistance to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), but it all seemed to have been in vain when the country collapsed in the spring of 1975. Unification of Vietnam occurred, and the American effort to protect the independence of South Vietnam came to naught. Casualties were enormous for the Vietnamese people, both civilians and military and in both the North and South, while the American military took nearly 59,000 losses in battle and 153,000 wounded. The bitter and difficult experience in this long war was compounded through the weakness of alliance partnerships that backed America in its efforts.

Weakness of alliance networks

When the Johnson administration was considering the introduction of military forces into Vietnam, it was George Ball in the inner circle who pointed out that the number of allies who were supportive of U.S. efforts in Vietnam was considerably less than the number that had offered help during the Korean War a decade earlier. At the time, insiders were making much of the lessons from Korea, namely that the American operation should abide by the principle of proportionality in contrast to the inflated objectives of at least General MacArthur in Korea (Khong 2005, 507–510). In fact, President Johnson cited the SEATO Treaty of 1954 as a rationale for the Vietnam War. The signatories specifically promised protection for a threatened Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos (Chittick 2006, 134). In the same year, the signatories of the Geneva Conference also had promised support for the principle of keeping the same three nations free of conflict ("Final Declaration … " 2005, 418–419). Of course, that conference and its key three accords had little force or staying power, in any event. Further, passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution by Congress in 1964 was partly rooted in the reasoning that the United States had a moral obligation to assist any SEATO nation that found its security jeopardized ("The Tonkin Gulf Resolution … " 2005, 421).

Overall, South Korea was the main ally with which the United States was linked. Even in the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration provided a billion

dollars in assistance to the Diem regime. In fact, this made South Vietnam the fifth largest recipient of American foreign aid in the world (McCormick 2010, 92). Such a pattern provided a foundation for the greatly expanded commitments noted above. At critical points, the United States made important decisions about the war without checking with any allies or partnerships. For instance, no formal talks with NATO or SEATO preceded the key decision early in the war to begin air attacks on North Vietnamese ports (LaFeber 1972, 249–250). During the war, no Western European nation provided combat troop. Those nations which did provide that kind of assistance were Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Thailand. South Korea was providing a kind of payback for America's help during its war in the early 1950s. Australia and New Zealand had always feared Chinese adventurism in their area, and so the China rationale may have influenced their defense decisions. An expected ally such as Japan could have at least given moral support to the operation, but they offered criticism of it instead (LaFeber 1972, 266). Finally, there may have been the most alliance support given at the time of the cease-fire in January 1973. There were twelve nations that approved this cease-fire, and China and the Soviet Union were among them (Hook and Spanier 2004, 134). Clearly, ending the war had a stronger multilateral component than either beginning it or prosecuting it did.

Domestic factors in America

The eventual lack of public support paralleled the weak alliance component of this war, and the two no doubt nourished each other. Initially, Congress overwhelmingly approved the Tonkin Gulf Resolution to enable the president to respond to the twin attacks on the American Navy with force (McCormick 2010, 93). However, after serious public and congressional doubts rose sharply about the war, many legislators regretted their vote, had no idea what a large commitment that they had legitimized, and wished they could undo their original support. Even as early as 1966, Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair J. William Fulbright coined the term "arrogance of power" to characterize the overall process by which President Johnson had deluded both the Congress

and the public. He pointed out the fact that the South Vietnamese government did not even have the support of its own people, and he went on to question seriously the workability of the "means" that the administration had chosen to fight the war ("Senator J. William Fulbright . . ." 2005, 426). Even the ultimate insider and "hawk" Robert McNamara, secretary of defense through most of the Johnson years, expressed considerable post facto doubts about the war in 1995. He notes his own surprise when General William Westmoreland requested as many as 175,000 additional troops by the end of 1965 and then 100,000 more the next year ("Former Secretary of Defense . . ." 2005, 428).

Such questions and doubts within the American establishment no doubt both reflected and sparked intense public debates about the war. College campuses in particular became centers of ferment and debate about the desirability of that war, and by 1968 it was difficult for representatives of the administration to appear and give speeches on large campuses. The fact that the military utilized a draft to conscript people into its ranks stirred up families and undermined morale within combat units. Increasing use of drugs in Vietnam weakened the fighting force and was partly related to the "fragging" of officers by persons within their own ranks of the American Army and Marines. Much of the dissent peaked during the 1968 presidential elections. At the end of 1967, Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota announced his candidacy for the Democratic Party nomination that the sitting president would simply inherit. After the Tet Offensive, Senator Robert Kennedy of New York announced his candidacy as well, and soon President Johnson took himself out of the race for the nomination.

The Republican Party standard bearer Richard Nixon spoke of a plan to end the war but was surprisingly a man of few words about its details. In large part, his victory was a rejection of the Democratic Party candidate Hubert Humphrey, a man who had been Johnson's vice president, and an insider who was not known earlier to have voiced any important doubts about the course of the war. In office, he took his entire first term to Vietnamize the war, and the cease-fire coincided with the advent of his eventually aborted second term. Key events during his first term created the same kind of public discontent that both Johnson's continuous escalation and the Tet Offensive had a few years earlier. After the expansion of the war into Cambodia in 1970, protests

at Kent State University in Ohio led to four student deaths at the hands of the National Guard. That event sparked countless sympathetic protests on other college campuses. In late 1972, when most Americans thought that peace was at hand, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger announced what became known as the Christmas carpet bombing of Hanoi. It was in reality a final effort to obtain leverage over the North Vietnamese before the peace conference, but to many it seemed belated, brutal, poorly timed, and excessive.

Symbolic of the intense domestic conflict of the times were the unrelated assassinations of two evocative leaders, one representing the black community and the other an heir of a very popular pre–Vietnam War president. The deaths of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy in the spring of 1968 revealed the vicious vortex that spun through all corners of the country. If "things fell apart" in the world in 1914 with the advent of a war of previously unimaginable destruction, so the heads of many Americans bowed now in embarrassment before the values and creed emblazoned in the heart of Lincoln Memorial.

Aftermath: The Vietnam Syndrome

In terms of foreign policy, the words "Vietnam Syndrome" came to stand for the renewed interest in domestic affairs and in rebuilding the home front. Mostly, people wanted to forget that the Vietnam War had ever happened. Veterans came home to stony silence, as if they had somehow been responsible for the travesty into which many of them had been involuntarily called. Just has many World War II vets did not really speak about their experiences in that war until half a century later, so the American public did not begin to account for or try to explain what had happened. It might have been the case that the film industry would immediately have begun to depict what the struggle had been like. However, it would be nearly a full decade before the movies appeared that gave meaning to the war.

At the same time, "Vietnam Syndrome" also stood for a partial retreat from the internationalism that had become the normal approach by U.S. leaders through and after World War II. There was little interest in challenging Soviet aggressive actions such as the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 or in

the crackdown on the Polish Solidarity Movement in December 1981. Earlier the Ford administration had reacted very mildly to the fall of South Vietnam in April 1975. Even during the war, the lame duck Johnson administration had been passive when the Warsaw Pact tanks crushed the Prague Spring reformers in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Closer home, the rise of a Marxist Sandinista Movement in Nicaragua did not provoke much of a response by American officialdom until the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980.

In sum, there were both symbolic and practical angles to the "Syndrome." The war set off a smoldering fire of soul-searching that infected veterans, civilians, political leaders, and cultural figures. How could an America whose manifest destiny it had been to expand to the Pacific Ocean have itself caused so much suffering in Southeast Asia? Was it the same America that had absorbed the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941 that by itself had perpetrated the My Lai massacre? Why was it that the nation that pushed back aggressive dictators in both Europe and Asia had taken it upon itself to send 550,000 soldiers half a world away to combat a nationalist movement who considered its own manifest destiny to be the unification of its people and regions?

In practical and concrete terms, the lesson of Vietnam was encapsulated in the Powell or Powell/Weinberger Doctrine. The provisions of that doctrine were to be instructive when future conflicts emerged that seemed to require an American response. There should be clear objectives at the outset, an overwhelming amount of resources to accomplish them, and a sharply defined exit strategy (McCormick 2010, 95). Obviously, American leadership did not measure up to those tests during the experience of war in Vietnam, but they did guide future leaders, including Colin Powell himself, during the Persian Gulf War a decade and a half after the collapse of South Vietnam. Ironically, the rapid resolution of outcomes in the Gulf War generated the widespread conclusion that America had finally purged itself of the "Vietnam Syndrome."

As in the Korean War, there were at least broader regional factors at play in the struggle in Vietnam and Cambodia. In interpreting specific events during the war, some analysts attributed victories to South Vietnam, America, and their allies including Australia and South Korea (Shaplen 1967, 95). This type of thinking gave the impression that Washington was spearheading an alliance in a way that paralleled its leadership in past twentieth-century

wars. Some Washington insiders and strategy analysts envisioned a hoped for victory in South Vietnam as a deterrent against future communist adventurism in neighboring nations such as Thailand, Malaysia, and even India (Nixon 1967, 111). Protection of South Vietnam for democratic development might generate ripples that would bring similar results to the broader region of South Asia. In that sense, the effort to prevent dominoes from falling in Southeast Asia paralleled the early twentieth-century thinking of key personnel in the Bush administration that erection of a democracy in Iraq might become a waterfall that would both flow into surrounding countries and carry in political systems that approximated the western models.

Theoretical implications of the Cold War

Alliance theory can reveal both some of the vulnerabilities that afflicted American foreign policy planning during the Cold War but can also serve as a pointer to strengths that enabled the nation to maintain its position in a balance of power with the Soviet Union. Again, there were important distances and gaps that exacerbated the security dilemmas in facing a common threat in a number of globally important regions of the world. At the same time, regional organizations were growing and maturing in a way that permitted policy makers to maneuver their way through the open spaces that verged on becoming vacuums of power. Although the Cold War was global in scope, the key hot spots emerged in Europe, Asia, and Latin America.

Europe was the center of concern over the ongoing series of Berlin Crises as well as with regard to the growing presence of nuclear weapons. One weakness in achievement of U.S. national security goals was certainly "gravitational distance," for the Atlantic Ocean was a cleaver that had the potential to weaken the western alliance. There was certainly the anxiety of European leaders that the United States would not really come to their aid in a stand-off with the Soviet Union or its Warsaw Pact allies. In addition, French policy separated from that taken by American leadership after DeGaulle's unhappiness with the themes of his partner across the Atlantic emerged in the early 1960s. There was also a degree of "typological distance," for the intensity of the World War

II alliance among the United States, Great Britain, and the peoples subjected to Nazi controls yielded a somewhat more relaxed set of alliance assumptions characteristic of a prolonged Cold War. However, these soft spots do not indicate that "distance" created a "shatterbelt" in the western alliance.

There were plenty of strengths that kept the western alliance mainly intact during the Cold War. There was really no "attributional distance," for common historical and cultural experiences over centuries knit the nations together, even if in loose way. An effective regional organization developed in the national security area, for there were a full eighteen countries that had become part of NATO by the late Cold War. European nations that had been occupied in the 1940s returned to the democratic patterns of governance that had characterized the interwar period, and all of these dynamics generated frequent patterns of communication and mostly cooperation. Within Europe itself, the expanding and deepening common market, or eventually European Union, helped overcome distances that existed within Europe itself. In the end, this cross-Atlantic community weathered the constant issues related to Berlin and also the challenging tensions connected with both the development and restriction of sophisticated weapons systems.

In contrast with its relationship with Europe, the American links to Asian allies and networks were considerably more problematic and even riddled with continuous provocations and misunderstandings. Although the United States was again an ocean away from the troubled areas of East and Southeast Asia, "gravitational distance" was much more problematic than it had been with Europe. America had not played much of a role in Asia, with the exception of World War II. In a sense, the attack on Pearl Harbor awakened American leadership to the importance of building defense networks with selected nations of Asia. There had never been a history of continuous conversations as there had been with the nations of Europe. "Typological distance" exacerbated this dilemma, for anticolonial rebellions in Asia destroyed common protective borders that the French, British, and Japanese had imposed in the decades before World War II. In terms of the "hot wars" fought in this period, the Japanese departed from Korea in 1945 and the French from Vietnam in 1954. While their withdrawal after military defeats permitted a greater degree of national self-determination in the respective regions, the direct result was

an invitation to civil war that eventually pulled in the United States like two small magnets. Different cultural characteristics were clearly a hallmark of any building Pacific community. America's roots lay primarily in Europe and secondarily in Africa, but not in Asia. On the Asian continent itself, Japan was a lingering demon to the peoples in both Korea and Indochina. While North Koreans welcomed China as an alliance partner in their war, the North Vietnamese did not. Simmering tensions and deep-rooted historical memories undercut future partnerships between America and even the southern parts of Korea and Vietnam. Thus, it is safe to assume that any Pacific security community was in reality a "shatterbelt."

If considerable distances of several types made any steps by American leaders into Asia quite difficult, there were few bridges across the Pacific that could help transcend the gaps. There was no Asian counterpart to NATO, and that meant that Presidents Truman and Johnson had to stitch together any national partnerships on the run. However, there was little consistency over time to those linkages. For instance, Japan was technically on the American team in terms of moral and economic support during the Korean War but not during Vietnam War. In a glaring way, there was a sharp drop-off of alliance partners for America between the Korean War and Vietnam War. Many Europeans envisioned the struggle in Korea as similar to their own, in terms of the Soviet threat. However, there were no European cheerleaders for the United States during the conflict in Southeast Asia. Perhaps, the single ray of light was the reality of détente during the latter stages of the war in Vietnam. As America and the Soviet Union became alliance partners of a sort on the matter of reducing the two huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons, the potential for future trouble between the two superpowers in a post-Vietnam Asia was lessened.

The Cuban Missile Crisis highlighted the significance of Latin America for American strategic interests. It may seem strange that any "distance" at all would have characterized this relationship, as both shared geographic space at least in the Western Hemisphere. There was really no "gravitational distance," for American industries had been deeply involved in the region to the south for reasons of economic gain for many decades. Similarly, any "typological distance" would have occurred in the first half of the nineteenth century,

when the Spanish and Portuguese pulled out as their empires collapsed. However, there was considerable "attributional distance" between America and its neighbors to the south. Primarily, this rested on political differences or experiences rather than on cultural contrasts. The United States had kept its marines in several countries for long stays, had been heavy-handed in wresting territory for the building of the Panama Canal, and had supported authoritarian regimes that offered protection for its economic interests on more than one occasion. Therefore, there was a basis for Latin American resentment in general and discontent by countries individually with the results of the American presence. The sympathy of Cuban leaders like Castro for the Soviet Model may have seemed surprising to Americans ninety miles away but understandable to others in the region. Later, the Chilean people would actually elect a socialist leader Salvador Allende to office, and that would set off a new mini-Cold War in that hemisphere that the United States shared with its southern neighbors. In the latter part of the Cold War, the rise of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua would pull the same ideological trigger for the Reagan administration.

After the Cuban Missile Crisis ended, there was a return to a kind of normalcy in the region. Castro remained in power in Cuba, and the United States continued to orchestrate a partly successful boycott of the island's economy. However, the potential for a shooting war or return to missile diplomacy was unlikely after 1962 with regard to Cuba, Chile, or Nicaragua. From the American perspective, the positive factors that made this a more optimistic scenario than Asia was the close geographic distance, the long history of relating to one another as nations, and the common cultural traditions. There were also shared democratic traditions at various points in the post-war period. Ironically, the emergence of authoritarian governments in individual Latin American nations was not always a deterrent to a partnership with the United States, for they often were more intensely anti-communist than were their democratically elected counterparts. Finally, the OAS was in existence and could at least offer votes of confidence in the positions taken by American presidents on issues of common security significance. This was most evident when the OAS supported President Kennedy's blockade as the method for resolving the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Overall, alliance theory is instructive in helping to decipher some of the reasons for the success or failure of the foreign policy of the United States in the three critical regions during the long history of the Cold War. Broadly speaking, that theory can help illuminate some of the reasons for the greater success of American foreign policy in Europe and Latin America than in Asia. There was considerable geographic and culture closeness between the United States and Latin America, while the relationship between Washington and Europe was a shared one in terms of common culture, parallel democratic patterns of governance, and key organizational links. In sharp contrast, there were few such linkages with Asia at the times of the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Common aspirations of South Korea and South Vietnam for national self-determination and perhaps democracy constituted shared values with the United States. However, those aspirations foundered on the rocks of the geographic, cultural, and political distance that had been a common feature of their occasional historical experiences together. As well, a sudden and inflamed American presence on the Korean Peninsula and in Vietnam was not a substitute for a strong and continuing regional security organization.

Part Three

Creation of Alliances to Restrict and Defeat Rogue State Power: Immediate Post–Cold War Period

Many hoped for the dawn of a peaceful age after the fall of the communist regimes in Central Europe in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. For example, the United States embraced a Base Realignment and Consolidation (BRAC) process right away in 1991. However, the draw-down in military capabilities that consumed leaders may have been a mistake, for by the middle of the decade challenging Rogue Leaders had emerged in far-off places.

American-Led, United Nations–Based Alliance to Check Saddam and Iraq, 1990–1991

Saddam Hussein had been a major factor in Middle East politics since his takeover of the Iraqi Ba'athist Party in 1968–1970. For instance, he had invaded Iran in 1980 in an effort to gain control over the Shatt al Arab, a move that would enable his country to move its oil into the Persian Gulf more efficiently and at a much cheaper price. After that war ended in stalemate in 1988, he sought other methods for achieving the same objectives. By the summer of 1990, he had fastened on Kuwait and invaded that country in August of the year. During the fall America transferred military personnel and equipment to Saudi Arabia in preparation for war. Ironically, these were the same months in which Americans followed the end of the Cold War, as the Gorbachev regime collapsed along with the Soviet Union on December 13. President George H. W. Bush was successful in obtaining support from both the American Congress and the United Nations to take "all means necessary" to dislodge the Iraqi army from Kuwait. The presence of so much oil in the region no doubt was a prime factor in western willingness to take on this battle. A long struggle against Saddam's million-man army was expected, but the war itself was finished by the end of February. Pinpoint bombing by the American and British air forces softened up the Iraqi military, and a well-planned ground invasion consumed only one hundred hours. American power was thus critical in checking a Rogue Leader and his ambitions, but it turned out that it was only the first chapter in a very long story.

End of the Cold War and a new day?

There was a kind of euphoria in western circles after the rapid collapse of the Moscow-led communist empire and the corresponding unexpected end of the

Cold War. There was discussion about the "end of history" and the inevitability of the spread of the liberal democratic model where communist patterns had been the norm. The Bush administration, correspondingly, talked about the creation of a "New World Order" in which the primacy of American military and defense capabilities would be a given. Early in this period the Clinton administration embraced the doctrine of "engagement and enlargement," an approach that suggested American foreign policy would be predicated on nurturing relationships with precisely those nations that embraced democratic practices in order to expand the universe of like-minded political elites and similar political systems. Many spoke of the reality of the "democratic peace," a descriptive label based on the axiom that participatory political systems were less likely to initiate war than were authoritarian leaders and regimes.

In the early post–Cold War years, American leaders became wrapped up in a whirlwind of overtures to the countries of the former communist bloc. They redirected foreign assistance to the newly freed countries, as the old priority on the developing world had temporarily faded from the scene. Some of the more advance of the post-communist nations quickly established links with the European Union with an eye on potential membership. The Clinton administration offered selected nations the NATO status entitled PfP. The military forces from those nations began to take part in NATO training sessions, exercises, and even operations. Certainly NATO became potentially more significant as a player in the Balkans with the 1999 addition to its full membership ranks of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. At that time there were at least five other formerly communist nations that were considered to be on the doorstep of alliance membership. They included Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The last three had actually been republics in the former Soviet Union, and their inclusion aroused Russian apprehensions as NATO marched to their very borders. It was really a far cry from the Allied Intervention in 1919, but some of those around President Yeltsin acted as if it were not.

Amidst this march into the new more peaceful age were also several ominous signs. East Europe had thrown off communist patterns and regimes by the end of 1989, but the slow collapse of both the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav federation preoccupied their leaders for the next two years. As President Bush

called for a new "coherent defense policy" in a 1990 speech, he also warned about the continuing "animosities and opposing interests" that were circulating elsewhere ("President George Bush Proclaims..." 2005, 509–510). In fact, the end of the Cold War corresponded with creation of a kind of vacuum of power in a number of regions. With the elimination of American and Soviet efforts to cultivate and reward allies in many corners of the world, ambitious leaders who had old scores to settle woke up to a newfound freedom of maneuver. As they hatched their plots to extend influence beyond the borders of their own nation-states, their actions were seemingly unrestrained by any kind of routine balance of power. In that atmosphere they became "Rogue Leaders" that riveted the West once again on a new set of problems. Saddam Hussein was one such Rogue Leader, and he was willing to challenge both democratic norms that were beginning to spread after the Cold War as well as the national integrity of nations on the Iraq border.

Immediate build-up to the Persian Gulf War

Saddam Hussein and Iraq fitted into to the goals of American national security policy during the 1980s. For America, the catalytic event at that time was the emergence, in 1979, of an Islamist government in Iran that President Carter had identified a few years earlier as "a pillar of stability in the Middle East." For over a year, the designers of American foreign policy were fixated on the challenge of getting over fifty embassy personnel released after Iranian militants had taken them hostage. In the following year, Iraq invaded the western part of Iran in the Shatt-al-Arab, and a war ensued that lasted until 1988. From the American vantage point, Iran was the new and unpredictable force that needed to be contained, and Iraq became a tool in that effort. Despite Iraq's reliance on the Soviet Union for military assistance, they had kept their domestic communist movement under control and thereby served American interests (Hook and Spanier 2004, 273). In addition, any blows that Iraq could inflict on Iran would be a positive outcome that could promote American interests once again in the region. For so long, the Shah of Iran had been a reliable ally and the makers of American foreign policy clearly missed him.

Ironically in terms of the later Gulf War, both America and Kuwait assisted Saddam in his battle with Iran. The Emir in Kuwait loaned Iraq billions of dollars (Paterson et al. 2005b, 491), while the United States provided dual use technology that Iraq later utilized in beginning work on nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons (Jentleson 2007, 362).

However, the impact of that war was not a gentle one for Iraq, for Iran pushed them back out of the captured territory in spite of the usage of chemical weapons by the Iraqi military. Iranian tactics such as sending civilians and even youth across fields of land mines to clear them were deplorable. However, it was Iraq that ended up frustrated with the outcome of the war. They were $80 billion in debt from the war effort (Hook and Spanier 2004, 271), and they had not acquired the extra territory on the Persian Gulf that would have enabled them to export their oil at prices cheaper than the middlemen from neighboring countries were charging them. Therefore, they made plans in 1990 to do a similar probe into Kuwait, a nation whose absorption would greatly expand their shoreline on the Gulf. Their old maps revealed Kuwait to be actually a province in their previous empire, and so to Saddam a takeover may have seemed a natural step. In the summer of 1990, the American ambassador to Iraq had a talk with Saddam, and his conclusion from that conversation was that the United States would not do much if Iraqi troops crossed the border. Therefore, Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2 and soon had taken over the entire nation. There was a parallel noted to the outbreak of the Korean War exactly forty years earlier, for the State Department had not included South Korea in the defensive perimeter that the United States was committed to protect.

The attack was certainly a wake-up call to the Bush administration that had been celebrating the recent liberation of East Europe as well as following the first set of elections in those nations in the spring of the year. Had Saddam been able to hang on to Kuwait, he would have commanded 40% of the world's oil reserves. That would have been a serious threat to American allies in the west that were totally dependent on imported oil (Magstadt 2004, 171). President Bush feared that now Iraq could "dictate world oil prices" (Papp et al. 2005, 197), and the president saw clearly what the new geopolitical reality in the Persian Gulf might do to the New World Order with its assumption of American primacy (Hook 2011, 57). Historical analogies played a role the

perceptions of foreign policy architects in Washington, much as they had during the war in Vietnam. However, this time it was not the precedent of the Munich Agreement of 1938 that President Bush had in mind. Instead, he compared the Iraqi attack to Hitler's invasion of Poland in 1939. With that image in the forefront of discussion, the American path was clear and only the timing was a matter of debate. America's linkage with Iraq during its war with Iran was both a distant memory and a kind of embarrassment.

American planning for the Gulf War

Initially, the Bush administration expected a very difficult battle in Kuwait and Iraq, for Saddam had boasted for a long time about his one-million-man army and about its "crack" Republican Guard elite. For President Bush, the better part of wisdom was to take such rhetoric seriously and carefully plan for a difficult war (Snow 2004, 252). It was also part of the management style of the president to display his "proactive character" (Chittick 2006, 155) in demonstrating to allies and other leaders in the UN that America was capable of more than the incremental and sometimes haphazard planning that characterized the foreign policy process during the war in Vietnam. Proactive planning meant careful consultations with both Congress and the United Nations. Whereas American had responded to the Tonkin Gulf provocations in 1964 with an attack on North Vietnamese naval installations within a matter of days, George Bush took a full five and one-half months to pave the way for the invasion.

During that time, he mobilized a massive amount of material and personnel in Saudi Arabia in preparation for the attack on Iraq. All during the fall of 1990, military vehicles and manpower were moving in great numbers down major arteries such as Interstate 75, on their way to Florida ports for transport to the Gulf region. Routine celebrations and flyovers at domestic air force bases took on a new urgency, for both participants and applauding crowds knew that war was in the air and very likely. America and its allies imposed economic sanction on Iraq in hopes that might avert the necessity of war, and the matter of how long to permit sanctions to work became a major strategic question. Bush submitted various resolutions to the United Nations, and on

several occasions they endorsed the need to do something. As they were reluctant to state formally that they sanctioned war in the form of air strikes and possible invasion, the phrase Bush submitted in the end was that they vote to use "all means necessary" to get Iraq out of Kuwait. No president had asked Congress to declare war for a full half century, but the president did ask both houses of Congress to pass resolutions that contained the same language as the resolution that the UN passed near the time of the war's beginning. The House of Representatives passed its resolution in a decisive way, but the Senate ratified the same language with only four votes to spare, 52–48. Even the distinguished Senate defense specialist Sam Nunn voted to continue economic sanctions, the other option favored by the minority.

Looming in the background of this critical period of the fall of 1990 were the lessons of Vietnam. Multilateral decision making was preferable to unilateral, and endorsements by the United Nations were preferable to rather desperate peacemaking missions sanctioned by the UN secretary-general. Whereas the war in Vietnam had engaged an advanced western country accustomed to conventional set-piece battles in a confusing conflict with nearly invisible guerilla forces, the upcoming Gulf War would spotlight a very modern air force that had experienced a revolution in military affairs (RMA). Victory would be probably in light of the overwhelming U.S. advantage in "electronic and information technologies" (Jentleson 2007, 362). Finally, Colin Powell as the current chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was cognizant of his own "Powell Doctrine." There would be reliance on overwhelming Air Force capabilities at the very beginning, as America would not back into war this time with an underprepared military force as well as only partially prepared plan. There would be consultation with allies through the UN instead of the kinds of unilateral moves characteristic of both the Johnson and Nixon administrations. In fact, symbolic of this new multilateralism were plans to have the Royal Air Force (RAF) from the United Kingdom fly the first sorties in the war. Importantly, the doctrine also called for the "end game" that was so glaringly absent during Vietnam. Victory would be achieved and declared when the allies had defeated Saddam and pushed his army back across the border and fully out of Kuwait. Initially, there was no discussion about regime change in Iraq. In terms of historical parallels, the planning about how to

define victory was similar to that of Truman in Korea, especially as he fired the general who tried to expand war aims. In fairness to Johnson and Nixon, pushing the enemy back across the 17th parallel was much more complicated than it was in Korea or the Persian Gulf. Many of the enemy forces actually were South Vietnamese, while the leadership of that beleaguered nation was often unrepresentative of the nation that they sought to lead.

An alliance goes to war

The long wait after the August 2 invasion ended with the expiration of the deadline given to Iraq on January 15, 1991. The economic sanctions had impacted the Iraqi people, as they had effectively cut off 90% of Iraq's imports and 97% of the country's exports. In the early days of Desert Shield, the code name given to the preparatory moves toward war, the United States sent 200,000 troops, a number that quickly grew to 500,000 by November. America's allies added many as well, and the grand total of the combined military forces was 700,000 by the end of the year. The long period of preparation made it possible for the administration to have an overwhelming force in place before the hostilities started, but it also enabled President Bush to have the mid-term elections behind him (Paterson et al. 2005b, 492–493). Concerns about Iraq's wider ambitions led to inclusion of important regional allies as well. Thinking that Iraq might next set its sights on Saudi Arabia, arrangements to protect that nation as well as efforts to station allies troops on its soil gained momentum ("The Road to War" 1990/90, 1).

The war itself was heavily reliant on air power in the early going, and that meant most of the actual forty-three days of war. Allied forces flew about 100,000 sorties and had two separate but related missions. In the first stage, they focused on destruction of command and control posts, airfields, communication centers, and military bases. In the second, they knocked out the bridges and roads across which both Iraqi troops and their military equipment were passing (Hook and Spanier 2004, 274–276). Key to the success of the air war was deployment of Tomahawk cruise missiles that hit Iraqi targets with impressive precision. Utilization of Patriot cruise missiles was a

key part of the allied defense plan, for they possessed the capability to intercept Iraqi Scud missiles. Finally, on February 23, the allied ground forces invaded Kuwait as well as eastern Iraq (Paterson et al. 2005b, 493). General Norman Schwartzkopf devised a surprise flanking maneuver from the west and then hit the Iraqi army from behind. Saddam had expected a direct, frontal hit and was unprepared for that type of move. In that sense, the military maneuver paralleled the unexpected landing that General MacArthur devised on Korea's Inchon Peninsula in 1950.

Clearly, the alliance component in this conflict was a powerful nexus around which the American president could express his multilateral inclinations and expectations (Zakaria 2009, 220). Clearly, there was far more controversy over and opposition to the second Iraq War than there had been for the earlier Iraq or Persian Gulf War. While the United Nations supported the action on thirteen occasions by passing supportive resolutions, a full twenty-seven nations voluntarily became part of the winning coalition (Jentleson 2007, 361). In addition, NATO was supportive of this engagement, and many moderate Arab countries were as well. There was also a parallel to the Korean War, for this was only the second time in its history that the UN had specifically invoked "collective security" (Magstadt 2004, 171). During the long years of Cold War, the veto principle that applied to permanent members of the Security Council prevented such resolutions. Each mission that received U.S. support would encounter a veto by the Soviet Union, and the same applied in the opposite situation. During the intervening four decades, UN "blue helmets" provided a number of valuable contributions in locations like the Sinai Peninsula and Cyprus. However, the UN dispatched them as peacekeeping forces after the military forces on both sides had agreed to a cease-fire of some sort. In the case of the Gulf War, the Soviet Union was weakened by the struggle of its republics against the center and less than one year away from implosion. They did not really stage protests when the allies destroyed military equipment that Moscow had provided Iraq in previous years (Paterson et al. 2005b, 493). A final contribution of the alliance to the American-engineered mission was reimbursement to the United States of 88% of the $61 billion price tag of the war (Magstadt 2004, 172).

Aftermath: Setting the stage for the 2003 war with Iraq

There were those in the Bush inner circle who wanted to "march to Baghdad" in order to destroy the troublesome regime of Saddam Hussein. However, JCS chair Powell was cautious and unsupportive, for he envisioned such a move as the Powell Doctrine in the sense that it expanded the original military objective of simply expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait. President Bush shared the same vision, for he was still thinking about Iran as the larger danger and expecting that post-war Iraq could continue to be a buffer against that more notorious and rogue state (Paterson et al. 2005b, 493). After a draining although short war, the Bush administration did not have the inclination to involve itself in nation-building. Given the ethnic tensions within the country, the potential breakup of Iraq would be another destabilizing blow to an already-fragile region (Magstadt 2004, 172). There was also an expectation that a battle in Iraq would be a tough one, given the relatively high developmental level of the nation. In addition, there was no guarantee of continued congressional and public support for such an expanded and probably lengthy engagement. There would also be no guarantee of continued support from all the allies and the United Nations itself (Papp et al. 2005, 198).

Iraq technically accepted the basic conditions of UN Security Council Resolution 687, an agreement by which they had to accept three conditions. First, they needed to respect the existing border with Kuwait and not again attempt to cross it in an aggressive manner. Second, it was necessary for them to accept the presence occasionally of UN inspectors on their own territory. Third, complete disclosure of all work on CBN weapons was a must (Paterson et al. 2005b, 493). There was also an expectation that he would respect the rights of the Shiite majority that largely lived in the oil-rich southern region of Iraq along the Iranian border, as well as those of the Kurdish minority in the north. Further, the United Nations devised a special organization to implement the provision that called for its oversight of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMB) capability. That organization was called the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM).

In spite of all these arrangements that had the basic objective of containing Iraq and its challenging leader, the record of compliance with the UN

provisions in the ensuing decade was weak (Jentleson 2007, 361–362). Saddam did attack both the Kurds in the north and Shiites in the south, the former with chemical weapons. As a result, the UN called upon the Clinton administration to establish no-fly zones over both regions in order to protect the two ethnic groups. Further, he often cancelled the planned visits of UN inspectors with regard to any development of CBN capabilities (Hook 2011, 57). There were additional western reactions, especially by the United States, to those violations. Specifically, in 1993 President Clinton ordered selected missile attacks on Iraqi targets. During the following year, he ordered 36,000 troops to the Gulf Region in a show of force that had the intention of getting Saddam's attention. In 1996, there were additional bombing missions against several Iraqi positions (Paterson et al. 2005b, 494). In both 1997 and 1998, on separate occasions, Saddam expelled UNSCOM inspectors from his country. As a result, President Clinton ordered a four-day bombardment from the air on the Iraqi military headquarters.

It was clear at the end of the decade that the intact alliance of the 1990–1991 period was not as committed to the American–engineered tactics as they had during the war itself. For example, the UN Security Council did not pass an approval resolution for the 1998 air attacks, and the main reason lay in the criticism offered by China, Russia, and even France. Continued efforts to re-impose sanctions and constant efforts by Saddam to resist them had taken a toll on the allies. At the same time, President Clinton was much preoccupied at the time by the major scandal that led to impeachment proceedings against him. There were also disagreements among members of his "ABC" advisory team that included Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, and Secretary of Defense William Cohen (Hook and Spanier 2004, 277–279). Both the domestic and international consensus that was so evident in the fall of 1990 had weakened in obvious ways with the result that Saddam had an even freer hand.

Thereby, the stage was set for the next war against Saddam and Iraq that began in 2003 and ended in 2011. In conservative circles within the United States especially, there was regret that President Bush had not "taken out" Saddam in the weeks after the end of the Persian Gulf War. Given the clarity of the allied victory in early 1991, it was incredibly frustrating to watch Saddam

somehow be strong enough to stymie and paralyze the West for more than a decade after his defeat on the matter of nuclear inspections. While one reasons for ending the war with the liberation of Kuwait was to prevent Iraq from succumbing to perpetual ethnic unrest and conflict, the need to impose two no-fly zones indicated that the country might fall apart anyway.

While American leaders were focused on Iraq, Saddam, and compliance with restrictions on NBC capabilities, there were other tremors in the region that perhaps received too little attention in the 1990s. Osama bin Laden had earlier had put together sets of foreign fighters to dislodge the Soviet Union from Afghanistan during the 1980s. Based on the radical thinking of Muslim intellectuals like al Sayyid Qutb, he eventually headed up a strongly anti-western group that became known as Al Qaeda. The American-led war to liberate Kuwait was a provocation in the plans of that terrorist group, and the American continued military presence after the war in Saudi Arabia after 1991 was a point that bin Laden often mentioned in his statements and tape recordings.

Attacks by Al Qaeda on American facilities occurred in seemingly unrelated fashion during the decade after the end of the Persian Gulf War. In 1993, the group attacked the World Trade Towers for the first time, and some casualties resulted. Those Twin Towers were obviously a striking symbol of American economic power that enabled the nation to send military forces to the Middle East when it wished. Then, in 1998 the group struck in two African locations. One was the American Embassy in Kenya, while the other was its embassy in Tanzania. There was considerable loss of life in these two attacks, and most of the casualties were African citizens who worked at the two locations. In 2000, Al Qaeda hit an American naval vessel near the coast of Yemen, and several dozen American military personnel on the USS *Cole* lost their lives. Both the 1998 and 2000 attacks were efforts to display anger with the American presence in struggling areas of the developing world. However, American intelligence did not develop conclusions of how each attack was part of a larger tapestry that would have the ability to depict and shape American foreign policy in the twenty-first century. Perhaps the overconcentration on the war of nerves with Saddam Hussein was partly responsible for that failure. Once again, the United States continued to fight the last war and then discovered later that it was unprepared for the next one.

At the same time, there was another thread of continuity between the Persian Gulf War and other challenges, and this one was even more directly related to the dynamics unleashed by the sudden end of the Cold War. During the long war of nerves between the United States and the Soviet Union, their rivalry tended to dampen other potential conflicts both between and within nation-states. One outcome of the conclusion of the Cold War was the freedom that "Rogue Leaders" received to do their work in a seemingly unrestricted atmosphere. When President George W. Bush referred to the "Axis of Evil" in his 2002 State of the Union message, he really had three countries headed by Rogue Leaders in mind. Of course, Saddam Hussein and Iraq was one, and thus he put them into a framework that evoked memories of the 1990s but also served as a pointer to the war that would commence in the next year. The other two were Iran with the Islamists in charge and North Korea with the unpredictable Kim Jong–Il in charge. All three made no secret of their desire that their nations possess nuclear weapons in their struggle with the West, and North Korea actually developed a few of those weapons.

An additional Rogue Leader who paid little heed to the international community and its organizations was Slobodan Milošević, the Serbian leader in both the old Yugoslavia that existed before 1991 and the new but truncated nation with the same name that survived in the debris of the federation's collapse after that critical year. His concern was "protection" for Serbs who ended up as minorities in some of the nations that emerged after the collapse of the old and larger Yugoslavia. In that sense, his policies were similar not only to those of Iran who provided military assistance to Shiite nonruling majorities in Iraq and Bahrain but also to embattled minorities in Syria and Lebanon. However, the outreach of Iran was to fellow Shiites in countries well beyond their own borders, while Milošević was concerned about the fate of Serbs trapped in nearby countries that had once shared citizenship in the nation known as Yugoslavia. Regardless of the nuanced differences, the tactics of Milošević were the same as those of Saddam and perhaps somewhat inspired by him. Both moved seemingly at will in unexpected directions, surprised the regional and global communities continually, punished other nearby ethnic groups, and engaged in war when they wished. They were similar Rogue Leaders unleashed by the end of the Cold War and precursors as well as models to bin Laden.

American-Led, NATO-Based Alliance to Check Milošević and Serbia, 1992–1999

Whereas the Persian Gulf War of 1991 was unrelated to the Cold War, the challenge that emanated from Slobodan Milošević's Yugoslavia was embedded in the aftermath of Cold War. The Yugoslav federation had collapsed in the same year as had the Soviet Union, and there were some striking parallels between the two situations. Russians in Moscow looked out into fourteen new countries that previously had been part of the Soviet Union. In each of them they saw a Russian minority that could be subject to persecution by the new governments. Similarly, Serbs in the truncated version of Yugoslavia that remained after 1991 were very anxious about the plight of Serbian minorities in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, and even their own republic of Kosovo. Whereas Saddam took aggressive action in order to further the interests of the Iraqi state, Milošević was a "Rogue Leader" who commenced wars in order to either protect vulnerable Serbian minorities or to create a Greater Serbia in the Balkans.

Breakup of Yugoslavia and initial western assumptions

Both the rigidities of Cold War superpower polarization from without and communist controls from within kept the ethnic, religious, and cultural differences from exploding into a series of civil conflicts in the Yugoslav Federation that persevered from 1918 until 1991. Creation of that federation in the first place had been attended by at least two deeply rooted historical issues.

First, two pre–World War I empires had previously governed sections of the emergent Yugoslavia. Centuries earlier the Ottoman empire had conquered

the southern areas that included Macedonia, parts of Serbia, and Kosovo. The same was true of the new nation of Albania. The Turkish rulers in the Ottoman empire did not accomplish much in terms of economic development and education in the outlying sections of their realm. Thus, the peoples governed by them were ill-prepared to interact politically and economically with others who had made more progress along those dimensions. However, the one powerful stamp that the Turkish overlords left in the region was the presence of the Islamic faith in most of the villages and towns. In contrast, the groups in the northern sections of the South Slav Federation that the leaders in the region were forging had primarily been under Habsburg rule in the Austro-Hungarian empire. Thus, the Slovenians, Croatians, and some Serb areas had experienced considerable progress economically and educationally, due to the priorities of their overlords in Vienna and Budapest. In that sense, they were unprepared to interact in a common political home with groups that had not shared in such experiences. Religious traditions of the Serbs were linked to the Moscow-centered Christian traditions of Eastern Orthodoxy, while those of Croatians and Slovenians were linked to Rome-centered practices of western Christianity. Montenegrins were generally part of the Serbian patterns, while Bosnia was a genuine mixture of all three traditions: Muslims with links to the Turks, Serbians with the ties to Eastern Orthodoxy, and Croatians with their connections to western Christianity. Historically, the new leaders would need to deal with huge challenges rooted in such different traditions and experiences.

Second, there was a serious debate at the outset about what the political configuration of the new state should be. Serbs, based on their numerical plurality status within the federation argued for a Greater Serbia in which they should be dominant at least politically. Understandably, all the rest found a confederation with an equal role for each ethnic group the best approach to protect their autonomy from Serbian efforts to absorb them or to dominate them. This debate was a very dynamic one in 1918–1921, and it continued to bedevil Yugoslavia throughout its entire history (Banac 1984, 403–405). Failure to resolve that underlying debate had much to do with the breakup of the federation in 1991, and it certainly fueled the civil wars of the 1990s.

As early as July 1990, it was apparent that the anti-communist revolution that had cycled through Eastern Europe in 1989 would eventually touch Yugoslavia, albeit in a slower and more gradual way. For example, in July 1990, Serbia held a referendum on a new constitution in light of the probability that a number of their republics would soon be independent nations. In that referendum, they made both Kosovo and Voivodina part of a Greater Serbia. Kosovo reacted by passing a "measure" that made it a "sovereign republic" instead. Serbia's reaction was dissolution of the Legislature in Kosovo (Magstadt 2004, 184–185). Soon, the republics began to declare independence with Slovenia and Croatia understandably leading the way, for they were the most prepared for independence and the demands that it entailed. Serbia's response was an invasion of each, in spite of the fact that the European Community recognized them both (Hook and Spanier 2004, 307). Slovenia was able to free itself of the Serbs in a few weeks, but the Croatian struggle really lasted until 1995, although it was somewhat of a sideline event in comparison with the all-absorbing war in Bosnia. In April of 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina took the same step of separating itself from Yugoslavia, a move that the Serbs greeted with almost immediate shelling of Sarajevo (Paterson et al. 2005b, 481).

The United States and leaders in Western Europe were slow to come to terms with the new reality or to anticipate the consequences that were to follow. For the Bush administration that lasted until January 1993, the old Yugoslavia had become a familiar sometime partner in the Cold War struggle with Moscow. The Yugoslav leader Tito had challenged Moscow as early as 1950 and had also made Yugoslavia into one of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement. Western European leaders were reluctant to take on a leading role in the southeast corner of Europe. Some had conflicting loyalties, as France had historic ties to Serbia and Germany to Croatia. There was a general preference in Europe for imposition of economic sanctions, in hopes that the Serbian population would clamor, under deprivation, that their leaders back off on the forays and even aggression into the surrounding new nations with Serbian minorities. Importantly, NATO considered the former Yugoslav space to be "out of area" in terms of its heavily western-centered defined mission. NATO's strategy and capabilities were also fine-tuned to deal with a "classical invasion"

from the east and not well prepared for a new ethno-based guerilla-style war that would be as characteristic of the Balkans as it had been in Vietnam (Jentleson 2007, 333).

There was one western plan for Bosnia that received careful attention in 1992, the first year of the war. The terms of the Vance-Owen Plan called for division of a decentralized Bosnia into ten provinces and at least partial retreat by the Serbian army. In part, the hesitation of President Bush about this American-British initiative led to its demise, and war replaced it (Hoffmann 1997, 186–187). The Clinton administration would initially prove to be just as cautious as that of Bush before him, but eventually the suffering and casualties would force him to take a stronger hand. By 1995, he was ready to push for a posture of continuing globalism and positive about the use of "our military muscle through NATO." The lesson that he derived from the Balkan Wars of the mid-1990s was that "American leadership is indispensable" ("President William J. Clinton Applauds…" 2005, 510–511).

Bosnia and the Dayton Accord, 1992–1995

Following the brief war in Slovenia and the continuing bitter one in Croatia, the Serbian leader fastened on Bosnia as his target in 1992. The situation was that many Serbs lived in an intact area in the eastern part of the new country. However, they were only the second largest ethnic group at about 33%, with Muslims constituting a plurality of about 43% of the population and Croatians a minority with 10%. Milošević ordered the Yugoslav army into Bosnia, and the result was that they pushed the territory of the Serbian Republic in Bosnia well into the Muslim-Croatian area. Eventually, they controlled 70% of the territory of the country, and charges of "ethnic cleansing" spread throughout the region and beyond. The West was relatively disengaged in this war, unlike the earlier dilemmas in the Persian Gulf. The new Russia was strongly pro-Serb, and this was one factor that dissuaded the United States from taking action in an area that did seem to be Europe's responsibility. Compounding the suffering was the deep involvement of Bosnian Serb leaders such as President Radovan Karadžić and General Ratko Mladić in the punitive war against both Muslims

and Croatians. While evidence emerged of excessive military actions by both Serbian-targeted groups, the discovery of the mass graves at Srebrenica in 1995 was probably the turning point for the West. Serbian troops had marched off Bosnians of all ages into a field and brutally executed them. The Clinton administration endorsed a bombing campaign on Serbian positions with a result that the war soon ended. Further, the American leadership sponsored a peace conference on neutral territory in Dayton, Ohio. Bosnia became a country largely managed by outside organizations such as the UN, NATO, and eventually the European Union (EU). Surprisingly, the peace agreement largely held up. By 2011, the judges at the World Court in the Netherlands had the opportunity to try Milošević, Karadžić, and Mladić. The new country of Serbia and its leaders made purposeful efforts to overcome the stains of the past and looked to possible membership in the EU while also becoming a Partner for Peace in NATO.

There were UN peacekeepers in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995, but the "blue helmets" were powerless to stop the bloodshed. Serbs overran their positions when they chose (Papp et al. 2005, 208), while at the end of the war they were unable to stop the Serb massacres that had much to do with bringing all parties to the conference table in Dayton. While Milošević dispatched the Serbian army into the eastern section of Bosnia, local Bosnian Serb leaders such as President Karadžić prescribed parallel tactics of hostile action against both the Muslim and Croatian communities. As a result, the Bosnian Serbs eventually took 65% of the territory of the nation, about double their percentage of the population. Croatians and Muslims together were left with 35%, and this was about 8% less than the Muslim proportion of the nation's people. Local Serbian guerillas often fought with weapons that the Yugoslav military had provided, and purposeful and consistent "ethnic cleansing" and additional human rights violations provoked outcries by the international community (Magstadt 2004, 185). "Ethnic cleansing" entailed both mass killings intended to reduce the Muslim proportion of the population and rape of Muslim women directed at producing children who were part Serb and part Muslim. The trade embargo imposed by the West perceptibly hurt the largely Serb population in Yugoslavia, as the government imposed strict rationing of basic necessities used daily by the civilian population. Erosion of the currency led to

adoption of the "super dinar" by Belgrade in January 1994. In addition, there were numerous factory closures that resulted in pushing a full two-thirds of Yugoslav Serbs out of work by 1994 (Magstadt 2004, 185–186).

President Clinton considered an appeal to the UN to take the kind of firm action that it had in the immediately preceding Persian Gulf War, but it was clear that the UN was reluctant to take on a second peacemaking role that contrasted with the peacekeeping function that it had performed so many times between 1953 and 1989. Thus, the American president leaned toward deployment of NATO forces that could actually have an impact on the outcome of the war and end the ethnic blood-letting (Chittick 2006, 157–158). In 1994 the military alliance utilized selected air strikes on Serbian positions in Bosnia with little telling effect. In fact, the Serbs retaliated by taking hostage many UNPROFOR soldiers (Lieber 1997, 188; Papp et al. 2005, 208).

It was clear to the West that Muslims were progressively disadvantaged in this war and that any outside assistance was of little benefit. For instance, the western arms embargo even hurt the Muslims more than the Serbs, for the latter possessed more weapons before it went into effect. Further, the economic sanctions were hurting Serb civilians in Yugoslavia but not the members of their armed forces (Hook and Spanier 2004, 308). The asymmetrical war came to a head in the summer of 1995 when western media sources unearthed evidence of mass graves in both Srebrenica and Zepa (Paterson et al. 2005b, 481). While UN peacekeepers stood by with arms at their sides, the Serbian military under General Ratko Mladić took innocent Muslims to locations such as soccer fields and killed them at point blank range. Examination of the mass graves revealed the crutches of the aged and the toys of young children, evidence that sharply refuted Serb claims that the executed had included only soldiers and terrorists. It is likely that more than 7,000 Muslims died at Srebrenica alone (Jentleson 2007, 422).

At this time, Serbs still occupied the Krajina arms of Croatia, and the latter began a spirited pushback movement in August of the year. In accomplishing that victory, they pushed many Croatian Serbs out of their country (Lieber 1997, 16), and then President Clinton gave the signal to the Croatians to continue on into Bosnia and overrun Serb positions in the northwestern part of that country (Paterson et al. 2005b, 481). At the end of August, the

somewhat desperate Serbs killed 37 civilians outright in a Sarajevo marketplace in Bosnia, and the West had finally had enough. In addition, landmine explosions resulted in the deaths of three U.S. officials (Jentleson 2007, 441). The Clinton administration decided to deploy both the NATO Army and Air Force capabilities, while Congress was willing to fund the American component for one year. In the end, the decision was made to deploy ground forces only after achievement of a peace agreement (Lieber 1997, 16–36). However, usage of air power and selective bombing of critical positions around Sarajevo and other key cities did result in bringing the Serbs to the peace table (Chittick 2006, 226). All main parties to the conflict came to Dayton, Ohio, at the end of 1995, and they agreed to division of the nation into a Serbian Republic and a Muslim-Croatian one (Magstadt 2004, 186). The two other key provisions of Dayton included an immediate cease-fire and acceptance of a NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) (Chittick 2006, 226). A three-chambered presidency was inclusive ethnically, for each of the three major groups in Bosnia had a position in it. Due to the plurality in the population of Muslims, their representative in the body formally chaired it. IFOR initially included a force of about 60,000 NATO personnel, 20,000 of which were American (Jentleson 2007, 438). Surprisingly, Russia sent 2,500 troops under the PfP Program (Papp et al. 2005, 208). The presence of these Russian troops sent a strong message to Serbia, for Russian-Serbian relations had been tight in the past and would continue to be after Dayton as well. UN involvement would include administrators and overseers of the process by which Bosnia would elect its leaders and establish its delicate governing structure. Thus, a combination of belated military punishment and painful economic sanctions had pushed the Serbs in that direction. The needless loss of life as well as the intentional terrorist attacks against the Muslims had finally prodded the West into taking steps that could finally halt the horrors of a war that may have taken the lives of 200,000 persons.

The role of an alliance in restoring a new balance of power in the region was part of the process of ending the conflict. The implosion of Yugoslavia in 1991 created a power vacuum that jeopardized the situation of Muslim populations in several of the successor countries, most notably Bosnia and Macedonia. Limited western involvement became a necessity, since the Muslim groups by

themselves proved unable to fend off the pincer move by Serbs and Croatians in the northern areas (Glenny 1995, 98). Some concluded that limited NATO involvement might better enable America to "get its allies to become partners in power projection" (Gompert and Kugler 1995, 7). Such statements implied the need for a broader framework of regional security that would prevent future Balkan Wars.

Kosovo and the NATO bombing campaign, 1999

The Clinton administration took a much quicker and stronger military action, once Milošević set his sights on his own Republic of Kosovo. That republic differed from others in the new Yugoslavia, for its population was 90% Muslim. Serbs in the northern sector of Kosovo complained about persecution by the Muslims, and Milosevic sent in the army. America coordinated a NATO bombing campaign on the Serbian military, and this drove the army back out of the troubled republic. This campaign was unusual, for the tension was internal to a state, and that is why it differed profoundly from either the Persian Gulf War or the Bosnian War. Had the air war not been successful, it would have been very difficult to get alliance partners to agree on a land invasion for those very reasons. One unique feature of this operation was that it included at least the tacit support of three former communist countries that had just become NATO members one month earlier. Those countries included the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.

In spite of the fact that the Ottoman empire and its leaders bequeathed their culture and religion to most of the people within the territorial boundaries of Kosovo, Serbs also have strong emotional and historical bonds to the region. Their final losing battle to the Turks took place at Kosovo Field in 1389 (Hook and Spanier 2004, 312), and so Serbs see the heart and soul of their people as located in the midst of a Muslim population. Further, Pec is the location of the founding of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and that is also located within Kosovo. In its modern history under the Yugoslav Federation, Kosovo received autonomy with the drafting of a new constitution for the nation in 1974 (Hook and Spanier 2004, 313). Tito had been under pressure from several non-Serb

groups in previous years, and it was unclear if the federation would hold up or hang together after his death. He also established a Collective Presidency that he chaired during his own lifetime but that rotated leadership annually from one republic to another. Perhaps this arrangement enabled Yugoslavia to persist as a nation for a decade after the founding leader's death.

In 1989, several years before the collapse of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milošević rescinded the grant of autonomy to Kosovo (Hook and Spanier 2004, 313). He was able to do that as the party leader in the Serbian Republic, since Kosovo's territory was located within it. During the war in Bosnia, western leaders became concerned about potential Serb attacks on Muslims in other locations such as Macedonia and Kosovo. One result was placement of a small UN force of 300 troops in Macedonia as a kind of "firewall" against Serb moves in that direction (Hook and Spanier 2004, 313). By early 1999, the concerns of outside powers grew, and there was a mutual understanding that one lesson from Bosnia was that it was better to act earlier rather than later. Therefore, France hosted a conference of all parties at Rambouillet in order to fend off another Balkan war. While the Kosovars agreed to the resulting accords, Milosevic rejected the plan (Hook and Spanier 2004, 313). In the early months of 1999, clashes took place between Serbs and the recently formed Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). A battle that took place in southwest Kosovo in March of the year was the critical event that activated military action by the West (Chittick 2006, 503).

President Clinton basically implemented a "unilateral peacemaking policy with NATO forces," for his preference in this conflict was that it was preferable to use that alliance rather than the UN (Chittick 2006, 157–158). The UN was more prepared for peacekeeping rather than peacemaking, and Russia would no doubt veto any operation directed against Serbs in the Security Council. The American-directed military strategy centered on putting a halt to Serbian "ethnic cleansing," providing security in the southeast corner of Europe, and restoring credibility to NATO (Jentleson 2007, 428). The military alliance had just taken in three new members from formerly communist-ruled Eastern Europe, and they included the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. If the alliance was unwilling to take firm action when clear aggression took place in the neighborhood of those nations, then there would be questions about

what meaning membership actually had. Most of the other countries in the region were by that time PfP members, and it was important to provide them with reasons for continuing on with their plans for full membership. One argument for inclusion of former communist nations was that their inclusion would move the alliance east, and so any Kosovo-type operations would no longer bear the appearance of being "out of area." At the same time, the new NATO members did have reservations about being involved in a military operation so soon after joining the alliance. As a result, NATO planners asked permission to use their air space for missions over Kosovo, but they did not require anything more.

The operation itself by the alliance lasted 78 days and consisted exclusively of an air campaign. Consideration of ground troops was a very sensitive issue, for the western alliance was not protecting an independent country as it had in the Persian Gulf War or in Bosnia. Instead, the West was protecting a republic in the shrunken nation of Yugoslavia. Use of ground troops would have been out of tune with UN guidelines that justified international intervention only when an attack on a sovereign nation had taken place. President Clinton himself had promised to postpone introduction of ground troops until the military campaign ended and yielded to a cease-fire. Thus, alliance planners headed by the United States utilized "gradually escalating air strikes" (Magstadt 2004, 197) in an effort to push the Serbs back out of Kosovo as quickly as possible. Overall, NATO forces numbered 50,000, of which 5,000 were Americans. The alliance carried out 6,000 bombing missions, most of which the U.S. air and naval forces directed (Magstadt 2004, 197). The mission was known as Operation Allied Force, and the strategists did everything possible to reduce casualties on their side. For example, they ordered NATO planes to fly at an elevation of 15,000 feet. This prevented the alliance partners from experiencing any casualties during the campaign, but it did increase the number of civilian casualties on the ground, for it was more difficult to be accurate when firing from that elevation (Papp et al. 2005, 209).

One result of the air campaign was dislocation of even more people than had occurred when Serbia itself was hammering the Kosovars. Albania, Macedonia, and even Montenegro received the bulk of these refugees. They were nearby nations, and the first two had a significant number of sympathetic Muslims

themselves. As NATO attacks pushed the Serbs back, Serbs in turn pushed the Muslims out of Kosovo. As a result, there were approximately 800,000 refugees in all, a significant percentage of the population of Kosovo (Paterson et al. 2005b, 481). Following the cease-fire there were reports by Serbs of retaliatory unneeded violent acts by the KLA against the departing aggressors, but there was little effort by the West to investigate those charges thoroughly. Under UN auspices, NATO kept troops in Kosovo with humanitarian goals such as rebuilding schools and overseeing the northern border of Kosovo with Serbia. Of course, expansion of Kosovo's own security capabilities was a foremost goal, and the alliance set the target of increasing the numbers of local police to 13,000. Even though the salary offer was very tempting, Kosovars did not sign up in numbers that enable the alliance to meet its goal (Snow 2004, 322–323). In some ways, the West took steps after the war that build the capacity for Kosovo to act like a state rather than a republic, and indeed Kosovo declared its independence as a nation in 2008, a move that many nations such as Serbia and Russia did not formally recognize.

Earlier historical and current regional global dynamics certainly were evident as the Kosovo crisis played itself out. For example, Kosovo was in a sense ripe for the plucking after the West deemphasized the Balkans following the end of the Cold War. More developed countries such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic received far more attention due to their potential to become part of and contribute to western structures of power such as NATO and the EU. Yugoslavia had been important to U.S. policy during the Cold War since Tito became a kind of nonaligned conduit between East and West (Zimmermann 1995, 2). After the bombing campaign, serious observers noted that global hopes for a democratic peace were dashed as well as the corresponding conclusion that causes of war lay primarily within states. Instead, struggles like Kosovo demonstrated clearly that the "structural level" still provided powerful inducements for nations to go to war (Waltz 2000, 5–7). Kosovo also served to display the extent to which there had as yet been no real solution to the outbreak of ethnic tensions that accompanied the breakup of the Ottoman empire after World War I (Hagan 1999, 52). Kosovo's outcome also made the future of that corner of the Balkans uncertain, for some predicted the eventual independence of the region and status as a nation, while others

envisioned the possibility of a Greater Albania that would include Kosovo, parts of Macedonia, portions of Bosnia, and the entire nation of Albania (Hedges 1999, 24). Finally, the Kosovo experience resulted in renewing NATO's sense of purpose, and this pride was evident at the 50th Anniversary of the western alliance that was celebrated in April 1999. Through the decision to protect Kosovo and its people, the involved partners "have defended their solidarity with NATO through moral argument" (Rodman 1999, 45). Thus, the brief air campaign generated clear conclusions about the importance of alliance involvement in this nearly forgotten corner of Europe.

Aftermath in Bosnia and Kosovo

NATO played a major role in both locations after the end of the official wars, for the UN essentially "deputized" the alliance to carry out the military components of the post-war peacekeeping missions (Snow 2005, 352–353).

In Bosnia, the alliance replaced IFOR with a smaller Stabilization Force (SFOR) that was half the size of the former. Its 30,000-strong military forces primarily were there to keep the two new ethnically based republics from stoking again the fires of war. There were many skeptics in the West who were convinced that this was not possible, but in future years the violent acts were far fewer than people had expected. There were also tasks related to the very dangerous work of locating minefields and deactivating the mines themselves. These had the potential to do much damage as children played and adults went about their daily tasks. Destruction of remaining weapons of great destructive power was also part of the operation (Papp et al. 2005, 208). While SFOR was successful in pulling together the personnel and resources of NATO members, PfP alliance participants, and representatives of other nations too, it was difficult to get the members of the three ethnic groups to work together after such a difficult period and so many casualties (Chittick 2006, 226). In December 2004, NATO formally turned over the peacekeeping mission to the European Union, as they had been developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for a number of years and were prepared

to take on the remaining work. There were also efforts to locate the leaders most responsible for the war crimes, but this took a long time as many had gone into hiding. The effort was even-handed, for there were suspects in all three ethnic groups. Eventually, authorities found both President Karadžić and General Mladić, and the Serbian government sent both to The Hague for trial by the World Court.

In Kosovo, the UN administrators worked with a NATO force of 50,000 troops to accomplish basic tasks such a repatriation of hundreds of thousands of Kosovars (Carter 2002, 82). There was a major effort to ensure protection of the republic that had experienced 10,000 deaths in the war itself. However, the alliance forces also worked to protect the 10% Serbian minority in the northern part of Kosovo, and disarmament of the KLA was a major step in that direction. There was also much significance devoted to making the local law and court systems effective. There was much Serb anger at the West and especially NATO, but many Serbs also looked somewhat longingly at the rest of Eastern Europe to the north that had been undergoing radical reforms since 1989. As a result, Milosevic lost the 2000 election, and the newly elected President Kostunica extradited him to The Hague for a trial (Magstadt 2004, 198–199). Allied officials perceived this to be a triumph after all the suffering in the former Yugoslav territories (Bass 2003, 82). He was very resistant to the legal process there, and his death brought some closure to a very sad time in the early history of the post-Yugoslav states.

Role of alliances in the Balkan Wars

The principal alliance connections obviously centered on activities of NATO, but a number of other alliances played a role in the two settings as well. NATO eventually performed the air strikes that ended the war in Bosnia, and they did the same in Kosovo at a much earlier point in the crisis. They established a relatively large IFOR contingent immediately after the signing of the Dayton Accords and then reduced it in size and renamed it SFOR a few years later. In a parallel way, the alliance established Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo after the

end of the conflict there, and that protective force remained in place even after the creation of a nation-state in 2008. The United Nations played a kind of role of sponsor of the NATO missions in both locations, for the probability of a Russian veto based on their historical connections to Serbia always would have neutralized a Persian Gulf type of operation. In addition, the UN performed humanitarian missions in both locations as well as providing administrators to assist in state-building in Bosnia (Chittick 2006, 171). A unique feature of the alliance missions in Bosnia was the participation of Russian peacekeeping forces, an eventuality that would have been unthinkable in Kosovo (Jentleson 2007, 334). Whereas Kosovo was a NATO war (Jentleson 2007, 442) that included a kind of "Coalition of the Willing," Bosnia entailed a unique "dual-key" arrangement that prevented NATO from taking action unless the UN gave them the green signal (Lieber 1997, 63).

The Balkan Wars also exposed limitations in alliance military capabilities. In the Bosnian operation, the allied air attacks only worked when they were effectively coordinated with rebel attacks on the ground. In the Kosovo campaign, the 15,000 foot requirement reduced the accuracy of the air strikes and resulted in mistakes such as the hit on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade (Hook 2011, 324). In spite of those limitations in alliance military activities, NATO planners did demonstrate a willingness to involve other alliances in addition to the UN. The Organization of Security and Cooperation Europe (OSCE) provided an unarmed international observer force several months before the air campaign in Kosovo, but it clearly had no power to stem the Serbian tide and attacks on the Kosovars (Carter 2002, 72). In a promising way, the EU took on a much larger obligation in Bosnia when NATO handed the baton of leadership to them at the end of 2004. However, NATO equipment and capabilities continued to provide much of the structure upon which CFSP forces relied. In sum, there was a rich mix of alliance engagements in Southeast Europe during the first decade after the end of the Cold War. Although coordination was imperfect and, in the Bosnian case, the operation painfully late, the result was military defeat on two occasions of the Rogue Leader Slobodan Milošević. It was then up to the Serbian people in the election process and the World Court to complete that process.

Theoretical implications of the wars against Rogue Leaders

In the decade between the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks on American territory, alliance partnerships headed by America were generally successful in meeting the objective of checking Rogue Leaders. However, casualties, suffering, and dislocations were very high both in the Persian Gulf region and in the territorial space that the old Yugoslavia occupied. Key components of alliance theory can in part illuminate the challenges, failures, successes and prospects in both regions in which the Rogue Leaders had such a powerful and devastating impact.

Gravitational distance made both regions vulnerable to aggressive and disruptive moves by seemingly unhampered leaders, for potentially protective countries and leaders were still blinded by Cold War perspectives and priorities. American leaders and public were in the process of drawing a deep breath after the collapse of the communist systems and the apparent disappearance of the common Cold War enemy. During the Gulf War planning and implementation processes, the communist systems in Eastern Europe had collapsed, and the Soviet system was tottering but still shakily on its feet. In that situation and after, the United States was in the process of planning a draw-down of its military forces, and the first base domestic closure plan emerged from the military itself in 1990–1991. Neither the Persian Gulf nor Southeast Europe was much on the minds of the superpower that initially was intent on helping to nurture a "New World Order." Similarly, the alliance partners in Western Europe were much more focused on building bridges to the budding democracies that now appeared in their neighborhoods directly to the East. Expansion of Europe to its historic larger borders took priority in terms of both economic and political assistance. However, the oil dependence of the West as well as its shock over the "ethnic cleansing" and human rights abuses on European territory were wake up calls as well as reminders of the need to close the distance.

There was considerable typological distance in the Balkans that accompanied the collapse of the Yugoslav Federation that had dominated that corner of Europe from 1918 to 1991. The various non-Serb minority groups within the country had never felt totally secure, given the failure of a succession of political leaders to resolve the issue of whether the underlying governmental

architecture was that of a confederation or of a greater Serbia. However, the force of Tito's personality as well as his family roots in both the Croatian and Serbian communities served as one deterrent to the use of force or aggression by Serbs against the smaller groups. Still, the Serbian advantage in terms of dominating positions in both the political system and the military was clear. In addition, the decade after the death of Tito was characterized by a Collective Presidency whose rotating leadership position reflected fairness, at least on paper, to the many groups within the nation. However, the breakup of the country into five separate nations in the early 1990s created a "shatterbelt" that exposed the extreme vulnerability of the smaller new nations in the face of the strong-minded regime that remained in place in the vestige of Yugoslavia.

This new fragility combined with a degree of "attributional distance" to set the stage for Serbian aggression that was seemingly directed at protection of its own new minorities in the other countries. There were sharply different cultural traditions that exacerbated the situation now that the common force of communist systemic patters was disintegrating. Serbs were numerically second to Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the Muslims constituted a full 40% of the population of Macedonia. Serbs found themselves subordinate also in both Slovenia and Croatia. In the sense that the Serbs were part of the Eastern Orthodox traditions, they differed historically from Croatians and Slovenians and of course from Muslims. As the official atheism of the communist regimes receded, new waves of ethnic and religious feeling hit the shoreline like a winter storm.

To a lesser extent, typological and attributional distance played a role in the new uncertainties in the Persian Gulf region. During much of the Cold War, Moscow sent military equipment to Iraq in the hopes of cultivating a new client or at least ally. Similarly, Washington had firm links to the Shah's regime in Iran until 1979, and there was even an American military presence in that nation in light of the Soviet threat further north. Thus, the Cold War polarity provided a kind of predictability to the foreign policies of those nations. However, all of that changed in the direction of uncertainty when the Islamic fundamentalist revolution replaced the Shah at the end of the 1970s, while the end of the Cold War served as a final blow to any regional order that existed. In the new vacuum, a small nation like Kuwait became vulnerable, and the

Gulf Region itself turned into a kind of "shatterbelt." In addition, both Iran and Iraq possessed Shiite majorities, although the Sunnis were in a ruling position in Iraq. This anomaly was partly responsible for the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, and it was in the aftermath of that failed effort by Iraq's Saddam to take more territory that his takeover of Kuwait occurred.

In light of the fragility in both regions in which the Rogue Leaders operated, the West made efforts to transcend distance and create at least a temporary common security space. Coordination of the UN force that pushed Iraq out of Kuwait met the test for which the founders created the organization in 1945. With no Security Council veto, the international force was actually able to protect a small nation that had succumbed to a neighboring aggressor. Of course, this was the opposite of what had taken place in the 1930s when Japan and Germany were on the move against a series of neighbors. However, in 1990–1991, it was no doubt the pull of oil and western dependence on imports of it that enabled the nations to come together in ways that they were unwilling to in more far-off challenges such as the wars in Rwanda and Burundi. However, once the temporary alliance achieved its goal of liberation, the UN forces rapidly demobilized and departed the region. It would take the perils that accompanied the 9/11 attacks for the United States to work to build a more dependable security structure.

The West was willing to build more permanent and lasting security structures in Southeast Europe after the end of both the Bosnian and Kosovo Wars. This was after all a region that had shared European history to a large extent, although the days of the Ottoman empire were long and left a powerful cultural and religious legacy. NATO offered PfP status to most of the nations in the region, and thereby each began to take part in alliance exercises and occasional meetings. Later, many took part in the humanitarian and even military missions in both Afghanistan and Iraq. As the new nations of the Balkans took up those new roles, they received expose to western nations that had long experience in balancing democratic norms and practices with effective state bureaucratic guidelines. Such a meeting of minds would not embed that balance in the new nations immediately, and it might not even be what suited them best. However, it would be a start in examining new political and economic models that might make it possible for them to get

past the turmoil and chaos of the 1990s. Similarly, the Balkan nations began to consider membership in the EU, and their exposure to European democratic and state-building norms increased considerably during the process.

It was also true that there was a continuing and physical western presence in the Balkans after both the Dayton Accords and the cease-fire in Kosovo. In Bosnia, UN overseers became a near permanent fixture while the new self-governing institutions began to get their feet on the ground. When NATO left Bosnia after a near decade there, the EU replaced them and continued to offer their services. Sequentially, IFOR, SFOR, and the EU offered practical experience with new models and thinking that might have helped past wounds to heal. In Kosovo, NATO's KFOR remained on the spot, even after the declaration of independence after 2008. This was an involvement that was particularly important in light of Serbia's considerable hostility and sensitivity to this new western-backed national presence on its border.

It is not possible to conclude that strong security communities replaced the "shatterbelts" in both the Persian Gulf and the Balkans, but it is worthy of note that American attention in the two regions had an impact and drew attention to new possibilities for building security links if not a community. In both cases, America did not act along but with alliance partners. In both situations, the United Nations played a role in endorsing action, but it was the existing capabilities of NATO nations that provided the force and made the difference.

Part Four

Utility and Disutility of Alliances in Dealing with Challenges from Terrorist Power, 2001–2014

The problem of rogue leadership did not disappear with the defeat of Saddam in 1990 and the positive results of the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo in the spring of 1999. Moreover, the attacks of 9/11 profoundly changed the psyche of the United States and its allies about the nature of the threat both to the global system and to innocent populations stretched across the world. In the case of Iraq, the George W. Bush administration perceived the threat as one that had the potential for nuclear terrorism within the framework of a rogue state.

In a number of ways the 9/11 attacks had an impact on the American polity in parallel to the attack on Pearl Harbor six decades earlier. Both attacks were complete surprises to the American public and leadership circles, and in the two situations the American intelligence community had not "connected the dots" in ways that would have allowed for anticipation and preparation. Both came shockingly from the sky and hit American territory in a way that seriously challenged a sense of security that was based in part on the protectiveness of two large ocean bodies on its eastern and western borders. While the attacks at first seemed like isolated operations, further examination revealed that powerful forces stood behind them and had planned them, in the first case the Empire of Japan and in the second bin Laden's Al Qaeda network with the protection that the Taliban offered in Afghanistan.

Further, American strategists and policy planners faced an uncertain, highly decentralized target when planning reactions and retaliation. In the case of

the 1941 attacks, Japanese power and capabilities were spread out among numerous Pacific locations, and an island-hopping set of tactics would prove very difficult to carry out. In 2001 and after, the terrorists connected with Al Qaeda had spun spider webs of communication cells that were highly difficult to identify. Instead of a pyramid with one person giving directives, the typical cell may have included ten persons who passed messages sequentially and in a horizontal way from one to the other. Thus, conventional military approaches proved to be incapable of containing or defeating the enemy. President Truman resolved this dilemma by ordering the use of atomic weaponry against two Japanese cities. Presidents Bush and Obama involved America in its longest war in history with the announced terminal point of 2014 always seeming to be a risk. For example, on one day in June 2013, the eighth, nearly twelve years into the war, one NATO soldier from Italy was killed in western Afghanistan, while seven allied personnel from PfP member Georgia were killed in the south of the country. In addition, three American soldiers lost their lives in a "green on blue" killing by a member of the Afghan National Army!

America, NATO, and the War
in Afghanistan, 2001–2014

America went to war in Afghanistan in order to overthrow the Taliban regime that had provided a secure sanctuary to Al Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden. The Taliban was an extremist Islamist movement that had militarily conquered Afghanistan in a systematic way in the late 1990s. They had imposed a theocracy on the people that included extreme limitations on a people that had become accustomed to a certain level of personal freedom. Destruction of old non-Muslim cultural artifacts such as statues of Buddha at Bamiyan aroused the ire and condemnation of the West. However, their unwillingness to hunt down and turn over bin Laden and associated leaders was the last straw that broke the camel's back.

At the time of the 9/11 attack, Afghanistan was a "failed state," and there was a real need to attend to the key political and economic factors that would assist it in getting past the divisive tribal and ethnic differences. The Pashtun made up about 38% of the population, and it was from their midst that the Taliban emerged. In addition, the Tajiks and Uzbekis made up a considerable share of the rest of the population. The swirl of hostilities among such groups made state-building a seemingly untenable proposition, and into the mix also came considerable anti-Americanism that was based on resentment about the role of the United States and its military forces in Saudi Arabia and during the Persian Gulf War. With only three airports and sixteen miles of railroad, the nation and its leaders had much work ahead in terms of political and economic development (Snow 2004, 351–354).

A surprised America reacts

The shock of the 9/11 attacks on the American psyche was instantaneous and profound, for its territory had not been the target of an attack since the British invasion during the War of 1812. Unlike the Japanese attack on American military personnel at Pearl Harbor, this set of strikes took the lives mainly of civilians aboard three of the four planes and in the Twin Towers. Further the loss of life added up to about 3,000 in comparison with the 1,000 who died in the Pearl Harbor attacks (McCormick 2010, 208). A mere decade after the end of the Cold War, a time at which the western world had breathed a sigh of relief, this new blow "shattered the sense of national security" that had seemed so firm a few days earlier. The collective insecurity in the nation was heightened when mysterious anthrax poisonings occurred a few days later and took several more lives. In such an atmosphere, it was very difficult for members of the administration to plan a response in tune with all the tenets of the rational actor model with its careful attention to the precise costs and benefits of all plausible options (Hook 2014, 98).

In this crisis, there was one of the clearest examples of a "rally around the flag" in the American experience. Even nine months later, the approval ratings of President Bush overall stood at 72%. Overall, Congress passed twenty-one pieces of supportive legislation for reacting to various aspects of the crisis. For example, during the week after the attacks, the Senate passed its Joint Resolution 23 that provided the president with a nearly open-ended right to use force to deal with the enemy. Other important pieces of legislation included the USA PATRIOT Act, whose provisions for sacrificing certain individual freedoms in return for enhanced ability to locate future terrorists would stir controversy for over a decade. A little more than a year after the terrorist strikes, Congress passed the Department of Homeland Security Act, and the favorable vote in the Senate was 90–9. In the previous month, a Joint Congressional Resolution even stretched legislative support to the point that they were willing to endorse the use of force against Iraq (McCormick 2010, 208–211). All of these efforts had the objective of preventing such an attack and tragedy ever again.

In spite of those hopes and the near unanimity on the need to take action, terrorists continued to possess the capability to harm populations in a wide

range of locations around the world. They hit the Madrid transportation system in 2004 in an effort to undermine a government that had been supportive of the American invasion of Iraq, and they carrier out a parallel hit in London the following year. There was a devastating attack on railroad stations and hotels in Mumbai, India, in 2008, and the forces responsible for it were from Afghanistan's troubled neighbor Pakistan. It was again a metro system that Chechnyan terrorists targeted in Moscow, when they carried out their third major attack against that power in 2010. American sites and personnel were killed on two notable occasions in 2012–2013. They first targeted the American Embassy in Benghazi, Libya, and the American ambassador was among the casualties. Terrorists took advantage of the general unease and protests in the Arab world in reaction to an American film that cast Islam in a negative light. Finally, newly converted terrorists from Chechnya generated great shock and many casualties in the totally unexpected bombs detonated at the finish line of the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013 (Hook 2014, 346). While the reactions taken by American leaders after 9/11 made sense as responses to the incredible shock of the attacks, it remained clear that the enemy was far different and much more undefined than those faced in the wars of the twentieth century.

Evolution of a military strategy in the war on terror

A little over one week after the terrorist onslaught, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described the parameters of the coming American response in terms that would have been incomprehensible to his counterparts in the two world wars in the first half of the twentieth century or even to American leaders who fought the two Asian wars in its second half. He depicted alliances as not fixed but as "floating coalitions of countries, which may change and evolve." He alluded to the need to engage the enemy in "electronic combat" within cyberspace as well as on and in traditional battle settings. There was no prediction of a quick victory, as Woodrow Wilson had been able to deliver in World War I, but instead he called for American patience in a "sustained engagement" that would have no predictable and fixed end point (Hook 2014, 340). In a sense, his description paralleled President Kennedy's

admonition four decades earlier that the American people needed to be prepared for a "long twilight struggle" with the Soviet Union in the immediate future. In fact, Kennedy's depiction of the situation was even more accurate with regard to the twenty-first century struggles against terrorism than it was in the mid-twentieth century against the specter of seemingly "monolithic communism."

Essentially, the Bush administration developed very quickly the basic elements of Operation Enduring Freedom that would accomplish both the overthrow of the Taliban government in Afghanistan and the eventual capture of the terrorists who were responsible for planning the attacks on the United States. It was also vital that the powerful America presence not seem threatening to surrounding countries that were also in an uneasy situation with regard to their domestic situations and also relations with one another (Hook and Spanier 2004, 343–344). The American strategy would rest on seven basic pillars all of which were essential to success. Of course, military combat was at the top of the list, but intensified law enforcement measures at home were essential to prevent further attacks on the homeland. Effective diplomacy to merge the strategy with needed allies was significant as well, while the gathering of both human and electronic intelligence would strengthen the first three pillars. In addition, there would be a need for "financial statecraft" that could cut off the funding channels to the terrorist cells. Those states that would be in the trenches with the United States, often fearing parallel attacks on their territory, would need considerable foreign aid and especially sales of arms from America. Finally, there were many "fragile corners" on the edges of American life that were part of the homeland security equation. These "corners" included such hubs as transportation networks and communications systems (Hook 2014, 345). Taken together these points of strategy constitute a meaningful whole in coming to terms with a very new type of threat to America's security.

The battle in Afghanistan was the central part of American security planning but not the only component. The CIA estimated that there were 5,000–10,000 Al Qaeda fighters spread across 68 countries. In response to those estimates, American leaders dispatched 200 military personnel to the country of Georgia to train their military in stopping the flow of terrorists into and out of Russia's

troubled Republic of Chechnya. Further, Bush sent 700 U.S. troops to the Philippines in an effort to help out with the battle against Abu Sayyaf. Yemen had been both a fragile country during the latter part of the Cold War as well as a brewing point for radicalism of the communist or Al Qaeda vintage, and so American forces went there as well (Papp et al. 2005, 219–221). Knowing that Al Qaeda fighters were in war-torn Sudan, the president sent the U.S. Navy there also to prevent them from escaping (McCormick 2010, 215). All of these steps made sense in light of the global character of the war against terrorism, but the challenge of defeating an enemy in sixty different countries greatly exceeded the demands of any previous war in which the United States had been engaged.

Tentative outline of a new doctrine of war against terrorism

In June 2000, more than a year before the terrorist attacks, the National Commission on Terrorism issued a stern warning about the need for more preparedness against terrorist attacks against the United States. The Commission noted three areas in which there had been a transformation in the framework within which terrorists operated. First, the complex processes of globalization had provided Internet capabilities and website resources that made it much easier for them to prepare the attacks themselves. Second, there was a new dimension of the surprise element that made their attacks potentially much more lethal. Third, there was by now a brief history of provocative, destabilizing actions by the United States in the Middle East that required retaliation of some kind. Such actions included support for the Shah of Iran over several decades, the backing of Iraq in its war in the 1980s with Iran, and the hasty departure from Afghanistan after the pullout of the Soviet army in 1988. As a result, America was particularly vulnerable as a target of those forces and persons who more willing to harm civilians than personnel in regular armies (Jentleson 2007, 364–365). However, the American election campaign was in full swing, and the outgoing Clinton administration was not in a state of mind to develop a completely new doctrine that the incoming president might choose to ignore.

However, two years later the Bush administration had put together a doctrine to deal with the new reality in the aftermath of the attacks. This new doctrine had both elements of "preemptive defense" and "defensive realism" within it. In other words, the American leadership was willing to strike ahead of time before an attack against the nation occurred, and at the same time the new insecurity fed the need to be constantly on the defensive in light of the new dangers that had become a permanent part of the national landscape. There were also hints of Wilsonian idealism in the new approach, for democratization of the region was to be part and parcel of the new stability. In many previous eras, doctrine had been anchored in a growing self-confidence about American's ability to utilize its power to have an impact for the good on troubled regions. However, this new combination of realism and idealism was rooted in an environment of less certain outcomes (McCormick 2010, 212).

The formal name of this new doctrine was *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. As noted above, it contained seven categories of action that the new global conditions required. Critical among these seven pillars would be new patterns of cooperation with other key global actors that the expansive terrorist networks might pull into their web. Expansion of NATO through the addition of ten new countries from the former communist bloc certainly provided one set of players that were closer to the primary arenas for terrorist action than its more traditional members were. In Asia, outreach to Australia, South Korea, and Japan made sense in light of past wartime linkages in the 1950s and 1960s. Thailand and the Philippines could be strategic partners as well, and this would provide an Asian bloc in the east that could supplement the new expanded NATO bloc of states in the west. There would also be times in which Russia, India, China, and Pakistan could be part of the floating coalitions that distinguished the post-9/11 age (McCormick 2010, 216–218). Russia had provided assistance in terms of permitting U.S. military bases in nations that were part of former Soviet space. If it were possible to cultivate support in both India and China for assistance in needed situations, that would create a tie-in to the two most rapidly growing and populous Asian giants. Finally, a relationship with Pakistan would be critical but fragile, for its domestic political situation was turbulent, while its presence on the very

porous Afghan border created a potential tinderbox of conflicts. And yet, a firm hand by its domestic leadership could create innumerable benefits in the much intensified battle against terrorism.

Stage one: Defeat of the Taliban, 2001–2002

It did not take long for President Bush to decide upon the necessity of a war in Afghanistan. In fact, his purposes no doubt coincided with the hopes of many in Afghanistan who had sacrificed so much freedom after the Taliban victory. It is probably also the case that the key players in the Bush administration had little idea of what the struggle would be like after the overthrow of the Taliban. They might have learned from the experience of the Soviet Union in its 1979–1988 war or from much earlier efforts of world powers such as England to gain influence in the region. In any case, the first stage of the war itself did not take long, and soon many Afghans rejoiced in the departure from power of the Taliban, as they could now dress differently, listen to music, and watch their daughters and sisters happily return to school.

The overall aim in the war was to combine the use of air power with ground actions by the military of the Northern Alliance, an organization that combined the Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and some Pashtun forces that were anxious to push the Taliban from their ruling position. The Northern Alliance commenced its struggle on September 22, less than two weeks after the attacks by Al Qaeda themselves. The American and British bombing raids began about two weeks later, and they focused heavily on the capital city of Kabul and the terrorist stronghold of Kandahar in the south of the country. In particular, there was an effort to paralyze the communication centers used by the Taliban as well as the arteries that enabled them to move from place to place. In the first two months of the war, the allies carried out 20,000 bombing sorties, a number that exceeded the amount used in Bosnia and Kosovo combined. For the first time, unmanned drones played a part in the attacks, as they possessed the capability to provide needed coordinates to the U.S. Air Force or to drop guided missiles themselves (Hook and Spanier 2004, 344–345). Additional high-tech weaponry exceeded the capabilities

that the allies had deployed in Southeast Europe during the previous decade. On illustration was the Joint Direct-Action Munitions (JDAMS), weapons that incorporated satellites to guide the bombs to their destinations. Deployment of Green Berets and other elite military units on horseback was an imaginative adaption to of long-standing military forces to the rough terrain of this new battlefield (Jentleson 2007, 366).

In this early part of the war, it was possible to strike an important alliance in the process with Pakistan, a nation against which the United States had imposed sanctions after their detonation of a nuclear test in 1998. After several years of turmoil, General Pervez Musharraf had come to power as the elected president, and he perceived parallels between his efforts to control terrorists in the area of Kashmir with the U.S. campaign to punish those responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Provision by the United States of one billion dollars in aid firmed up the willingness of President Musharraf to cooperate in the raging battle next door (Hook and Spanier 2004, 344). Such conditions would not obtain in future years, as so many issues made prickly the relationship between the United States and Pakistan. Some of those tensions centered on drone attacks over Pakistani territory that resulted in civilian deaths as well as the seeming reluctance of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to share all the information they had on terrorists who had crossed the border from Afghanistan in pursuit of shelter and safety in the nearly ungovernable regions of western Pakistan. Of course, the culminating event was the failure or unwillingness of U.S. leadership to inform the Pakistani government officials that they had located bin Laden in Pakistan and were about to attack his residence.

This first stage of the war ended very quickly with a technical victory over the Taliban in mid-November, and the fall of Kabul on November 12 was the symbolic centerpiece of this outcome (Hook 2014, 67). In reality, the war was not over, for the collapse of Taliban governing power did not mean that they would disappear from their native Afghanistan. Those who fled into Pakistan would return to fight on a more propitious day or when the snows melted in the spring. Further, the foreign fighters represented by Al Qaeda still circulated throughout the war-torn nation and would not release their grip on America or its military forces. Their tactics were those of guerilla warriors

who still knew that their leader bin Laden was out there in the wilderness and that he was occasionally sending inspiring messages to them. Completion of the first stage of the war was somewhat similar to the fall of Saddam's regime so quickly in May 2003. In both cases, the quick euphoria of a victory yielded to the painful realization of what a "long twilight struggle" actually felt like.

Stage two: Engaged in a long twilight struggle with the Taliban and Al Qaeda, 2002–2014

In the first few years after the victory over the Taliban in 2002, it appeared as if the political situation there would stabilize. Even though warlord power had created powerful regional rule at the expense of the center in Kabul, there were hopes invested in President Karzai in setting up some kind of democracy that could also offer peace and order. America soon turned its attention to Iraq, and the war there consumed increasing attention while Afghanistan moved to the back burner. Many of the key American political and military leaders who had been responsible for the success in Afghanistan actually went to Iraq in order to accomplish the same results there. However, an unhealthy mix of former Taliban and Al Qaeda forces continued to stir the pot and often gained apparent sanctuary in nearby Pakistan. Their IED attacks damaged American tanks and took many lives. However, they also took the lives of many Afghans, including innocent children. Suicide bombings and focused attacks by small military units kept the danger level very high to both military and civilian forces. Many allies had joined the United States in this military operation due to the empathy they felt over the 9/11 attacks and due to the threats that they perceived to their own societies. Of course, their casualties reverberated back into their own countries and raised questions about why these types of sacrifices were necessary.

There were several factors that slowed down progress after the overthrow of the Taliban. The Northern Alliance was less energized by the prospect of hunting down the fleeing Al Qaeda members than they had been in ridding the country of Taliban rule. A golden opportunity to capture key terrorist leaders including bin Laden was thus lost near Tora Bora. Deployment of U.S.

ground troops at this point in the struggle would probably have improved the chances of rounding up these individuals, but American public opinion was reluctant to embrace moves beyond the use of air power. At times, clearances from the Pentagon and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) were slow, and opportunities disappeared (Jentleson 2007, 366). In the end, many Al Qaeda and Taliban armed forces escaped across the border into Pakistan (Hook and Spanier 2004, 346).

Once enemy combatants fell into the hands of the anti-Taliban coalition, then it was incumbent on the Bush administration to figure out what to do with them. Trials in the American legal system were one option, and following the Geneva Convention on rules relating to prisoners of war (POWs) was another. However, President Bush and his advisors opted for a third route, and the rationale was that Al Qaeda was not a state and thus not covered by the Geneva Convention (Chittick 2006, 217). The result was that the allies sent 7,000 prisoners to Guantanamo in Cuba (Hook and Spanier 2004, 346).

The level of violence continued to grow after the early years of apparent victory. For instance, in 2003, terrorist attacks worldwide numbered 208, and they led to 625 deaths. In 2005, the number of attacks had escalated to 11,000 and the deaths to 15,000. A full half of the attacks and casualties took place in Iraq and Afghanistan (Hook 2014, 339). By 2008, the level of violence and casualties began to escalate even more in Afghanistan, with ominous signs for the near future. The situation was very difficult, for conditions in the Iraq War were also very bad at the beginning of this period. As such, the Bush administration had announced a surge strategy to cope with the rise in insurgency in Iraq, and this entailed the dispatch of considerably more troops to that nation as early as January 2007. Correspondingly, the reduction of troop levels in Afghanistan to help out in Iraq generated more successes by the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan (Hook 2014, 68).

Up to that point, the overall military strategy in Afghanistan had been one of counter-terrorism, in which the allied military forces had put the top priority on going out of populated areas to locate and eradicate the enemy. However, this strategy left the cities exposed and their inhabitants vulnerable to attacks. Therefore, the American military leadership switched to a strategy of counterinsurgency with the departure of General McKiernan

and the arrival of General Stanley McCrystal in the spring of 2009. This proved to be more successful in combination with the decision of the Obama administration to opt for a "surge" in forces. The latter step was in fact an imitation of the same strategy adopted in 2007 in Iraq. In the spring of 2009, President Obama upgraded the American military capability in the nation by an additional 21,000 troops. Allies such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and Slovakia supplemented these efforts with additional insertion of forces. Then, in December he sent an additional 30,000 troops to fulfill the promises of the surge (Peterson 2011, 107–108). The surge also entailed the sending of 80,000 troops to the troubled Helmand Province two months later (Peterson 2011, 107).

Later in 2010, General David Petraeus, the implementer of the surge strategy in Iraq, stepped down from overall command at CENTCOM to take the lead over allied military forces in Afghanistan. By this time, the entire operation had been consolidated under NATO, and so all questions of strategy had become alliance ones. It is also true that the Obama administration made an effort to rely more on drone strikes, intelligence, and Special Forces rather than simply on military power (Hook 2014, 68).

In spite of the level of casualties and violence, plans for a drawdown of forces after the surge proceeded apace, although the discussions between military and civilian leaders were often tension-filled. With substantial reductions in troops planned for both 2011 and 2012, the realistic goal became departure of all fighting forces by the end of 2014. In the meantime, training of both the Iraqi police and army became a major necessity.

Alliance and coalition partners

After President Bush decided to use the American "preponderance of power" to destroy the Taliban government that had continued to provide sanctuary to bin Laden and Al Qaeda, the United Nations Security Council offered support for the mission. Like the Persian Gulf military engagement in 1990–1991, "self-defense" was the basis for the American-led attack, and that situation fit perfectly into UN guidelines and standards. The Taliban was not a government

that had a seat in the UN, and only two nations had actually granted it diplomatic recognition. In the aftermath of the support from the Security Council, a full 170 nations joined the American-led coalition (Jentleson 2007, 365). The UN took additional steps to cope with the terrorist tactics utilized to carry out the attacks and probably plan future ones. For example, they passed UN Security Council Resolution 1373 on September 28, 2001. In that resolution they asked member states to halt money transfers to suspicious persons and potential terrorists through their banking systems. They took the further step of establishing an Implementation Committee to oversee the activity of their members in that new challenge (Chittick 2006, 217–218). This kind of endorsement by the UN as a kind of alliance partner profoundly differed from their deafening silence two years later when President Bush ordered troops into Iraq.

The lineup of alliance partners in later months was indeed impressive. Relatively well-off countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, France, and Australia had promised assistance less than a month after the brutal attacks. There would also be a need for many countries to provide both overflight and landing rights for Air Force planes involved in the attack, and forty countries agreed to those requests. The effort to name Operation Anaconda was the descriptive label for the second stage battle to capture the fleeing enemy soldiers, and forty countries made contributions to that endeavor (McCormick 2010). In terms of the war effort itself, by early 2002, seventeen countries had sent a total of 16,500 troops to Afghanistan, and 136 had been willing to provide military assistance. Already, there was consideration of the need to rebuild the nation after the war was over, and the total offered at that point constituted $1.8 billion (Papp et al. 2005, 219). Such a broad alliance reflected the collective shock of so many nations about the nature of the original attacks and the common fear that the terrorists might high key political and economic centers in their own nations.

American efforts to pull Russia into at least an indirect partnership were sensitive and touchy. President Putin and other Russian leaders had expressed considerable disagreement at the lack of western understanding of their own two wars in the 1990s against terrorists based in Chechnya. Further, there had been considerable Russian anxiety and anger about the march of NATO in the

same decade to their very doorstep. Inclusion of three former Warsaw Pact members from Central Europe had already taken place, and plans were afoot for the admission of a number of other former communist states, including three that had actually been republics in the old Soviet Union. They included Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. However, Putin did not resist when the Bush administration requested permission for American to negotiate access to two bases on former Soviet space. This effort resulted in access to Manas in Kyrgyzstan and to Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan. Russia also permitted overflight rights to the Americans over its own territory. A sort of thaw in American–Russian relations occurred, for serious discussions about arms control commenced, and the consultative NATO-Russia Council was created in 2002 (Papp et al. 2005, 222). Ironically, the 9/11 attacks by a very new enemy brought the United States closer to its long-standing old Cold War nemesis.

Incorporation of alliance partners in the planning process continued even during later years when the war and continuing sacrifices became so difficult and even controversial. For example, the Obama administration organized a Conference on Afghanistan in January 2010. Discussions centered on the success and future usage of surge troops, the eventual transition to Afghan control, and even the possibility of talks with moderate elements of the Taliban. In addition, there was an outreach to a number of key Central Asian nations about the possibility of transit of supplies into Afghanistan. The traditional route through Pakistan was by that time a troubled one, for sensitive relations between that nation and America had gradually occurred due to the impact of the war on Pakistani territory and people (Peterson 2011, 108–109). Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives who had escaped into Pakistan had also attacked vehicles that were on their way with soldiers and supplies into Afghanistan. In a formal way, the Bush and Obama administrations continued to keep contacts alive with partners in the mission, from its origins through the time when tentative plans for departure came to take shape. In that light, it is also important to acknowledge indigenous forces as allies in the struggle as well (Biddle 2003, 31). The Afghan National Army (ANA) underwent considerable expansion in preparation for the American departure. In spite of the sad incidents of killings by the Afghan military of NATO personnel, it remained

true that the future of Afghanistan depended heavily on the capabilities of these internal allies both to preserve the political structure and to protect the lives of their citizens.

Evolving role of NATO in the war

After the initial bombing attack on Afghanistan in 2001, there was a separation between the objectives and activities of American and NATO forces. The former were preoccupied with the hunt for the Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters who were on the run, while the alliance troops worked primarily on projects related to nation-building (Chittick 2006, 219). As Secretary of State Colin Powell put it, "an international coalition against terrorism was in the offing" (Ajami 2001, 2). By December 2001, there were a number of organizations created to give structure to both the military and political operations. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was the main vehicle for combining all the force structures and capabilities used during the war. Importantly, ISAF also provided reports that NATO needed to paint the broadest possible picture of the tactical and strategic situations in the country. American military leaders divided Afghanistan up into five regional commands for ease of command and control. The regions included North, South, East, West, and Kabul. Organizational steps also included the setting up of a new office of NATO Senior Civilian Representative whose principal focus was political development. Assistance that the UN would provide in the areas of infrastructure such as highways and clinics was channeled through the newly formed Afghan Compact that bore the full name of UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) (Peterson 2011, 84–87). With all of these structures in place, the basis for an organized approach to the problem of stabilizing Afghanistan took shape.

A small change in the NATO relationship to ISAF took place in August 2003, a time when NATO actually took command of ISAF. This bound the alliance more firmly to the work in Afghanistan and made formal the fact that NATO was for the first time engaged in an "out of area" mission (Hook

2014, 190). The next step in the NATO alliance's deepening engagement in the military management of Afghanistan took place in 2006. In June of the year, the allies carried out the most extensive military campaign against the Taliban since late 2001. Soon thereafter, in September, the United Nations authorized NATO to take formal command of ISAF (Jentleson 2007, 366–367). The UN document was entitled "Declaration by NATO and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan," and it deepened the cooperation between the military alliance and the forces of the Afghan National Army. Afghan forces would get in the habit of visiting alliance headquarters from time to time, while they also would receive invitations to participate in joint military exercises. NATO also at that time took formal control of the twenty-five Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that were scattered throughout the country (Peterson 2011, 81–83). Often, the smaller new members of NATO received assignments to one or more of the PRTS, and they worked closely on projects related to important matters such as school construction and even the teaching of students. A large contingent of at least 20,000 soldiers remained separate from NATO and exclusively under American command.

Further formalization of operations occurred in the following months. For instance, at the Riga Summit in Latvia in November 2006, there was much discussion about the fact that alliance partners were imposing caveats on their operations in Afghanistan. In particular, they would dispatch their troops but only to a location in which the chances of casualties were low. However, the real needs were in the hotly contested areas such as Logar or Helmand provinces. American pressure on this matter led to some progress. During the following year, there was more discussion about all NATO members stepping up the number of their military forces. In the end, the agreement was that the alliance partners would contribute a total of 30,000 soldiers (Peterson 2011, 88). Hovering in the background and sometimes forefront of these negotiations was often the question of whether alliance members were meeting the NATO standard of devoting 2% of their GDP to the defense sector. Quite a few of the new members had approached or met that standard in the 1990s when they were in the PfP program. However, full NATO membership had been accompanied by a fall below that financial floor. In all of these ways,

the transatlantic alliance gradually heightened its profile in Afghanistan in ways that made clear that the United States was not alone in the battle against terrorism.

A second watershed in the evolution of NATO strategy accompanied the decision taken in March 2010. President Obama agreed that most of the 20,000 U.S. soldiers who were outside of the NATO command would move under its tent. Allied planners hoped that this further consolidation would improve communications among all the allies and assist in the avoidance of civilian casualties. As the counterinsurgency strategy was now a year old, the merger would allow for improved restructuring of capabilities in order to implement more effectively the new set of tactics (Peterson 2011, 111). However, there were still a few American forces such as military police that remained separate. Much later in June 2013, NATO and Afghanistan's President Karzai made a major decision in light of the plan for all but 15,000 troops to be out of Afghanistan at the end of 2014. The NATO coalition basically turned over control of domestic security to the Afghan forces, a step that put the American and NATO forces into a supporting role. In fact, this important step was the fifth and final step envisioned by planners when they met in November 2010, at a NATO summit in Lisbon, Portugal. Thereon, allied forces would not be leading the attack on the insurgents but would provide advice, air support, and medical evacuations (Izvestiya 2013; USATODAY 2013a). This was not the final step in the evolving alliance strategy but was a long way from the initial moves of late 2001.

A brief look at the extent and degree of allied participation in the war reveals the extensive commitments that even small nations at times made. For example, non-NATO member Sweden had a contingent of 410 troops in Afghanistan and increased it to 440 in the early days of the surge in 2010. The French, who for decades had stood on the edges of alliance activities, made the decision in 2009 to quadruple their assistance for schools and nonmilitary projects (Peterson 2011, 105–109).

The three Central European nations that joined NATO at the earliest time in 1999 each made substantial contributions. For example, Hungary focused on infrastructure projects and maintained 315 troops there at the end of 2009, while Poland provided 1,995 troops at the same point in time and had particular

responsibilities for protecting Kabul Airport. The Czech Republic engaged in a broad range of valuable activities to include provision of meteorologists as well as a field hospital at Kabul Airport. They also contributed to nongovernmental organization (NGO) activities that helped inoculate children and teach in schools in Itarchi. The Czechs were also willing to put their soldiers in harm's way, and this was apparent in their dispatch of 200 soldiers to Logar Province in 2004. Further, their 5th Contingent spent 86 days patrolling the rugged hills and terrain in the eastern part of the country (Peterson 2011, 93–97). Obviously, they were less willing to utilize the caveats than were some of the other partners.

Other new alliance members from former communist states who joined in 2004 also made credible contributions to the broad alliance. At the end of 2009, the military presence of Bulgaria stood at 540, of Latvia at 175, of Romania at 940, of Slovakia at 240, and of Slovenia at 70. In addition, the Bulgarians made their own Sarafovo Airport available to the allies as a jumping-off point for Afghanistan. Estonia was willing to emplace its soldiers in dangerous places in both Kandahar and Helmand Province during its 2009 elections. Lithuanians did work in the PRT in Ghor Province in order to make the area more hospitable for UN personnel. Romanians actually engaged in battle with the Taliban in Kandahar Province in 2006, while Slovakia provided an engineering construction team at Bagram Airport as well as a demining unit at Kabul Airport (Peterson 2011, 92–98). Overall, this was a commendable presence, as it contributed much to the NATO mission of defeating the enemy as well as of rebuilding the nation and state.

Conclusion

In the end, the alliance members were willing to incur real risks as part of their commitment to assist the United States in the military response to the vicious attacks of 9/11. One such risk was the disruption of energy supplies, for Iran and other Middle Eastern states might have been willing to punish the smaller nations that went along with this American-guided project. Second, there were budgetary challenges in general for each of these

nations, especially after the onset of the economic crisis of 2009. Meeting the NATO request for devoting 2% of GDP to defense might have been a continuing hardship. And yet, such financial commitments were important due to the fact that NATO's mission entailed political as well as military components and responsibilities. Committing a certain proportion of GDP to defense became a sign that a nation and its leaders were serious about the political obligations that underpinned military operations and commitments (Wallander 2002, 2). Ironically, some critics of the Johnson administration during the war in Vietnam had pointed out that he demonstrated a "deafness" to U.S. allies and thereby underestimated the political function of NATO (Fox 1967, 358). Over a broad span of time, NATO had been in fact the "military arm of a political community built upon a common culture and shared sentiments" (Modelski 1963, 771).

Third, there were fears by some of the participants that they might become embroiled in questionable torture techniques that the alliance militaries at times used. Bulgaria and Norway were targets of such charges at one time (Peterson 2011, 100–102). Reactions to this dangerous involvement by the militaries of smaller countries constituted a fourth risk to the incumbent governments that made the commitments. In the year 2010 alone, socialists in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia challenged centrist governments with objections about the nature and length of the commitment. In the Netherlands, the left was able to extract a pledge from the government that all troops would be out of Afghanistan by the end of the year (Peterson 2011, 109). In spite of these four sets of risks and more, the alliance held together in unique ways in a constantly changing mission that lasted well over a full decade. In spite of the controversies, the West displayed courageous unity against a remorseless and unforgiving enemy.

America, Coalition of the Willing,
and the War in Iraq, 2003–2011

Origins of the American-led war in Iraq were very different from the previously described factors that led to emplacement of troops in Afghanistan. In fact, many Americans and allies were puzzled by selection of Iraq for a second front in the effort to contain terrorism after 9/11. In early 2002, President Bush had listed Iraq as one of the three countries on an "axis of evil" that posed a potential nuclear threat to the West. However, UN inspectors had, with mixed results, been admitted to Iraq to investigate the question of whether they were working on a nuclear capability. Sanctions imposed on Iraq in the 1990s after its Gulf War defeat had been partly directed at preventing this possibility. In early 2003, President Bush put together a Coalition of the Willing and was dead set on an invasion of Iraq to destroy Saddam's regime as they had the Taliban. However, key allies such as France and Germany were opposed to this venture, as was Russia. There was no chance of obtaining endorsement by the UN, EU, or even NATO.

Justification for the American-led invasion of Iraq

In many ways, the controversy over the Iraq War within the United States and among America's allies has centered over the rationale for embarking on war in the first place. In particular, critics have emphasized that the fear of Iraq's development of a nuclear capability was the principal rationale that the Bush administration offered in defending its decision to begin the invasion. Critics have also noted that the failure to locate either nuclear weapons or the workshops devoted to development of a nuclear capability gave way to

a series of additional arguments to justify the invasion. Perhaps, Iraq could become a bastion of democracy and thus a model for other troubled nations in the region. Maybe Saddam's crimes against his own people in previous decades justified his removal, a step that the coalition might have taken at the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War in early 1992. In the eyes of the Iraq War's critics, these latter reasons were simply efforts to cover up for the fact that the invading forces had found no evidence of work on a nuclear capability. Critics had also noted that there was no linkage between the 9/11 attacks and Saddam's record of brutality, for he was a rather secular leader who was not particularly wrapped up or vulnerable to extreme Islamist arguments. Thus, an attack on Iraq would have no correlation to the efforts to punish or root out Al Qaeda cells. Importantly, critics have also faulted the Bush administration for its failure to amass any international organizational support and its resulting willingness to act "unilaterally." For many critics, the rationale for invading Iraq was as weak and contrived as the scenario that President Johnson depicted as a reason for retaliating against North Vietnam for its attacks on American ships in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964.

At the same time, it is important to investigate the actual reasons that the Bush administration provided when it commenced the operation in March 2003. Exploration of those reasons can at least make evident what the mindset of President Bush and his advisors was, although such an investigation would not probably convince many critics that there was indeed sufficient justification for that war. When President Bush made his case for waging war in Iraq on March 17, he put the spotlight on the central issue of WMD. He set the historical context by pointing out that the allies had placed conditions on Iraq for stopping the Gulf War in 1991. One important condition was that Saddam's regime would "reveal and destroy" all such weapons. He observed that, in the period between 1991 and 2003, the West had engaged in twelve years of diplomacy to secure that condition and that the UN had passed twelve Security Council resolutions to enforce that major condition. Further, the western concerns were not just confined to nuclear weapons development but pertained also to usage of chemical weapons. Such a reference brought up the fact that Saddam had used those types of weapons both against the Kurds in an ongoing civil war in the North as well as against Iran in the war with them in

the 1980s. By lumping nuclear and chemical weapons together, the president was suggesting that usage was likely, if and when they possessed a nuclear capability ("President Bush Makes the Case … " 2005, 555–556).

Past history also played a role in the administration's depiction of the regime in Baghdad, for the president also observed that Iraq had demonstrated "a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East." No doubt, this was a reference to the Iran-Iraq War that Saddam had initiated in 1980 and that lasted nearly the entire decade. At the same time, there was in this reminder a belief that the Iraqi record was worse than that of other neighboring states, for the invasion would only be hitting them. For many observers, this distinction was a fine one and a matter of degree, for one could have made the same argument perhaps about Iran or about a number of African countries that were not the subject of an American-led invasion. Part and parcel of this depiction of the special recklessness of the Iraqi leadership was the charge that they had "aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of Al Qaeda." In the context of 9/11, it was the better part of wisdom perhaps to assume the worst in terms of linkages among terrorist groups and rogue states, for the goal at that time was to "connect the dots" in a way that had not happened prior to 9/11. In the haste and urgency of the overall situation during the previous two years, it was too easy to assume that all those forces that hated America and worked against its interests were in a conspiracy with one another. Therefore, the search for evidence of a Saddam–Al Qaeda physical link was unnecessary, as their common assumptions had brought them together. However, it is possible that it was the invasion of Iraq that pushed Al Qaeda into Iraq in an effort to exploit the continuing unrest and divisions.

A key difference from the war in Afghanistan was the refusal of the UN to endorse the American-led intervention. In the view of the president, Saddam had let that organization down as well by resisting their efforts to enforce the 1991 Resolution that was the key criterion for ending the war at that time. In the mind of President Bush, the UN has therefore "not lived up to its responsibilities." Consequently, he remarked that informally "a broad coalition is gathering," a development that the administration would later identify as the formation of the "Coalition of the Willing." In order to move in such a unilateral way, the president also made an effort to link the upcoming

campaign to larger global and historical dynamics. For instance, he mentioned the lesson that world leaders acquired through appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s. Just as planners of the war in Vietnam argued that appeasement of Ho Chi Minh would be a similar mistake in the 1960s, so the Bush administration contended that appearing weak to Saddam Hussein could open the floodgates of threats that would undermine global security in each corner of the earth ("President Bush Makes the Case…" 2005, 556–557). Certainly, it is possible to conclude that the Bush team overestimated the threat from Iraq and missed many key facts of the situation. However, in the continuing emergency after the 9/11 attacks, the president no doubt felt that it was better to assume the worst in terms of enemy intentions and connections instead of thinking that Saddam was unlikely to ignore one more opportunity to cause damage to the United States. Since the Bush administration eventually began to think of establishing a democratic model in Iraq as an illustration for the rest of the region, it is not surprising that they would not perceive Afghanistan in isolation but as connected with other dynamics and undercurrents in the region.

In the end there was a parallelism between the ultimatum that the United States gave to Iraq and the one provided to the Taliban in Afghanistan. In the latter situation, the administration had threatened war if the Taliban leadership did not leave Afghanistan right away. Similarly, the president gave Saddam and his sons 48 hours to leave Iraq or the result will be "military conflict." Of course, a major difference was that the Taliban had provided sanctuary to those who attacked America, whereas the Saddam regime had mainly inflicted grievous suffering on its own people. Saddam had also created conditions that continually unsettled the broader international community, including the UN. The matter of a preemptive war was also on the minds of all involved, for the bombing attacks on and invasion of Afghanistan had clearly been ones of self-defense by a nation that received an attack that resulted in 3,000 casualties. President Bush admitted that the upcoming operation was not self-defense but was an exercise in "disarming Saddam Hussein now" before the enemies hit again ("President Bush Makes the Case…" 2005, 557). This also might have been part and parcel of post-9/11 overpreparedness coupled with a determination never again to be surprised. However, the reasoning looked to many observers as a flouting of UN norms that only self-defense justified

military action. It also embarrassed the key UN inspector in Iraq, Hans Blix, who petitioned in vain for another thirty days to investigate whether Iraq was indeed still working to perfect its nuclear capability.

Stage one: Countdown of events leading up to the regime replacement by May 1, 2003

As the UN inspector Hans Blix departed the scene, preparations were made for the invasion. Turkey had initially indicated willingness to offer its territory as a path to invasion, but they later backed off due to concerns about the reaction of Kurds in their own territory as well as in northern Iraq. They also were a Muslim country and worried about the reaction by fellow countries if they cooperated too much in the invasion of another country of the same faith. Finally, the invasion came from the south, and the American- and British-led troops were relatively untouched as they drove to Baghdad. There had been expectations of a bloody, sustained urban guerilla battle for the capital, but the victory over the regime was an accomplished fact by May 1 of the year. President Bush landed on an aircraft carrier and gave a victory speech in front of a banner that stated simply "Mission Accomplished." That appearance and banner would later come back to haunt the administration.

Some observers have pointed out that the Camp David Meeting on the Weekend after the 9/11 attacks surprisingly put the invasion of Iraq on the table right away. If the "neo-cons" had been looking for a reason to invade Iraq for a long time, then this was the golden opportunity. Less well known is the position taken by Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz that the September 11 attacks justified an attack on Iraq even before the one on Afghanistan. In his view, Iraqis would then be unable to transfer nuclear technology to Al Qaeda and exacerbate the fears and indeed the situation. In addition, an earlier attack on Iraq would send a message to other rogue states that might be anticipating involvement in the hornet's nest of Afghanistan. Further, the United States might then be able to transform Iraq into a "staging area" for other attacks against regional terrorists (Hook and Spanier 2004, 360–361). No doubt this view was a minority one even within the Bush administration, but it does

reveal the synoptic thinking that the attacks on America were part of a web of hostility that required America to engage in many chessboard moves.

In early 2002, President Bush gave the State of the Union Message in which he used the soon-to-be famous line "Axis of Evil" to describe the rogue states of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea (Papp et al. 2005, 224). The common characteristic of each was its pursuit of nuclear capabilities and the resulting danger to so many nations if they were successful in that endeavor. At the time, most listeners were surprised that the president had used a term that sounded like Old Testament morality, and few expected that regime change might be forthcoming in any of the three states in the near future. In June of the same year, the administration inched closer to the possibility of a preemptive war, and the president's speech at West Point was an indicator of having arrived at this new crossroads. The president noted that earlier Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment were unworkable against the new kinds of threats that were characteristic of the twenty-first century. The "new thinking" that was now required included the possibility of preemptive action in order to save lives and defend freedom (Jentleson 2007, 367). Then, in September the administration issued its *National Security Strategy for the United States*, and that document called for confronting threats "before they are fully formed" and for "acting preemptively against such terrorists" (Bush 2007, 571–572).

Much more specific discussion pertaining to Iraq occurred in the following month of October 2002. Publication of the National Intelligence Estimate that month referenced the fact that Saddam had both chemical and biological weapons in his possession and that Iraq possessed missiles that went beyond the restrictions that the United Nations had imposed (Hook 2014, 67). The president was also able to gain support from a vulnerable legislature for the use of military action against Iraq. It was a mid-term election year, and Republicans would end up winning control of both chambers of Congress. In this vote there were no corresponding requirements that overtures first be made to the UN (Hook and Spanier 2004, 364). Eventually, the United Nations did pass Security Council Resolution 1441 that pointed out how Iraq had been violating its 1991 Resolution 687. That resolution called upon Iraq to report on its WMD capabilities within thirty days and to permit UN and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors back into the nation.

Iraq was partially responsive to that resolution, for they gave a report on their weapons program and let inspectors back in during the last month of 2002 (McCormick 2010, 220).

The momentum toward war built in the early months of 2003, and the report of the UN inspectors was ambivalent. On the one hand, their visits into Iraq did not provide actual evidence that Iraq possessed biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. On the other hand, they concluded that Iraq had not been fully truthful about its work on WMD. As a consequence, the inspecting team requested more time to investigate the matter thoroughly (Papp et al. 2005, 225). However, the Hans Blix-led inspecting team did issue ominous statements that reinforced the decision of President Bush to go to war. Blix reported that the Iraqis interfered with the UN personnel and insisted that governmental representatives be present during interviews with scientists and other citizens. Further, there had been 1,000 tons of chemical agents in Iraq in 1998, but it was unclear what had happened to that stockpile (Hook and Spanier 2004, 365). All these dynamics came to a head in March when Secretary of State Colin Powell appeared before the UN to make the case for the invasion of Iraq. He warned the UN that it might become an irrelevant organization if its member nations continued to permit Saddam Hussein to stonewall its inspecting team (Papp et al. 2005, 466). The writing on the wall was very clear for all to see, and war was apparently inevitable.

Momentum became a drumbeat toward war by March of the year. Based on the supportive congressional resolution of the previous October, President Bush issued his ultimatum to Saddam and his sons to leave the country on March 17. Of course, the leaders remained in place and the invasion from the south was imminent. A combined air and ground attack made this war different from the Persian Gulf War during which a long air war preceded a very short ground operation (Hook and Spanier 2004, 369). In fact, the ground forces that entered Iraq constituted 200,000 military personnel (Hook 2014, 67). That military procession met little resistance in its drive to Baghdad, but the fall of that city was not an easy victory (McCormick 2010, 221–222). Vice President Cheney's expectation that the Iraqi population would greet the invaders as heroes and allies was not borne out in fact, and thus tough urban warfare took place. However, on April 9, the allies had gained control of the

capital city, and in a symbolic but perhaps humiliating way, they took down the statue of Saddam. Within several more weeks it was possible to conclude that the allied invaders had been successful in pushing the old regime out of power, and President Bush declared that the American military and its companion nations had accomplished the mission by the beginning of May. During the bitter fighting and mounting casualties of ensuing years, that was a declaration that would come back to haunt the administration.

Stage two: Caught in a swamp of ethnic conflict, Provisional Government, and change, 2003–2011

In fact, the invading forces had never discovered the suspected nuclear weapons that had been the key root of the war and the cornerstone of Secretary of State Colin Powell's explanatory speech at the UN. Other justifications quickly emerged such as the need to rid the nation of a leader who had committed so many crimes against his own people, the hope of creating a model democracy in a troubled region, and, in the background, the risk to oil resources.

What ensued after the apparent victory was a horrific nightmare that did not begin to go away for at least six years. Early American administrative decisions alienated key elements of the Iraqi population. From 2003 to 2004, Paul Bremer served as a kind of viceroy in Iraq prior to its first elections. He and his staff made the decision to disband the Iraqi army and police forces that had served Saddam's interests. However, this step took away salaries from many persons and families, and as a result they looked around for an opposition to join. This step also weakened the general security situation in the country, for there were no experienced forces to deal with the ensuing violence.

De-Ba'athification was another management decision, and it led to dismissal of persons who had joined Saddam's party that was based on the Sunni minority. Of course, there was an expectation that the Shiite majority that had suffered under Saddam would take over many of the tools to power, but many of them had also joined the Ba'athist movement for practical reasons. Many people, even elementary school teachers, had joined that movement as a condition of employment, so they were alienated as well. Finally, it is unclear if

Al Qaeda forces were in Iraq before the American-led invasion, but they surely entered in order to feed off the trouble afterwards.

There was also a debate within American ruling circles about the nature of a Provisional Government that would be in place prior to the elections scheduled in 2005. Former General Jay Garner suggested an Iraqi-based Provisional Government, but American viceroy Paul Bremer opted for an American-led government. The ruling group included a 25-member Council ruling in tandem with 7 expatriates. The latter were controversial since they had seemingly abandoned their home country in earlier years. The representatives on the Council included 13 Shiites, 5 Sunnis, and 1 Kurd (Pelletière 2007, 78–103). By emphasizing ethnic differences on the Council, the basis was laid for future ethnic struggles, whereas a formula that encouraged the ethnic groups to work together on key problems might have had different results.

The years 2005 and 2006 were transitional in terms of leadership in both the United States and Iraq. In January 2005, Secretary of State Power stepped down and Condoleezza Rice took over, a person who was much closer to the president in her assumptions about the use of force in the world than was her predecessor. Clearly, Secretary Powell had been torn by the need to present the case for the Iraq War to the United Nations in the days just prior to the war. After the mid-term elections of 2006, the much-maligned Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld very quickly left office. He had managed to alienate the "old Europe," the soldiers who pleaded that their equipment was defective, and many key constituencies and leaders in the United States. Within Iraq, elections were held in 2005, and the two years of Provisional Government ended.

Much violence was directed at American forces and their allies, but the Sunni–Shiite conflict led to countless acts against the mosques, homes, stores, and human beings in the other group. Occasionally, the Kurds were targeted or involved in the violence as well. With the overall situation at white heat, the American military and civilian leadership fastened upon a surge strategy of sending in more troops in 2007. General David Petraeus was designated to head up this effort that included five more brigades, and by 2009 there were notable results. By that time, Afghanistan appeared to be in the more precarious situation, and so both the concept of surge and General Petraeus himself soon moved there.

For several years after 2005, the Iraqi political system under Prime Minister al-Maliki bore more credibility within the population than did the Karzai government in Afghanistan. There had been a careful effort to award political positions at the top to a Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd. Thus, each major ethnic group had a stake in the system. And yet, it took months for al-Maliki to put together an ethnically balanced government after the contentious second set of parliamentary elections in 2010. In spite of the continuing episodes of violence, the American combat mission ended in the spring of 2011. The question of how long a token force would be needed remained subject to negotiation between American and Iraqi leadership, but the Iraqis quickly ended the discussion by requesting rather immediately a complete withdrawal.

Allies in the war

A Coalition of the Willing in Iraq without official support from the UN or NATO represents quite a different undertaking from either the UN-endorsed Persian Gulf War or the War in Afghanistan with its heavy NATO involvement. However, President Bush did stitch together an alliance that worked with the United States from the beginning of the Iraq War. Prime Minister Tony Blair from the United Kingdom was his foremost supporter but also a partner who wished for one more effort to get a supportive vote from the United Nations. The certain prospect of a French veto made this option unworkable. Spain was a main partner as well, and its support was symbolized by its willingness to host a key planning meeting days before the war began. In all, there were 42 nations that made up the coalition that supported the American lead in the invasion of Iraq (McCormick 2010, 221–222). The contribution from the UK was particularly important, for it included both ground and air capabilities (Papp et al. 2005, 225). In addition to a supply of bombers, the British sent a full 30,000 troops to take part in the ground invasion. Prime Minister Blair's consistent support for the United States did cost him considerable domestic political support, and the pressure for him to depart from office in the middle of the election cycle had much to do with his stand on Iraq. The supportive Spanish government suffered the same fate, as a terrorist attack on the

transportation system at the time of the next elections disclosed the costs of the nation's support for the American venture. It may be that the incumbent governing party would have lost anyway, but the attack no doubt sealed its political doom.

If the traditional American allies in the western part of Europe were wary of and even hostile to the American-led war, the governments further east were more supportive, although their publics were far less so. Most had been free from communist control for only a little more than a decade, and thus they were willing to be part of a project that promised to expand the universe of free countries. They also had courted NATO membership through their PfP status, and the target date for formally entering that organization was just one year off for a number of them. After the defeat of Saddam's forces, the Poles received a major responsibility for managing the wide sector just to the south of Baghdad that included a substantial Shiite population. In fact, the Poles sent three successive rotations of 2,400 troops each, and even the German officers in that sector had to suffer the embarrassment of reporting to their Polish superiors. When considering the post-communist nations as a set, the Ukrainians sent the second highest number of troops after the Poles. The Czech Republic sent a 100 member mission that worked to train 12,000 Iraqi police officers at Al Shaiba Base near Basra. Other post-communist countries that provided aid of some sort included Bulgaria, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia. Additionally supportive Western European partners included Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway (Peterson 2011, 117). Although the coalition had obvious holes or gaps in it, all this involvement helped to weaken the charge that the Iraq War was a purely unilateral operation by the United States.

NATO eventually played a role in the period when allied forces were struggling with the challenge of building a sense of security and stability in the troubled land. In mid-2004, the UN asked NATO to create and set up a training mission for Iraqi police and military forces. They labeled it NTIM-I, and it lasted from August 14 until December 16. At that point, NATO switched the name NTM-I, and it became a semipermanent part of the security landscape in subsequent years. In addition to training forces, the alliance also set up a military academy. Bulgaria hosted training of Iraqis in their own

country, while Hungary headed up the Military Advice and Liaison Team (MALT) in 2007–2008. Even Latvia made a small contribution by training two Iraqi specialists in munitions detection in 2006. The Lithuanian contribution centered on training Iraqis at NATO military schools. Slovakia provided assistance in WMD monitoring, while Romania took part in some activities of NTM-I after its creation at the end of 2004 (Peterson 2011, 122–124). In light of all the sectarian warfare and bloodshed that erupted in a continuing way up until the point of the American departure and after, this particular training mission was an important indication of the hopes of NATO planners to do what they could to prepare Iraqis for guiding their own country to a better day. However, the fact that so many died in Shiite–Sunni violence in the first half of 2013 made it difficult to conclude that the near future would be much better than Iraq's immediate past.

Conclusion: Problems with alliance formation

Putting together alliances in the post–Cold War period was challenging due to the complexity of the enemy in contrast to the single-minded and single-centered foe during the Cold War. This was particularly true in the case of the Iraq War. While the challenge from Moscow tended to unify the West in most cases, the emergent threats in the early twenty-first century were more varied. They included the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, global terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. While the Bush administration looked to military power as the most appropriate way to deal with such challenges, Europe tended to support steps that centered on "measured and principled foreign interventions" (Moisi 2003, 67). Thus, there was nowhere near the allied agreement and support for the War in Iraq than there had been two years earlier in Afghanistan. Some critics of the Bush policy concluded dramatically that the result was "collapse of the Atlantic alliance" (Asmus 2003, 20). Similarly, others maintained that the administration's efforts to obtain allied support constituted "a stunning diplomatic defeat" (Rubin 2003, 46). Given the failure of the Bush administration to convince allies of the necessity of joining the United States in the Iraqi operations, other observers suggested

that America would have more luck in getting support for "modernizing the Arab world" instead of conquering and transforming troublesome portions of it (Ajami 2003, 2).

Key problems emerged right away with traditional allies France and Germany, and the German situation compounded the problem as they were chairing the Security Council during the critical month of considering the U.S. proposal. Probably, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's contrasting of the willing participants in the "new Europe" with the resisters in the "old Europe" did not help, although he was using that terminology in the first place in the knowledge that they were going to be holdouts. The opposition in France and Germany had a spillover effect in the role that Turkey might play in the war. At first, the administration was anticipating an attack from the north through Turkey as well as from the south. Tentatively, Turkey initially agreed to this plan, but the opposition of France, Germany, and Belgium prevented usage of this option. The three refused to permit the transfer of military equipment to Turkey, and that ended the prospects for an invasion through that country (Hook and Spanier 2004, 365). Further, the three also disagreed that the situation justified invocation of NATO's Article 4 on self-defense (Peterson 2011, 117). In their view, there was no evidence of an intention by Iraq to invade Turkey, although Kurds in northern Iraq had often crossed the border into Turkey to demonstrate solidarity with the Kurds who lived in southern Turkey.

Within the UN Security Council, there was clear opposition to the Iraq War from China and Russia (Hook and Spanier 2004, 367). The former was opposed to U.S. interests geopolitically on a number of key points and also needed the prospect of Iraqi oil to support its own ongoing modernization projects. Russia had during Soviet times been an arms supplier to Iraq, and so their hostility to Saddam was less than that demonstrated by other nations that had been at odds with Iraq since 1990. Further, there was continuing Russian concern about NATO's admission of post-communist systems as well as about U.S. leadership of that ongoing project. Russia had permitted takeover of two military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan right after 9/11, but the Iraq War was an entirely different matter. With the opposition of three permanent members of the UN Security Council, there was absolutely no prospect of endorsement by that multinational body.

By 2004, the criticism of the U.S.-led mission in Iraq confronted a more generalized and even theoretical opposition both domestically and globally. Senator John Kerry basically portrayed the invasion of Iraq as a mistake in his campaign for the presidency in 2004 (Papp et al. 2005, 225). However, he was weakened in his critique because he had endorsed the use of force in a congressional resolution in the fall of 2002. When NATO held its biannual summit in Riga in the fall of 2007, the Bush administration requested from the nations an additional 3,000 troops to be part of the ongoing surge strategy (Peterson 2011, 121). The failure to obtain that level of support is an indicator of European discontent with the quagmire that had developed as a consequence of the American-led invasion. There was also growing dissatisfaction with the way in which the never-ending struggle in Iraq undermined the ability to make much progress in Afghanistan. The struggle in Afghanistan had been relatively low key in the early years after the fall of the Taliban, but it had heated up considerably by 2008. Nations such as Canada wanted to concentrate on stopping the bloodshed in southern Afghanistan, but it was very difficult to generate the resources due to the commitments in Iraq (Peterson 2011, 121). In addition, it was more difficult to maintain the NATO presence in Kosovo and Bosnia, given the military needs in Iraq. Small alliance partners wished to contribute to humanitarian and peacemaking projects of their new alliance, but their limited resources made it difficult to contribute on so many troubled fronts. Thus, the Iraq War weakened U.S. leadership of NATO and also sapped the alliance by stimulating divisions within it (Peterson 2011, 112).

Finally, a growing body of critics charged that America had given up on the multilateral approach utilized during the administration of President George H. W. Bush and replaced it with an unwavering unilateralism. Such an approach was out of sync with the direction of global events, for in recent years there had been a "broader diffusion of power across the world" (Zakaria 2009, 43). If this were the case, would American leaders actually listen any more to the wisdom of their allies? Did the American exercise of military power in Iraq and Afghanistan convince other powers that there would be no future need for assistance from the partners? If the answers to these two questions were both "yes," then there might be permanent resistance from partners that had usually been supportive in the past. If the process

and outcome of the Iraq War had generally a "negative impact on alliance cohesion," then alliance building in future conflicts would be difficult and tedious indeed (Snow 2004, 41, 368–369). AS the full century of war ended, would America's ability usually to rely on dependable partners also come to an abrupt halt?

Theoretical implications of the war against terrorism

Analysis of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq bears scrutiny through the lenses of alliance theory, for their outcomes are so markedly different from those in the two world wars that formed the subject matter of the first part of this book. Those earlier wars had finality about them in terms of defined victories and obviously defeated enemies. In 1914, the results and consequences in both Afghanistan and Iraq were not nearly as clear or apparent. Who was victorious and who was defeated in those two initial conflicts of the new century? The awful silence in the answers to those related questions is both haunting and ominous for future conflicts in the world of the Arab Spring and beyond.

Certainly, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, there has been a "shared internal security dilemma" based on clear threats emanating from neighboring states. Afghanistan had been occupied by the Soviet military for most of the decade of the 1980s, and earlier in its history it had been subjected to tugs-of-war between the British and Russian empires. After the commencement of the war in 2001, Pakistan became a threat, for its spongy border allowed the seemingly defeated enemy to retreat there and plan for a battle on another day. The presence of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, unseen and unknown for years, became a symbol of the spiritual threat that hovered for nearly a decade over the Afghan people. The case of Iraq is more ambivalent. On the one hand, Saddam had clearly perceived Iran to be a direct threat, in particular to Iraq's ability to export its oil at a reasonable cost. In addition, the Shiite majority in Iran stood as a constant reminder of the inherent unfairness of minority Sunni rule in the Shiite majority state of Iraq. On the other hand, Iraq itself had threatened its immediate neighborhood by starting a war with Iran in 1980 and another with Kuwait in 1990. The impact of those wars continued to

resonate throughout the region and constituted barriers to security. A "security dilemma" also exists when there are sharp internal divisions within key states, and that has been true for both of these war-torn, troubled lands. The Taliban imposed an unrepresentative regime on the Afghan people, and Saddam did the same in relation to the majority Shiite population as well as the Kurds. Thus, security threats from within and without combined and flowed into a poisonous well.

It would be correct as well to identify this entire region that encompasses the two wars as a "shatterbelt." In both cases, there was a major problem with "gravitational distance" once the United States involved itself and its military. How could an admittedly powerful nation so far away offer continuing and true protection in the name of freedom? The American public was aroused by the 9/11 attacks to lead alliances into both countries against clearly defined enemy leaders, but the length of the war and casualty count had a wearing effect on the public after only a few years. Public support within the allied countries also declined in light of the length and expense of the conflicts. There was also incredible distance between western culture as represented by America and the variety of Islamic traditions with the two nations. America did sponsor western-style elections in both nations, and leaders emerged. However, in many ways this step forward in democratic forms merely opened the door to sectarian conflict within and expressions of religious and cultural anger directed outwards.

The matter of typological distance also is worth consideration, and in these two cases the Cold War background is important. Both Afghanistan and Iraq were in some sense under Soviet sway or influence during the latter part of the Cold War.

From 1980 to 1988, the Soviet military fought for influence in Afghanistan partly for geostrategic reasons and partly to create additional stability on its southern border. The geopolitical factor was the dual interest in strengthening its position in an oil-rich region that was closer to the warm water ports that Russian and Soviet leaders had desired for a long time. In terms of the Soviet search for additional stability, Moscow would have felt somewhat threatened if a second Islamist regime had emerged in addition to Iran. The Soviet Union contained 80–90 million people in its southern republics who were Muslim

culturally and traditionally. Soviet leaders were concerned about a potential impact of two extreme bordering regimes on its own population in republics such as Kazakhstan. Even after the Soviet withdrawal in 1988, they maintained semi-influence through puppet regimes until the Taliban takeover in 1996. However, all of their "hold" on the nation ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and certainly by 1996. At that point, Afghanistan lay open to ethnic conflict among Pashtuns, Kyrgyz, and Uzbekis with an overlay of the Al Qaeda foreign fighters and the Taliban itself also within its borders.

The Soviet leadership saw fit to arm the Iraqi regime in the last decades of the Cold War for somewhat different reasons. Until 1978, the United States firmly supported the Shah of Iran in his efforts to modernize or westernize his country. Moscow did welcome the indigenous communist party in that country, but their military assistance to Saddam enabled him to act as a kind of counterweight to the government next door that America propped up. With all of the tensions in the neighborhood, President Carter saw fit to identify Iran at that time as a "pillar of stability in the Middle East." Again, the dissolution of the Soviet Union sharply reduced its ability to support governments in nations such as Iraq, and the new Russian leadership was less interested in any case. Freed of Cold War pressures and allegiances, Saddam's Iraq became a weapon that its leaders directed at other nations for purposes of extending their own political and economic interests.

Flowing from those post–Cold War realities, there was also an extension of the attributional distance in the region in the sense that bottled up cultural and political differences came to the surface. After the Taliban captured control of Kabul as the final step in dominating all of Afghanistan, they made a purposeful effort to align their society in tune with extreme tenets of Islam. Their steps in the direction of theocracy were more extreme than had been similar moves in Iran after 1979. They imposed real restrictions on communications technology that could have been used to bring in messages about western developments, and they ruled that young girls could no longer attend schools. Such steps may have dovetailed with the views of bin Laden and his foreign fighters who had entered the country in the 1980s to fight the Soviet army, but they alienated a population that had no choice but to remain silent. While many of the ruling Taliban officials were part of the Pashtun ethnic group, the nonmajority

Uzbekis and Kyrgyz became alienated from the new order. Once America and its allies invaded in late 2001, most of those internal differences came to the surface. America struck a deal with the Northern Alliance that consisted of the two non-Pashtun groups, and a kind of civil war ensued.

In the case of Iraq, attributional differences exploded in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Saddam was neither Sunni nor Shiite, but he ruled through his Baathist Party in tandem with and on behalf of the Sunni minority. Sunnis received advantages in governmental appointments and also in key positions within his military. In addition, he waged a kind of war against the Shiite majority located primarily in the south of the country as well as against the Kurds in the north. Of course, his use of chemical weapons exacerbated the ethnic tensions. Once the Coalition of the Willing invaded and established the Provisional Government, it was clear that the majority Shiites would eventually come to control the nation and the Sunnis would be in a subordinate position. Following the elections in 2005, that revolution in ethnic control became the new reality. American pressure led to designation of certain positions in government for Sunnis as well as Kurds. However, it was unclear how much of a say those leaders actually had. In addition, countless Sunnis and Shiites lost their lives violently in every year that followed. Often Sunnis would attack Shiites as they traveled to shrines in various parts of the country, while Shiites would then immediately retaliate. Weddings, funerals, pilgrimages, and marketplaces became centers of fear rather than of celebration and normal daily activity.

Is it possible to overcome any of those types of "distance" through creation of a common community or activity by a regional organization? Both countries have neighbors who could potentially work with them to enhance the security of both. However, there are serious barriers to establishing any sense of community in the near future.

For Afghanistan, Pakistan could be a potential partner in light of their common culture and similar experiences in trying to govern nearly unreachable and remote areas of their own country. There is also a commonality in the efforts of both governments to deal with terrorists within their midst and in the challenges they both have to establish credibility in the eyes of the international community. However, their relationship has been troubled

during the entire length of the war in Afghanistan, for the porous border has enabled terrorists to seek save haven in Pakistan while not giving up on their goal of fighting on another day next door. The allied involvement for over a decade has also greatly harmed any understanding between the two. Use of drones by the United States has taken innocent Pakistani lives, while Pakistan somehow became the home of bin Laden for a number of years. The unannounced Navy Seal raid that resulted in bin Laden's death embittered relations between Pakistan and the United States, and this tension was linked to earlier suspicions that Pakistan's ISI was not always forthcoming with the United States about information on terrorists within their midst. Therefore, it would take time to get past this history of embittered relations in order to establish a basis for future mutual projects.

Iraq and Iran have in common the fact that Shiites are in the majority in both countries. In fact, there was an initial fear after the 2003 intervention that Iran might even want to absorb the adjoining Shiite area of Iraq with the consequence that the latter might actually break into three countries. President Maliki of Iraq has visited Iran, and the results of the 2013 elections in Iran were that the voters opted for the moderate Rohani, a man who might be able to work better with the secular regime in Iraq. Both are oil powers who possess the basis for expanded trade relations with China and India as well as a variety of Central Asian states. At the same time, the two nations do have the history of having fought a war against each other in the 1980s, and Saddam consistently used chemical weapons during the conflict. In addition, Iran has at times given sanctuary to Iraqi Shiite leaders like al Sadr as they hatched new military and political plans upon their return to Iraq. Any moves toward further accommodation between the two nations would also catch the attention of the United States and its western allies, for an arrangement between them might appear to be the worst of all possible worlds.

Existing international and regional organizations could also play a role in overcoming the many "distances" that characterize the area. NATO has played a role in training military and police officers in Iraq, and the alliance has also managed the Iraq War in part after 2006 and fully since 2010. NATO members and PfP associates played a role in both nations during the heat of the conflict. Many of the partners engaged in humanitarian and nation-building tasks,

and so their impact may be a continuing one even in their absence. It is clear that NATO and its partners are no longer welcome in Iraq, but they are likely to play a continuing role in Afghanistan, for even the Karzai government is counting on that. At the time of writing, it appears that the NATO contingent after 2014 may include as many as 15,000 NATO soldiers with 9,000 of those coming from the United States. Further, regional organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are available upon request to assist in the solution of a particular problem. Finally, individual nations in the region may offer mediation at particular times, as Qatar was willing to open an office for moderate Taliban figures to use in future discussions with the United States and later the Afghan government.

Balanced growth of democratic procedures and effective central bureaucracies can also assist in replacing the current "shatterbelt" with a more stable security framework. Each country has held several rounds of elections and has survived challenges and even violence that has at times accompanied them. In Afghanistan, the challenge has been to incorporate into any democratic framework the territorially fixated tribal chieftains. Iraq's continuing challenge is to allocate equitable shares of power to the Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. If that were to evolve in the near future, the foundation would exist for a consociational political arrangement in which the understandings of the three leadership groups might percolate down somewhat to citizens at the grassroots level. In Southeast Europe, Bosnia suffers from a similar condition, as it struggles to be inclusive at the top political level of the plurality Muslims, Serbs, and Croatians.

Establishment of effective but sensitive central government can also be an instrument for both accommodating internal differences and also building bridges to neighboring countries. President Karzai in Afghanistan reaches out to powerful regional leaders who are not in the habit of responding very quickly or at all to messages or commands from Kabul. He also faces continuing challenges from Taliban terrorists who try as much as possible to explode their suicide bombs as close to the governmental center as possible. The pressure on President Maliki in Iraq is to demonstrate that his administration can be effective in taking account of and representing Sunni interest. The Kurds are a significant factor too, but they maintain a certain independence and life of

their own in the north. Key decisions made by the central Iraqi government need to overcome the long-standing conviction that the leaders are essentially paying back the Sunnis for their long period of minority control in tandem with Saddam Hussein. An effective bureaucratic center can only emerge when both the political leaders and the ethnic groups somehow transcend the belief that the cycle of revenge for past sins should be ongoing and never-ending.

In conclusion, why did American foreign policy leaders and defense officials preoccupy themselves with threats emanating from Afghanistan and Iraq for well over a decade early in the twenty-first century? Why did the United States commit so many troops to those conflicts, incur such a high level of casualties, and suffer the loss of both allied and public support in the case of Iraq? The simple answer to both questions is the shock of a totally unexpected attack from out of the sky on a given day in September 2001. The ensuing sense of vulnerability awakened the nation and its leaders to the pressing need to punish the terrorists as well as to reconfigure the nation's security system in order to prevent a similar debacle in the future. Shadows and specters from the past figured into the decisions as well. Al Qaeda had hit the Trade Towers earlier, two American embassies in Africa, and the USS *Cole* without significant retaliation from the United States. The humiliation of the American military in Mogadishu upon its entry into the civil war in Somalia had also made its way into the psyche of the Pentagon. In addition, the memory of UN peacekeepers standing by while Bosnian Serbs carted several thousand Muslims in Srebrenica to their deaths in 1995 had both shadowed American leaders and strengthened the resolve to do more next time. The historical memory developed over a century included also the specters of the attacks on the Lusitania, Pearl Harbor, 38th parallel in Korea, Tonkin Gulf, Kuwait, and Bosnia. All of those memories, shadows, and specters exploded after 9/11 and drove America's national security policy makers to intervene with overwhelming military force in Afghanistan and Iraq. One can question the ways in which defense planners decided upon and carried out both wars, but it is difficult to question their inevitability.

Arab Spring, Discussions within Alliances, and the Potential for War, 2011–2014

Key conflicts of the Arab Spring

In the spring of 2011, a series of totally unexpected developments occurred that shook alliance loyalties and challenged American foreign policy leaders once again. Further, in some of the countries war was a direct result. The developments themselves have received several different names, including "Arab Spring," "Arab Upheaval," and "Arab Uprising." Whatever the label, the collective series of events captured the world's attention, challenged old assumptions, and raised serious questions about both the prospect of civil wars and the appropriate western response.

Tunisia and Egypt were the earliest center points of the phenomenon, and in both cases mass protests coupled with the use of social media pushed traditional regimes out of power. In Tunisia the upheaval began with the suicide of a street vendor with many siblings and also little economic hope for a better day. President Ben Ali, who had come to power several decades earlier, had in his early days borne the marks of a reformer. However, by 2011 he was the cause or scapegoat for economic troubles that had come to afflict the nation. Soon the mass reaction pushed him out of power, and he went into exile. Very quickly after that, Egyptians began to rally in Tahrir Square with serious complaints about the autocratic features of the Mubarak regime. Eventually, those popular pressures forced him from power as well, and he attempted to flee to his summer home. However, security forces brought him back to Cairo, and the verdict of the court was that he spend virtually the rest of his life in jail.

Yemen was also the target of considerable unrest that had been brewing for decades. In fact, the nation had been split into the Republic of Yemen and South Yemen from 1970 to 1990. Further, during the last Cold War the southern entity had been a center point of Marxist activity. Thus, it was no surprise when Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula became anchored in that part of the reunited country in post–Cold War times. A penchant for extremism was characteristic of both periods in that strategically located piece of territory on the Gulf of Aden. In a way that was similar to the paths taken by both Tunisia and Egypt, mass protests called for the removal of the national leader, President Saleh. Attacks led to a serious personal injury to Saleh, and he crossed the border into Saudi Arabia in search of medical treatment. Many in the country and abroad thought that this development offered him an easy exit from the country and a chance to save face. However, he insisted on returning to Yemen after his burns had healed, and he was equally adamant about staying in power through the rest of his elected term of office. However, pressures continued to build and he eventually stepped down. With the dangerous Al Qaeda units still circulating throughout the country, the instability continued.

Many other countries in the region went through similar changes, but they were more muted and on a smaller scale. For example, the Shiite majority in Bahrain demonstrated and called for the removal of the minority Sunni leadership from power. Military intervention by the largely Sunni majority Royal Family in Saudi Arabia next door at least temporarily saved the existing government in that important Gulf nation. In addition, the Palestinian leadership under Abbas came forward to win nonvoting membership in the United Nations by fall 2012, while Israel felt a renewed sense of vulnerability with all this ferment in the largely Muslim nations across the Middle East and North Africa. Their dogmatic determination to do something about Iran's alleged pursuit of nuclear capabilities may have been one result of that new sense of defensiveness and fragility. In addition, their sometime-ally Egypt would no longer be so dependable or consistent in its approach to the Israelis. Minor ripples of the Arab Spring even affected in small ways nations such as Tunisia, Algeria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Ironically, some called Iraq the first Arab Spring nation, based on its switch from the Saddam Hussein autocracy

to at least democratic procedures in 2005. However, it was of course the intervention by the American-led "Coalition of the Willing" that accounted for that change.

Civil wars broke out in two key states: First Libya and then Syria. Initially, the rippling revolution had skipped over Libya from Tunisia to Egypt. However, the many decades of autocratic and at times cruel leadership of Gadhafi had hardened the population against him, and the turmoil in surrounding countries soon spread through twitter and other social media to that sharply divided country. Like Yemen, but unlike Tunisia and Egypt, Libya possessed notable regional divisions. Gadhafi was entrenched in the western part of the nation in Tripoli, while the rebels were centered in the east in Benghazi. There were traditional ethnic differences between the two halves of the country as well. After the conflict became a civil war between the two parts of the country, and after the bloodshed rose to unacceptable levels, there was discussion in the West about a carefully defined intervention. In a sense, there was a precedent for this step in the 1986 NATO air attacks on the country after intelligence revealed that Gadhafi's forces had been behind the killing of two American servicemen in West Berlin. After President Obama garnered agreement for air strikes within the NATO command, America yielded to European allies for much of the management and implementation of the limited war. In the end, after months of civil war, the rebels pushed Gadhafi from power and killed him.

The war in Syria looked deceptively similar to the battle in Libya, and it raged all through 2012 and well into 2013. President Assad had moved from his reformist inclinations earlier in the century to a very hard-line and resistant posture by the time of the Arab Spring. Demonstrators pushed for his overthrow, and messages circulated mainly through social media, with official members of the media making only temporary visits to the country. However, the surface similarity to the Libyan civil war soon dissipated, as the opposition clearly contained many different splinter groups that worked at odds with each other. Some were democratic activists who wanted more opportunities for popular choice in the system. Many others were Sunnis who had chafed under rule by the Alawite/Shiite minority rule for a long time. Eventually, Al Qaeda (or al Nusra) took up its positions in the civil war. In the midst of the turmoil,

it was often difficult to determine whether it was the Assad regime or some element in the opposition that had committed violent attacks on marketplaces, universities, or ordinary towns.

As the casualties rose to 93,000 by early 2013, the eyes of the international community fastened on the beleaguered nation. Surrounding countries were deeply affected as well, as the UN reported, in March 2013, that one million persons had gone into exile from their homeland. International efforts to generate positive changes through UN declarations foundered on the resistance of especially Russia but also China to any calls for the toppling of the Assad government. All agreed that change was needed, but there was no unity on questions such as who should be able to take part in discussions about the future and fate of the country. General Arab anger about the involvement of the West and NATO in Iraq and Afghanistan made it very difficult to consider a Libya-style military operation. Further, the divisions within the opposition to Assad made it unclear who would benefit from a quick and precise NATO bombing campaign. Democratic activists might end up in a stronger position, but so might Al Qaeda. Assistance to the Sunni majority that was in the opposition would also have stoked the Sunni–Shiite tensions in one more country in the region, and the implications of that would have affected the same division in other places such as Bahrain.

The memory of Iraq had an impact as well, for the invasion in 2003 had resulted in bringing down the Sunni minority government and putting the Shiite majority in power. Retaliatory strikes by the Sunni's in an effort at revenge did not bode well for Syria where the same results could have occurred through Alawite efforts at revenge, if they were dislodged from power. Finally, nonlethal aid became a tool for assistance, but this was certainly short of what was needed to bring peace to the country. In spite of EU prohibitions, both the United Kingdom and France announced intentions to provide weapons to the opposition if the emergency became great enough (sueddeutsche 2013). The issue remained highly complex, however, especially after Al Qaeda in Iraq announced that it had merged with Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria. The new name for the merged group would become the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham, and the links between the two had been evident when the Iraqi branch spun off its Syrian counterpart in mid-2012 (USATODAY 2013b).

Arab Spring issues that impact the West

On April 7, Ayman al-Zawahri, the Al Qaeda leader, issued a call for all Arab Spring nations to divest themselves of western influence and also to refashion their states around the centerpiece of Islam (SME 2013). It is certainly true that Islamism had become a key feature of those states and a challenge to the foreign policies of both America and its allies. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt claimed the highest number of seats in 2011 parliamentary elections, while its candidate for the presidency Mohammed Morsi won the presidency in the summer of the following year. This was quite a revival of strength in contrast to the last elections held prior to the Arab Spring. In those elections held at the end of 2010, the Brotherhood dropped from 20% of the seats in the previous legislature to zero. There was a great suspicion that corruption had played a significant role in those outcomes (Hamid 2011a, 103). The power of the Muslim Brotherhood was magnified through its links to the military in post-Mubarak Egypt. When the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) proposed a series of constitutional amendments in March that liberals and former demonstrators opposed, the Brotherhood supported those legal changes. A few months later that same party stood with the military again in condemning planned protests against SCAF in Tahrir Square (Hamid 2011a, 104–105). Clearly the Egyptian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was politically skillful as it carefully planned its move to the top. However, massive protests and deaths on June 30, 2013, first anniversary of the revolution, broke out against the Morsi government and Muslim Brotherhood. That did not bode well for Egypt's future stability.

The Muslim Brotherhood, called Al-Nahda, was also a strong political force in Tunisia, the country in which the Arab Spring began. They played a role in the broad coalition that forced out Ben Ali's prime minister in late February, after the president left the country. Soon the new leadership was scheduling elections for later in the year. No doubt they were more moderate than their Egyptian counterparts and had earned some popularity by supporting the Code of Personal Status that had endorsed initial steps to expand the rights of women (Hamid 2011b, 112, 114–115).

While the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood into positions of political power in the two earliest countries to experience the Arab Uprising challenged American assumptions about the reliability of those two countries as allies, it is also true that both movements worked within their emerging new governing structures rather than against them. The same was not true for the offshoots of Al Qaeda that became active in the region after the Arab Spring began. In Yemen, Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula more actively sought to expand its influence beyond its base in the south of the country. The Iraqi Al Qaeda worked with the Sunnis to plan attacks on the newly empowered Shiites politicians and their citizens. Early in 2013, Al Qaeda in the Maghreb infiltrated the northern part of Mali to take advantage of a civil war within the nation, a step that led to intervention by the French military. As noted above, one reason for U.S. and allied reluctance to get involved in the civil war in Syria was the presence of an Al Qaeda faction in the broad-gauged opposition to Assad. In Afghanistan the attacks on NATO forces in 2012–2013 were still a product of the tandem of remaining Al Qaeda forces and the Taliban, both of which seemed to move with ease still back and forth across the border with Pakistan. Wherever these extreme Islamists nested, violence that either indirectly or directly impacted America and its allies was likely.

American policy was often in a tense and fragile relationship with its traditional partner in the region, Israel. Israeli leaders such as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu were wary of the new changes in Egypt, for they seemed to call into question the wisdom of the Camp David Agreement of the late 1970s. In that agreement Egypt had signed a peace treaty that provided tacit diplomatic recognition to Israel in return for gaining back the Sinai Peninsula. Specifically, there was a concern in Tel Aviv that the new leadership in Egypt might be much more forthcoming in assisting Hamas in its anti-Israeli activity that was rooted in the Gaza Strip. Developments in Egypt also seemed to encourage President Abbas in the West Bank to think of himself more officially as the official spokesman for all Palestinians. There was actually violence in August 2011, as Gaza-based terrorists made their way into Egypt and killed eight Israelis who were vacationing there (Byman 2011, 251–255). Such violent events stiffened Israel's spine and made American efforts to calm them down more difficult. Those new Arab Spring–related developments may also have

increased Israeli anxieties about Iran's intentions and thereby intensified their rhetoric about that nation's potential nuclear developments and the need for a strong western response.

Of course, the Iranian challenge to American interests extends beyond its assumed work on nuclear weaponry but also on its overt support for foreign forces of various types. They have been a principal supporter of Assad in Syria and slow to criticize his use of force against his own population. Attacks on the West have also included warnings about likely retaliation by Iran if the West ever contemplates a Libya-type intervention in the Syrian civil war. In addition, their support for Hamas has strengthened that group in its hostility to Israel, while their backing of Hizballah has created more tension in Lebanon (Maloney 2011b, 260–261).

The presence of American troops in several nations in the region is a kind of double-edged sword. On the one hand, it provides the basis for American watchfulness on potential sources of instability throughout the region. On the other hand, the continued western military presence after more than a decade of American-led war creates more fodder for anti-American propaganda of the type expressed by Zawahri in early April 2013. For example, the American Fifth Fleet is stationed in Bahrain, while the Air Force has a presence in Qatar and other military forces are located in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Bahrain is a nation with a Shiite majority but Sunni rule, and in that sense it parallels the situation in Iraq prior to the fall of Saddam in 2003. Thus, it was no surprise that there were Shiite-based demonstrations during the Arab Spring, and they even prompted Saudi Arabia next door to send in a military force to protect the established royal family (Doran and Shaikh 2011, 188, 190–191, 194).

The American military presence in Qatar dates back to the 1990s, when the United States received permission to set up the forward headquarters for the Central Command (CENTCOM) there in addition to the Air Force Base. CENTCOM was based in Tampa, Florida, and it was the critical command that had jurisdiction for the Middle East, including both Iraq and Afghanistan. Its leadership was critical for American efforts in those two wars as well as in any other potential points of conflict. Perhaps one result of the American military presence in Qatar is that nation's increased self-confidence to strive to establish a position of leadership in the region. For example, they have

offered to host talks with the Afghan-based Taliban movement, actually sent fighter plans to assist in the western effort to end the civil war in Libya, and have attempted to play a mediating role in Yemen, Syria, and the West Bank (Maloney 2011a, 179, 186).

America possesses strong ties with two major regional powers in the area, and the links to both of them offer risks but also the potential to work toward more stability in the area. The first is Turkey, a long-standing member of NATO and a country that is persistently seeking membership in the EU. For over a decade the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has had a share of political power within the Turkish government. Initially, there were concerns in leadership circles of America and its allies that the party would lead Turkey into a radical Islamist direction and undercut its role as a reliable ally. However, the AKP leadership was realistic and did not seriously violate Turkey's long-standing commitment to being a secular state. In fact, the Turkish leadership has attempted to offer leadership to the region and to help mediate a number of its most serious crises (Taspinar 2011, 269). Such a model could be a compelling one to some of the Arab Spring nations such as Egypt. However, anti-government protests in June 2013 shook western assumptions somewhat about the stability of the Turkish system. The second traditional American ally is Saudi Arabia, and its friendship is based on different factors than have been true for Turkey. Its regime is that of a traditional royal family that is connected with the very conservative Wahhabi branch of the Sunni tradition. In addition, the country is a major oil power and exporter that has adopted reasonably friendly policies toward the West. At the same time, the ruling family was shaken by the Arab Spring and adopted a policy of great caution with regard to it. This explains their interventionist role in Bahrain and their concern about the Saudi Shiite minority being ready to aspire to its own day in the sun. Further, they sense great danger across their southern border in the simmering of radical and violence-prone elements in Yemen. At the same time, they do have confidence that stems from their ability to contain Al Qaeda, and they did drive Osama bin Laden out of his native land (Riedel 2011, 159, 162, 166). From that perspective, the Saudi example is similar to that of Turkey, for its leaders have been able to contain the potential for violence within. The difference is that Turkey has accomplished this through gradual

evolution of a secular political system, while the Saudis have been willing to use force to protect their more conservative regime. However, in both cases the results have benefitted the American position in the region as well as that of its allies.

Role of alliances

There are several international organizations that can play a positive role in ameliorating some of the conflicts in the region. American policy planners welcome and work with nearly all of them. The UN has been willing to sponsor and call for action in the Libyan civil war; at the same time the organization has brought up the matter of calling for Assad's resignation in Syria several times. Vetoes by the Russians and Chinese have prevented this from taking place. NATO is significant in two important respects. First, it played a niche role in the Libyan conflict and was able to help tilt the balance in a relatively short time. There was no extended engagement as was the case in Afghanistan. Second, the NATO presence in the area has been somewhat of a stabilizing factor, even though the UN has not called for its involvement again. NATO's military forces are spread throughout the region and may help to reassure selected populations that they can provide help when needed. In addition, the Obama administration has developed a new NATO-based missile shield proposal that will eventually serve as a deterrent and protection against Iran, should that nation pursue seriously its nuclear capabilities and options for potential military use.

Although these two are the strongest available alliances, there are others that could play a role if needed. The EU does have a Common Security and Defense Policy, and that organization has managed the situation in Bosnia since December 2004. The Arab League is on the spot and has at least been able to send election observers on various occasions. Further, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) already has a record for limited action in the wake of the Arab Spring. Their leaders backed the Saudis in their successful efforts to quell the Shiite uprising in next door Bahrain. Presumably, the GCC would take a similar position if another regional power needed to deal with a brewing

revolution next door that threatened to spill across the border (Riedel 2011, 161). After the conflict in Bahrain calmed down a bit, the GCC offered $10 billion in assistance that was directed at easing the economic conditions that partly fueled the Shiite resurgence (Doran and Shaikh 2011, 192).

Conclusion: Potential for war

American policy planners and especially their NATO allies need always to consider and be aware of the potential that the Arab Spring will fuel wars for an extended time at least in the near future. Already, Libya has fought a civil war, concluded it with NATO involvement, and moved on to elections and rule by relatively liberal forces. The war in Syria has been even more prolonged and with a higher casualty count, but several important factors have made the western response one of diplomacy rather than war. By themselves, the French have decided to involve themselves militarily in their former colony of Mali, as the civil war began to threaten both the integrity of the nation and French moral and economic interests. Israel has rattled the saber against Iran, but the West has remained restrained while awaiting the next election outcomes and while attempting to keep the dialogue alive with a very difficult and unpredictable partner. War continues to smolder between Israel and its opponents in Gaza, the West Bank, and even the Golan Heights as a result of spillover from the Syrian civil war. Of course, a Coalition of the Willing fought for eight long years in Iraq, and the residue of that involvement is that it often seems as if the war continues to go on, at least among the Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. Finally, the Afghan conflict is clearly the longest American and NATO mission in the region. It is very unclear what its aftermath will be, following departure of the outside forces. In Iraq the ongoing conflict is essentially one among three key ethnic groups, and Al Qaeda is in the middle of things but not the puppeteer. In contrast, in Afghanistan the combustible mix of a weakened Al Qaeda but a relatively strong Taliban will no doubt survive the official end of the war. The specter of a radical Islamist outcome still looms in Afghanistan, whereas the major worry in Iraq after 2011 was Shiite restrictions or persecution of Sunnis and a potential lean toward Iran.

Conclusion: 2014—Reflections on a Century of War and an Abrupt Transition to New Conflicts

While the word "containment" was introduced into the language of defense strategy by George Kennan in the early years of the Cold War, it can also serve enough to explain certain aspects of American strategy in war over a full century. In addition, there are powerful linkages across the various periods in which American policy planners made decisions within the context of continuous war. In this concluding chapter there will be utilization of the terms "legacy" and "footprint" to clarify such connections. While a legacy is the inheritance from the dynamics of the preceding period, a footprint exemplifies the themes and patterns that pass on to the next generation of those in conflict. Pursuit of effective security communities is an ongoing goal of the alliance politics that percolates through all of these periods and themes.

Alliance networks and the defeat of the enemy in European and Asian states, 1914–1945

Breaking out of its isolationist shell was a difficult move for America early in the twentieth century and that explains the delay in entering both world wars. However, once engaged, American power had the objective of swinging the balance in the direction of containing the greatly overreaching policies of both Germany and Japan. In a sense, the period was one of continuing war, for the residue of World War I remained visible during the next decade and a half and then ignited quickly when stoked by the totalitarian dictators.

In some ways the themes of this period reflected the legacy of the profoundly different world that existed prior to 1914. As the twentieth century opened, citizens of England were still able to claim that they lived in the Age of Victoria. Monarchs in the Russian, German, Austrian-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires still held sway, even though all were much weaker than they

had been in the past. In Russia, a full century of challenges to the tsarist system would culminate in the Russian revolutions in March and November 1917. The German revolution was a longer and quieter one, but it entailed a gradual passing of power from the Kaiser to elected officials such as the chancellor. The Austro-Hungarian leaders had been reeling from pressures below since the tremors of the 1848 revolution, and as a result they had attempted some decentralization of the empire in the direction of more rights for the national minorities. The "Sick Man of Europe" was a label that came to characterize the Ottoman empire, an entity whose sweep through the Middle East, North Africa, and even Southeast Europe did not correspond with the ability of the center in Istanbul to preserve much political control.

All of these empires dissolved or became transformed during World War I, but they each provided a legacy for the period between 1914 and 1945. Lenin and the Communist Party took control by force in the new Soviet Union, and his tactics and much more so those of Stalin would terrify their own people as well as many other nations. The weakened German monarch would enable Adolf Hitler to manipulate the German polity by stoking resentment at both local economic condition and the combination of guilt and penalties imposed on them by the victors in the war. In Central Europe a whole belt of new nations replaced the Austro-Hungarian empire, and they all sought a role in the interwar period. Finally, new states replaced the Ottomans as well, but they were far weaker than the nations that emerged from the dust of the empire centered further north. Istanbul had been far less interested than Vienna in the education and economic development of the peoples contained within their borders. For the most part this legacy of the pre-1914 era was a negative one, and it would take nearly a full century to overcome the resulting swirl of ethnic hatreds and polarized ideologies.

This extended period of two world wars would leave sharply defined footprints that would lead into the post-1945 time frame. Germany's double defeat would leave a huge vacuum of power in Central or Eastern Europe. In Germany itself the imposed constitutional restrictions after 1945 would make it nearly impossible for its leaders to embark again on the path of aggression. In the area of international organization building, efforts to create a collective security landscape under the early League of Nations would provide a new

wisdom that would result in a stronger and more credible United Nations later one. Plans to set up a military alliance that reached across the Atlantic Ocean would put even more teeth into such an aspiration. Failure of interwar efforts to prevent the Holocaust spearheaded all of these endeavors. In Asia, Japan would emerge from the chastened experience of the war to resolve upon a role of global leadership that would center on economic accomplishments within a democratic framework. All of these footprints originated in the era of world wars and became even more pronounced with the passage of time during the Cold War.

Role of alliances in containing the power of a universalist state and its empire, 1945–1991

Containment was in a much more formal way the centerpiece of U.S. strategy during the Cold War. Perhaps, America did successfully check Soviet ambitions during those decades. At least, the feared invasion of Western Europe never occurred, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s came to naught. However, the perception that both the North Korean and North Vietnamese regimes were surrogates for Soviet/Chinese or purely Soviet purposes was mistaken. The sacrifices that the United States and others endured in those places, especially in the case of Southeast Asia, are much harder to understand or defend.

The bipolarity that characterized the Cold War was itself a legacy of the period of two world wars. While the Americans had helped liberate much of Europe from the West, the Soviet Union had done the same from the East. Thus, it was not a surprise that both superpowers amassed a huge set of allies during the early part of the Cold War. The vacuum in Central Europe thereby became a huge vulnerability for the new nations created after World War I. While domestic pressure forced the United States to bring its military home as rapidly as possible, Stalin was under no such restriction. Based on his interpretation of the Yalta Agreement of February 1945, he plotted coups that in some cases like Poland were masterminded from outside the country and in other cases like Czechoslovakia merged with some inside sympathies for the

Soviet Union. Legacies from the earlier period were also global in nature, for a second set of empires collapsed after World War II, as had been the case after World War I. This time the empires were those centered primarily in Western Europe and extended to Asia and virtually all of Africa. As France, Germany, Britain, Belgium, and others either negotiated away their colonies or lost them in battle, the playground of the Cold War expanded in a considerable way into those abandoned areas.

Footprints into the post–Cold War world also were evident as the communist world fell apart in 1989–1991. After more than seven decades of tension between Washington and Moscow, there was little likelihood that the two would see eye to eye as conflicts developed in the Balkans, with Iraq, and even with regard to Iran. Further, revival of the key defeated powers from World War II carried over into the 1990s, as it would be possible to describe Germany and Japan as the economic engines of their regions. Germany was the strongest economic force within the European Union, while Japan became the model for other "Asian tigers" such as South Korea and Taiwan. A certain wariness of both superpowers was another footprint whose visibility pushed many former allies away in different directions after 1991. For example, the experience of the United States in Southeast Asia during the 1960s and 1970s made many nations and leaders reluctant to follow unquestioningly the lead of the Americans. Similarly, the Russian crackdowns on allies during the Cold War and failed military intervention in Afghanistan led many nations to breathe a sigh of relief when the Cold War ended.

Creation of alliances to counter rogue states and their regional power, 1991–2001

Checking rogue state leaders and their states was definitely not on the American agenda in the euphoria that ensued after the formal end of the Cold War. However, it is a strategy that instantly became a necessity with Saddam's adventurousness in the oil-rich Middle East region. Human suffering in the Balkans at the hand of the ultra-nationalist Serbian leaders provided an additional rationale for an American role on the doorstep of Europe.

The sign of relief that many leaders and peoples expressed at the end of the Cold War quickly gave way to shock at the new types of challenges to international order. Thus, the sense of constant war and the need for allies continued and became even more pressing, as hot wars returned to Europe after their absence for nearly half a century. A principal legacy of the end of the Cold War was the unexpected implosion of both the Soviet and Yugoslav federations in the same year, 1991. Czechoslovakia broke up two years later, but the split was a negotiated one and bore few, if any, consequences for other nations. In the Balkans, there were wars fought by the Serbs and their leader Milošević against four sets of non-Serb groups including Slovenians, Croatians, Bosnian Muslim, and Croatian communities, and eventually the Muslims in their own Yugoslav Republic of Kosovo. In a sense, the disintegration of the two federations created a thirst to recreate the lost entity by trying to expand Serbian control in the new smaller states. Russian actions in Chechnya during the same decade had a similar thrust and result. Another legacy of Cold War was inattention to regions of economic importance and considerable political turbulence. The challenge represented by Iraq's takeover of Kuwait in 1990 was in part possible due to the preoccupation of the developed world with the collapse of communist power and the end of the Cold War. Even though Moscow had provided considerable military aid to Iraq in previous decades, the new Russia was too preoccupied with other new challenges to do much to resolve that problem in the Persian Gulf. The Americans were left to knit together the victorious coalition both with traditional allies and with supportive resolutions from the United Nations.

This last and troubling decade of the twentieth century also left significant footprints that stretched into the new millennium. Numerous UN resolutions to contain the ambitions of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein only cemented his willingness to repress both Kurds and the Shiite majority within his nation. In addition, he continued to resist UN inspections of potential nuclear facilities in the new century as he had in the old. While the Balkan Wars had ended, external forces continued to exercise considerable controls in both Bosnia and Kosovo. However, the most important footprint of the 1990s was the freewheeling activity of terrorist groups that operated across the globe and fed on the preoccupation of Russia and the West with their own internal preoccupations after the many foreign adventures and challenges of previous decades.

Battle against terrorism—beneath, above, beyond, and within, 2001–2014

In many ways, the effort to check aggressiveness at the end of this period of one hundred years of war has been the most difficult of all. Given the fluid nature of the terrorist groups, their decentralized structures, and the availability of technology and money, their impact on so many countries has been enormous. Among others, they have hit locations in Indonesia, Spain, and London since the attacks on the United States. They were also responsible for the explosion at the Boston Marathon in April 2013. The Chechnyan rebels have also hit Russia several times and in a number of locations. Global terrorists have been able to infiltrate countries unnoticed and attack structures and people from below. They have hit the United States with airplanes from above. They have taken advantage of globalization and the weakening of physical borders to operate well beyond the nation-state in which they might be physically present. They have psychologically unglued countless peoples with the idea that their damage may occur within the nation at any point such as a shopping mall, seaport unloading dock, marketplace, airport, or transportation system. American power could surely not contain such a threat by itself, but it also could not avoid the responsibility to take the lead in devising and aiming at construction of security communities. Allies were at times available and willing but at other times less so.

As implied above, the actions of terrorists were a clear legacy from the 1990s. Osama bin Laden had directed initial attacks on the World Trade Towers in 1993, but the loss of life was far less than it would be later. Al Qaeda had also been primarily responsible for the 1998 attack on American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 as well as the USS *Cole* off the coast of Yemen in 2000. While other previously noted preoccupations prevented the West and the United States from developing any coordinated and purposeful strategy to contain this accentuation of an old type of threat, all of those attacks were pointers to the heinous attacks on the World Trade Towers and Pentagon on September 11, 2001. A second and related legacy was the vulnerability of Afghanistan to the entreaties of bin Laden for protection and sanctuary. In fact, this weakness was evident in the 1980s when an unholy mix of domestic

coups and Soviet invasion softened up the nation for conquest by the Taliban at the end of the 1990s. That conquest set up the collaboration between Al Qaeda and the Taliban that resulted in the 9/11 attacks. In the same sense, the inability of the West to contain the ambitions of Saddam Hussein in a complete way in the 1990s was a legacy passed on to the leaders in the new century. Whether the American-led war in Iraq was justified or not, the "Saddam" issue was one that simply would not go away. In sum, the results of all these carryover legacies from the end of the twentieth century were extended to American-led wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

With the anticipated conclusion of the NATO and American-led military engagement in Afghanistan at the end of 2014, it is important also to reflect on the footprints that will extend from this period into the post-2014 years. American fatigue with military missions that are extended and that extract huge casualties on both sides is one clear footprint. Western reluctance to enter the Syrian conflict is a clear result of that fatigue. Both the restricted NATO operation in Libya and the limited French involvement in Mali reflect lessons from those twin experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. Another footprint from the era is the activity connected with the Arab Spring. With so many observers and participants preoccupied with Afghanistan and Iraq, and with the need again for relief from constant global pressure for a response, the Arab Spring was one more surprise. In that respect, it was somewhat like the Balkan and Persian Gulf conflicts that erupted just as the Cold War ended. In a way, the Arab Spring created dozens of large and small footprints that would not disappear for many years, or even decades.

Continuing terrorism, Arab Resurgence, and globalization, 2014 and after

This trio of continuing terrorism, Arab Resurgence, and globalization characterizes the last years of the "century of war." It is possible to view those forces as a combination of legacies that flow from each of the four earlier periods during the century of conflict. Examining the complicated nature of the twenty-first-century challenges reveals the truth of Kenneth Waltz's

conclusion in the 1960s that careful observers would eventually look back at the Cold War as a time of stability (Waltz 1967, 199–200).

Whether it is Cold War dynamics or the perplexities of the war against terrorism that is the topic under discussion, alliance theories continue to be a useful starting point for clearing up the cloudy skies of reality. It was during the 1970s that the experience in Vietnam gave birth to a new generation of security studies that focused on a whole range of issues (Walt 1991, 211). In part, analysts were then attempting to offer contrasting models to the dominant bipolar framework for depicting Cold War dynamics. To that "symmetrical" approach that centered on the balance between Soviet power and that of the United States, one observer offered as alternatives "asymmetrical," "hetero-symmetrical," and "hetero-asymmetrical" patterns (Hanrieder 1965, 302–303). While none of those four models offer wisdom for analysis of the war against terrorism, they do point to the need to provide more conceptual clarity to the struggles of the current age. Given the delicate nature of alliance relationships during the Afghan and Iraq Wars, game theoretical models may be useful. For example, such models can explore the motivations for alliance formation in the first place, the relationship between alliance formation and the outbreak of war, and the vulnerability of "unreliable alliances" to attack (Smith 1995, 405). All three of these issues pertain to the post-9/11 conflicts and NATO, for that alliance had re-formed itself after the Cold War. Very quickly, two wars emerged on the horizon that raised questions about a NATO response. Furthermore, alliance divisions and weaknesses during the highly controversial Iraq War may have invited, in part, the welter of terrorist attacks that seemed unending and that would persist after 2014. With these theoretical perspectives in mind, it is now time to turn to the three most evident challenges that are likely to be preoccupying after the technical end of the century of war.

Terrorism is in part a legacy of the continuing warfare that has extended over one hundred years. Each war in the period entailed ever more lethal means of destruction to the point that terrorists could see their own actions as a kind of personalized expression of what nations had been doing for so long. The use of gas warfare during World War I, gas chambers during World

War II, Agent Orange during Vietnam, chemical war by Saddam against his own population in the 1990s, and mass suicide attacks by airplane in the early twenty-first century had inured many persons to the death and destruction that followed in their wake. Thus, the expected terrorist attacks in the near future are simply an extension of the progressive dehumanization that has escalated within each sub-period of the century of war.

In a number of ways, the Arab Resurgence, or Spring, is also a culmination of trends and developments over an entire century, and it is surprising that the eruption did not occur earlier. Collapse of the Ottoman empire during World War I paved the way for expressions of Arab nationalism in the early 1920s in places such as Ataturk's Turkey and later Nasser's Egypt. Radical thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb began in that setting to develop radical attacks on the culture and politics of the West that would feed both terrorists of a later day and demonstrators involved in the "twitter revolution" in 2011. Similarly, the ending of the European empires in the developing world in the decades after World War II led to creation of independent states that often had seemed to spiral downwards into oppression and dictatorship by the time of the Arab Spring. During the Cold War there was growth of a large but not politically influential Non-Aligned Movement. That movement offered a third choice to those presented by Washington and Moscow and encouraged independent thinking within the Arab world. Egypt was one of the three founding members of that movement. It was also during the Cold War that the Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution occurred in Iran, and this offered an example to those who were interested in challenging the western model. Its emphasis on theocracy dovetailed somewhat with the positions of the Salafis and even elements of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt at the time of the Arab Spring. During the 1990s, both Saddam and Milošević challenged the West in bold and unconventional ways, a pattern that was partially reflected in the challenges connected with the Arab Spring. If Syria is excluded, the casualties that occurred during the Arab Upheaval were far fewer than those of the 1990s. However, in a number of the key Arab Spring nations, the population had paid the price earlier under the dictators. Insofar as a number of Arab Spring nations have been afflicted by terrorist

cells bearing links to Al Qaeda, the impact of post-9/11 Islamists prone to violence is undoubted. Such movements have been active in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Mali, and others.

The process known as globalization is also an outcome of technological growth throughout the entire century of conflict. Communications revolutions across the century made it possible for people in all corners of the world eventually to watch as wars and conflict unfolded. Technology made the lethality of war greater in each of the time frames under consideration within the century of conflict. As people and products moved so easily across borders, national leaders found their own ability to control key variables of political power far less. There were few signs at the end of the century of war that nations would be able to develop capabilities to halt globalization. What was uncertain was what the new forms of that process would look like.

If the transition after 2014 will bear the hallmarks of that trio of legacies, what specific footprints will follow in their wake to mark the way to increased stability? To start with, a new definition of globalization as an integrating force rather than a fragmenting one is an imperative. At this point in time, globalization undercuts the ability of states and leaders to influence very much their own destinies. However, globalization can also provide tools for regional organizations such as NATO and the Gulf Cooperation Council to have more of an impact on nations in turmoil. The concept can also nurture efforts by clusters of nations nearby to deal with those rogue states that pursue nuclear ambitions in an effort to unsettle neighbors as well as key superpowers.

With regard to the Arab Spring, or Resurgence, new models of development not tied necessarily to the western free market approach may increasingly leave a larger footprint. BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and now South Africa) offers the option of a more state centered or state capitalist approach that differs in many ways from the free market. State support for "national champions" and use of "sovereign wealth funds" can offer a model of development for Arab Spring countries that have been through so much turmoil but which often possess valuable resources such as oil, minerals, or sites attractive to tourists.

Finally, the scourge of terrorism begs for some sign of a footprint that will lead out of the dark cave. It is perhaps fitting that the century of conflict ended with a war in Afghanistan that lasted more than a decade and resulted in total NATO control over the operation, with America as the sparkplug. Attention to the details of the NATO operation there reveals that many nations outside the formal membership played a role in that mission. Nonmember Partners for Peace (PfP) worked with regular members to take part not only in military operations but also in rebuilding schools and hospitals. The broad-based nature of the coalition and the merger of military with nonmilitary activities can perhaps point in a positive direction, regardless of whether the Afghan War is seen historically as a success or failure. There is a need for a central coordinating point to mobilize energy and focus resources to combat the local appeal of terrorists who often provide food and turn on the power in communities that war has devastated. Encouragement by NATO of significant regional defense organizations can be a starting point to deal with terrorist tactics on their own turf. If NATO lacks the resources, and if its members have mission fatigue, it still remains as a tool that can coordinate and train leaders of other regional organizations in what works and in what does not. This is not a call to make NATO a dominating force in various regions but really a hope that the organization can operate as a laboratory and educational center that can empower those who live in the regions that are most vulnerable to terrorist attacks to construct their own effective security communities. The alternative is to be constantly surprised when terrorists take over a natural gas facility in Algeria, attack a bus in Pakistan, or devastate a line of pilgrims at a holy place in Iraq. Reliance on a strong and battle tested military organization for working with and nurturing regional defense organizations can give birth to the hope that the century to come will be freer of the wars that debased the last century. It can also be a century in which America and its allies deter conflicts rather than destroy enemy combatants.

Mazar
Some Day, My Boy

Someday my boy
Will grow up and be strong
Like the flowers bloom
In early days of June
Spring is coming soon

One day my son
Will protect our land
Like the roaring lion
Little boy of mine
Will guard the borderline

Folksong from Afghanistan

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